JUDGMENT 1. The facts of this case are not disputed. The Plaintiffs were decree-holders. They were executing a decree against the Defendants. The Defendants as judgment-debtors asked for time and obtained it by agreeing to pay interest at 9 p. c. instead of at 6 p. c. on the decree which had been given against them. Their agreement was contained in a petition to the Court of execution, dated 12th March 1892. No sanction was accorded by the Court to the agreement to pay an increased rate of interest. The Plaintiffs now sue for the sum due for increased interest under the agreement. The first Court gave them a decree, The District Judge reversed the first Court's decision on the ground that the Plain tills' suit is barred by sec. 244. 2. The Plaintiffs appeal. On their behalf it is argued that the suit is not barred by sec. 244 because the Plaintiffs are not suing for interest due under their original decree, nor does the question at issue in the present suit; relate to the execution of that decree. They are suing, it is said on a separate agreement contained in the Defendants' petition of the 12th March 1892, which is some-thing distinct from their original decree. It is further contended that this agreement is not void under the provisions of sec. 257A, and reliance is placed on a judgment of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Hurkissen Dass v. Nibaran Chander Banerjee 6 C. W. N. 27 (1901). But in that case the original judgment debt had been extinguished and a promissory note substituted for it, and it was held that this note could be sued on. This is not the case in the present suit. The agreement contained in the Defendants' petition of the 12th March 1902 did not put an end to the Plaintiffs' claim on their previous decree and substitute something in its place. According to the rule laid down in Venkata Subramania v. Koran Kannan I. L. R. 26 Mad. 19 (1902) and in Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh. I. L. it is only when the judgment debt is extinguished and a new contract made, that an agreement giving time for the satisfaction of the judgment debt, not sanctioned by the Court, can be enforced. 19 (1902) and in Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh. I. L. it is only when the judgment debt is extinguished and a new contract made, that an agreement giving time for the satisfaction of the judgment debt, not sanctioned by the Court, can be enforced. If we follow this rule, and we consider that we should do so, the agreement entered into by the parties giving time to the Defendants in consideration of their paying a higher rate of interest is void under the provisions of sec. 257A, as not having received the sanction of the Court and cannot be enforced by suit. For these reasons we dismiss this appeal with costs.