JUDGMENT : KNOX, J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellants in which the relief claimed was that a decree be granted to them declaring that out of a certain 5 anna 4 pie share” in village Lachmanpur, recorded in the name of the defendant in the papers of the Revenue department, the plaintiffs'’ are in possession of an eight pie share, and that the defendant has nothing to do with that share and is not entitled to have a partition made in respect thereof. The respondent, Jogi Chaudhri, had, prior to the institution of this suit, applied to the Collector for the partition into a separate mahal of the 5 anna 4 pie share which in the revenue papers was recorded in his (Jogi Chaudhri's) name. Upon his doing so, the present appellants filed an objection laying claim to an 8 pie share out of the 5 anna 4 pie share which Jogi Chaudhri had sought to convert into a separates mahal. The Assistant Collector, who was entrusted with the) partition proceedings, upon receiving this objection passed upon it an order of a singular nature. He in that order set out; that in his opinion this objection does not relate to a question, of proprietary title, but is really meant to defeat partition, and after making this declaration about the nature of the objection he directed that the objection and other partition papers be forwarded to the Collector. This is all that we can make out of the order recorded by the Assistant Collector on the 20th of November, 1903. This order must be taken, and is taken by us, as it was taken by the Courts below to be a rejec-tion of the objection raised by the appellants. Even so, it was a decree passed upon the objection before the Assistant Collector and, as such, open to appeal. The appellants here could have, and should, if they wished to set aside, have appealed to the District Judge. Instead of doing so they have instituted the present suit after a lapse of six months. They are now in this difficulty that section 233, (cl. k) of Act No. III of 1901 stands in the way of their present suit. The appellants here could have, and should, if they wished to set aside, have appealed to the District Judge. Instead of doing so they have instituted the present suit after a lapse of six months. They are now in this difficulty that section 233, (cl. k) of Act No. III of 1901 stands in the way of their present suit. Clause (k) of that section provides that no person shall institute any suit or other proceeding in the Civil Court with respect to the partition of mahals except as provided in sections 111 and 112. As the present suit was instituted, it was, as the relief clearly shows, a suit with respect to the partition of a mahal. We dismiss this appeal with costs.