JUDGMENT : AIKMAN, J.:— This is an appeal by a plaintiff who brought a suit for pre-emption. According to the plaint the immediate demand required by the Muhammadan Law was made by the plaintiff's general attorney who, it appears from the record, is the plaintiff's brother looking after his property during the plaintiff's absence at Lucknow. In their written statements, the defendant did not deny that the person who is said to have made the immediate demand was the plaintiff's general attorney but they alleged that the general attorney had no power or authority according to law to perform the required preliminaries. The Court of first instance overruled this plea and decreed the claim. The defendants appealed. In their grounds of appeal they take a plea that it was not proved by the evidence on the record that the plaintiff's agent was competent to perform on behalf of the plaintiff the legal requirements of pre-emption. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that although the second demand or invocation in the presence of witnesses may under certain circumstances be made through an agent, the first demand or talab-i-mawasibat must be performed by the claimant personally. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge went on to say that no mukhtarnama or copy thereof in favour of the person who made immediate demand had been filed. It was urged before the Additional Subordinate Judge that the mukhtarnama was filed in another case pending before him in appeal, but he declined to refer to that record. Looking to the pleadings, I think the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, if he had any doubt on the point, should either have examined that record or at least should have given the plaintiff an opportunity of putting in the mukhtarnama or a copy thereof. The appeal was decreed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed by the Court below. The plaintiff comes here in second appeal. The view taken by the Court below to the effect that an agent cannot perform the immediate demand but that it must be performed by the pre-empt or personally is opposed to the rulings of this Court. The case of Abadi Begam v. Inam Begam, [1877] I.L.R., 1 All., 521. was a suit for pre-emption under the Muhammadan Law. In that case the immediate demand was made by the plaintiff's husband. The case of Abadi Begam v. Inam Begam, [1877] I.L.R., 1 All., 521. was a suit for pre-emption under the Muhammadan Law. In that case the immediate demand was made by the plaintiff's husband. The learned Judges (SPANKIE and OLDFIELD, JJ.) say: “Nothing was shown to us to support the plea that a claim so made was invalid. On the contrary it appears to us that an agent or manager as in this case the husband for his wife may legally assert a pre-emptive claim.” In the case of Hari Har Dutt v. Sheo Prasad, [1884] I.L.R. 7 All., 41. the learned Judges (STRAIGHT, Officiating C.J., and MAHMOOD, J.,) observe: “It is a general rule of pre-emption “that any action on the part of a duly authorized agent or manager of the pre-emptor has the same effect on pre-emption as if each act had been made by the pre-emptor himself.” The case given on page 181 of Mac Naughten's Principles and Precedents of Muhammadan Law, 4th edition, is also directly opposed to the view taken by the lower appellate Court. The learned vakil for the respondents relies on a case, Musammat Ojheeoonissa Begam v. Shaikh Rustam Ali, [1864] W.R. 219.. The Judges there no doubt make the following observations: “Acts done by an agent are recognized in law as the acts of the principal, and we see no reason why the same maxim should not” apply in a case of pre-emption to those ceremonies which in their nature are capable of being performed by an agent. What he (the pre-emptor) could not do by agent, viz., declare his determination to become the purchaser as soon as the news of the sale reached him, he did in person.” It is clear therefore that the remark relied on was obiter. 2. I do not deny that a good deal might be said in favour of the view expressed by the lower appellate Court, but the authorities of this Court cited above are binding on me. Following those authorities, I am bound to hold that the decision of the lower Court on the question cannot be sustained. 2. I do not deny that a good deal might be said in favour of the view expressed by the lower appellate Court, but the authorities of this Court cited above are binding on me. Following those authorities, I am bound to hold that the decision of the lower Court on the question cannot be sustained. I allow the appeal, and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate Court, I remand the case to that Court under the provisions of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with directions to readmit this appeal under its original number in the register and dispose of the remaining pleas raised in the appeal to it. The appellant will have his costs of this appeal, including fees on the higher 6cale in any event. Other costs will abide the result.