JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— This is a reference by the local Government under rule 17 of the Kamaun rules. The question arises under the following circumstances:— One Muhammad Amin made a Will on the 4th of March, 1878 whereby, after making certain provision for his widow and daughters he divided his property between his three sons, giving to each of them certain villages. Prima facie the gift of the villages to each son was an absolute gift. But the Will goes on to provide that no son shall have a right to alienate the property given to him, and that on his death without issue the widow of the son so dying shall take no interest, but that the property of such son shall go to the surviving brothers or their heirs. The testator died, leaving him surviving three sons, namely, Abdul Karim by one wife, Abdul Qayum and Abdul Kadir by another wife. The Will was assented to by the heirs of the testator, and this has been found as a fact by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. The three sons entered into possession of the specific property devised to each of the sons. Abdul Kadir having died without issue, his own brother, Abdul Qayum, entered into possession of the whole of the property devised to Abdul Kadir, and the present suit is brought by the half brother, namely, Abdul Karim, seeking to recover a half share of the property of which the deceased Abdul Kadir was in possession. It is admitted that under the rules of inheritance according to Muhammadan law, if the property had been the absolute property of Abdul Kadir, the defendant would be entitled to succeed him as his heir. The plaintiff, however, contends that the terms of the Will ought to prevail, and that, according to these terms in the events which have happened, he is entitled to half of the property. It is quite clear that according to Muhammadan law the Will in question devising property as it did to the heirs of the testators, was invalid. It became, however, valid as a Will, the moment it was assented to by the heirs after the death of the testator. This proposition is admittedly correct according to Muhammadan law. Mr. It is quite clear that according to Muhammadan law the Will in question devising property as it did to the heirs of the testators, was invalid. It became, however, valid as a Will, the moment it was assented to by the heirs after the death of the testator. This proposition is admittedly correct according to Muhammadan law. Mr. O'Conor, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, argues that the assent to the Will made the Will valid not merely as a Will but also validated every term and condition contained in it, no matter how repugnant to Muhammadan law they might be. On the other hand it is argued that while the consent of the heirs rendered the Will vaild, the document must be construed according to the ordinary rules by which a deed or Will giving property should be construed according to Muhammadan law. In our opinion the latter contention must prevail. In the course of the argument we asked the counsel for the plaintiff the following question:— If a Muhammadan in the exercise of his limited testamentary powers disposed of one-third of his property to a stranger in terms similar to the terms in which the testator in this case gave the property to his sons, namely, after making an absolute gift sought to impose a condition that the donee should have no power to alienate, and that on his dying without issue the property should not devolve according to the ordinary rules of Muhammadan law, would such conditions and limitations be valid? The answer given was that in such case the gift would be good as an absolute gift, and the condition and limitations would be valid. We think that this was the only answer which could be given, and that we must apply the same rule to the present case. The document became valid by the consent of the heirs, but we must construe the Will according to the way in which a valid Will would be construed if the gift were made to strangers. Life estates and contingent interests are not recognised by the Muhammadan law, and we are not entitled to give the same effect to this Will which might be given to an English Will. Life estates and contingent interests are not recognised by the Muhammadan law, and we are not entitled to give the same effect to this Will which might be given to an English Will. In our view the gift in the Will to Abdul Kadir was an absolute gift, and the provision restraining alienation and the condition as to the devolution of the property after his death without issue are void, and accordingly the claim of the plaintiff cannot be maintained. 2. We are therefore of opinion that the decree of the Commissioner is correct, though not for the reasons which he has given. Under all the circumstances of the case we think that each party should abide his own costs in all Courts. This is our answer to the reference.