Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (June 3, 1902), modifying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur (January 81, 1901). The questions involved in the appeal under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment are (1.) whether the terms of the bond in suit were hard and unconscionable; (2.) whether in the circumstances it was obtained by the plaintiff from the respondent under undue influence within the meaning of s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as amended by s. 2 of Act VI. of 1899, which came into operation on May 1, 1899; and (3.) whether, if it was, the respondent had ratified and confirmed it prior to suit. Sect. 2 of Act VI. of 1899 is as follows " Sect. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is hereby repealed, and the following is substituted therefor, namely—16. (1.) A contract is said to be induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. "(2.) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another— "(a) when he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other, or "(b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. "(3.) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a contract with him and the transaction appears on the face of it, or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. Nothing in this sub-section shall affect the provisions of s. Ill of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. “Illustration. "(c) A. being in debt to B., the money-lender of his village, contracts a fresh loan on terms which appear to be unconscionable. Nothing in this sub-section shall affect the provisions of s. Ill of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. “Illustration. "(c) A. being in debt to B., the money-lender of his village, contracts a fresh loan on terms which appear to be unconscionable. It lies on B. to prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence." This suit was brought by Auseri Lal, predecessor of the appellants, against the respondent, Taluqdar of Mallanpur, whose estate had been, by order of the local Government dated August 6, 1886, made under Act XVII. of 1876, brought under the management of the Court of Wards. The bond sued upon was dated February 4, 1889. The pleas were that the bond was inoperative in law, having been executed at a time when the estate was under the management of the Court of Wards, and that, if enforceable, it was voidable on the ground of undue influence, or was executed under circumstances in which a Court of Equity would not enforce it according to its terms. The Subordinate Judge held that the case was not one of fraud or undue influence, but of inequitable dealing. He decided to interfere in the enforcement of the hard terms of the contract, and accordingly allowed simple interest at 18 per cent., but not compound interest. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner affirmed the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the contract was not void in law because it was executed while the respondents property was under the management of the Court of Wards, and also that the bargain between the parties was a hard, and, they added, unconscionable one. The judges of the Court differed from him on the question of the applicability of s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as amended to the case. They held that in the circumstances it was on the plaintiff to shew that the bond was not executed under undue influence, that he had not done so, that the transaction was a voidable one, that the respondent had not ratified it, and that it should be set aside. They held that in the circumstances it was on the plaintiff to shew that the bond was not executed under undue influence, that he had not done so, that the transaction was a voidable one, that the respondent had not ratified it, and that it should be set aside. They accordingly set aside the bond of January 13, 1892, and, granting equitable relief to the respondent, made a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs.4500, with interest from February 4, 1889, and for the sum of Rs.1250, with interest from January 18, 1892, at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum to the date of payment, giving him proportionate costs and directing each party to pay his own costs as to the rest of the claim. W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that the terms of the bond were not hard and unconscionable; nor was there any undue influence within the meaning of the above sections. Even if the contract were voidable, the evidence shewed that the respondent had ratified it at a time when no question of undue influence had or could have arisen. He contended that the cases of Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (( 1873) L. R 8 Ch. 484.), Beynon v. Cook (( 1875) L. R. 10 Ch. 389.), Nevill v. Snelling (( 1880) 15 Ch. D. 679.), Fry v. Lane (( 1888) 40 Ch. D. 312.), and Kamini Soondari Chowdhrani v. Kali Prosunno Ghose (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 215.), on which the Courts below relied, were not applicable to this case. He referred to Webster v. Cook (( 1867) L. R. 2 Ch. 542, 548.) ; Bennet v. Bennet(( 1876) 43 L. T. 246, n); Wilton & Co. v. Osborn. ([ 1901] 2 K B. 110.) De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the bond was invalid in law, having been executed when the respondent was disqualified from entering into a contract of the kind, resulting necessarily in a charge on his estate, which was under the management of the Court of Wards, and of which he was the disqualified proprietor. He referred to the reasons given in the preambles to Regulations X. of 1793 and ML of 1803; also to Act XIX. of 1873, c. vi. (Court of Wards) and s. 193; to Act XVII. of 1876, ss. He referred to the reasons given in the preambles to Regulations X. of 1793 and ML of 1803; also to Act XIX. of 1873, c. vi. (Court of Wards) and s. 193; to Act XVII. of 1876, ss. 162, 173, and 174; Mohummud Zahoor Ali Khan v. Mussumat Thakooranee Rutta Koer (( 1867) 11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 468.); Rai Balkrishna v. Mussumat Masuma Bibi (( 1882) L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 182.); Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin. (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 89, 96.) He contended on the evidence that the consent of the respondent had not been obtained by undue influence, but under circumstances in which all the terms of the transaction should be strictly enforced. Upon the question of their being unconscionable he referred to Rajah Mokham Singh v. Rajah Rup Singh (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 127.); Lalli v. Ram Prasad (( 1886) Ind. L. R. 9 Allah. 74.); Madho Singh v. Kashi Ram(( 1887) Ind. L. R. 9 Allah. 228.); Kamini Soondari Chowdhrani v. Kali Prosunno Ghose. (5) Counsel for the appellant was not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Davey. The original plaintiff Auseri Lal was the head of a joint Hindu family. He is now deceased, and the present appellants, as the surviving members of the family, have been substituted for him on the record. Auseri Lal, on behalf of the family, formerly carried on the business of a banker and money lender in the district of Sitapur, in Oudh ; and in the course of his business he had, previously to the transactions which are the subject of this appeal, lent money to the respondent, who was and is the Taluqdar of Mallanpur, in the same district. In the year 1886 the respondent, being then largely involved in debt, was, on his own application, declared by the Chief Commissioner of Oudh a disqualified proprietor under the pro visions of the Oudh Land Revenue Act, 1876, and his property was placed under the charge of the Court of Wards on August 12 in that year. The respondents property remained under such charge until some time in the month of July, 1898, when it was released to him, and he resumed possession. While the estate was under its charge the Court of Wards made an allowance of Rs. The respondents property remained under such charge until some time in the month of July, 1898, when it was released to him, and he resumed possession. While the estate was under its charge the Court of Wards made an allowance of Rs. 1250 per mensem to the respondent for the maintenance of himself and his family. On February 4, 1889, the respondent, without the sanction of the Court of Wards, borrowed from Auseri Lal the sum of Rs.4500, and executed in his favour a bond which was duly registered for that amount stipulating that he would repay the amount in two years, with interest at the rate of Rs.2 per mensem, payable half-yearly out of his allowance of Rs.1250 per mensem, and stipulating further that in case default was made in the payment of interest he would pay compound interest at the same rate until the amount secured by the bond was fully paid off and satisfied. The respondent did not pay any sum either for principal or interest due on this bond, and after it had become due negotiations were apparently opened by his officers on his behalf with the plaintiff for a further advance at a lower rate of interest. In the result an account was settled between the respondent and Auseri Lal of the amount due on the bond for Rs.4500, and it was found that that sum, with interest and compound interest at the rate of 2 per cent, per mensem up to January 13, 1892, came up to Rs.8750. On the last-mentioned date Auseri Lal advanced to the respondent the further sum of Rs.1250, and the latter without the sanction of the Court of Wards executed in favour of the former a bond, also registered, for the total sum of Rs. 10,000, stipulating that he would repay the amount in seven years, with interest at the rate of Rs.1. 8 per cent, per mensem payable half-yearly, and stipulating further that in default of payment of interest on due dates he would pay compound interest at the same rate, and that he would pay interest and compound interest on the amount secured by the bond until it was fully paid off and satisfied. The present suit was brought on the bond of January 13, 1892. The present suit was brought on the bond of January 13, 1892. The defence is, first, that the respondent, being at the date of the bond a disqualified proprietor, had no power under the Act to borrow money without the sanction of the Court of Wards ; and, secondly, that the bargain was an unconscionable one, and procured by the exercise of undue influence within the meaning of s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as amended by s. 2 of Act VI. of 1899. The first point depends on the construction and effect of the group of sections (161 to 177) in the Oudh Land Revenue Act, 1876, intituled "Chapter VIII. Court of Wards." Sect. 162 defines the persons who shall be held to be disqualified to manage their own estates, including (g) persons declared by the Chief Commissioner on their own application to be disqualified. By s. 166 the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards extends to the care and education, and to the management of the property, of the persons subject thereto. By s. 167 the Court of Wards may appoint managers of the property of disqualified proprietors, and if such proprietors be minors, idiots, or lunatics, may appoint guardians for the care of their persons. By s. 170 the manager appointed by the Court of Wards may collect the rents of the land entrusted to him as well as all other money due to the disqualified proprietor, and may, subject to the control of the Court, grant or renew leases of a limited duration. The more important sections are 173 and 174. "173. Persons whose property is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards shall not be competent to create without the sanction of the Court any charge upon or interest in such property or any part thereof. “174. No such property shall be liable to be taken in execution of a decree made in respect of any contract entered into by any such person while his property is under such superintendence." From a perusal of the group of sections above referred to their Lordships are of opinion that it was not intended to interfere with the personal status or rights of an adult disqualified proprietor who is neither idiot nor lunatic, except as regards the management of his property or anything expressly prohibited. There is no prohibition of a disqualified proprietor contracting debts or borrowing money, and it is contemplated in s. 174 that such a person may enter into contracts which, but for the pro visions of that section, might result in his property being taken in execution. But the disqualified proprietor may not without the sanction of the Court create any charge upon his property. It was argued, however, that to allow a disqualified proprietor to contract debt would enable him by anticipation to waste the estate when restored to his care, and so defeat the objects of the Act, and would therefore be inconsistent with the other provisions and purposes of the Act. This argument would have been a cogent one for the consideration of the Legislature in framing the Act. But their Lordships think that there is no necessary implication of a prohibition to contract personal obligations, and they are not entitled to read into the Act a curtailment of the proprietors personal rights which they do not find there. Their Lordships were referred to the case of Mohummud Zahoor Ali Khan v. Mussumat Thakooranee Rutta Koer (11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 468.), in which it was said that Sir James Col vile, delivering the judgment of this Board, had assumed that a disqualified landowner whose estate had been placed under a manager by the Court of Wards under Bengal Regulation LIL of 1803 was incapacitated from con tracting debts, as had in fact been decided by the Sudder Dewanny Court at Agra. It; was not, however, necessary to consider the point, as their Lordships held that the necessary formalities had not been complied with for making the person in question a disqualified proprietor, and gave judgment for the amount due on the bond. There was therefore no decision on the point. In the case of Rai Balkrishna v. Mussumat Masuma Bibi (L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 182.) the language of the marginal note is misleading, for the only question was whether the proprietor was competent to convey the property by mortgage or sale while the estate was under the management of the Court of Wards, and nothing was decided or said on the question now under consideration. Their Lordships agree with the decision come to by both Courts below that the respondent was not incompetent to execute the bond in suit. Their Lordships agree with the decision come to by both Courts below that the respondent was not incompetent to execute the bond in suit. On the other point the learned counsel for the respondent admitted that the case rested entirely on the question whether the interest charged in the two bonds was reasonable. The Subordinate Judge held that the rate of interest was high in this sense, that compound interest was charged. Simple interest at Rs.1. 8 per cent, per mensem he thought would not have been high. He held that the amended s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act did not apply to the case, but on a mistaken view of certain English authorities he was of opinion that wherever a transaction or contract appears to a Court of Equity to be a "hard bargain" it cannot be enforced in its " entirety ; " and, holding that this was a " hard bargain," he said " I do not mean that the present is a case of actual fraud or undue influence, but it is certainly a case of inequitable dealing." In the result he decreed the claim for Rs. 10,000 principal and simple interest at 18 per cent, per annum. In the Court of the Judicial Commissioner it was held that there was a presumption that there had been on the part of the then plaintiff an unconscientious use of power arising from the circumstances and conditions of the contracting parties. In other words, the respondents consent to the transactions was caused by undue influence within the meaning of the amended s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, and the transaction was therefore voidable. Accordingly the Court gave the plaintiff a decree for Rs.4500 (the principal money under the first bond), with interest at 6 per cent, a year from February 4, 1889, and Rs.l250 (the additional advance on the second bond), with interest at the same rate from January 13, 1892. Auseri Lal himself was advanced in years at the respective dates of the two bonds in suit, and states that his nephew Madho Ram, one of the present appellants, looked after his affairs, Madho Rams evidence was extremely unsatisfactory. He professed not to remember what took place when the bonds were executed, and not to know what was the Court of Wards or what the word "Court" meant. He professed not to remember what took place when the bonds were executed, and not to know what was the Court of Wards or what the word "Court" meant. This evidence does not assist the appellants case in any way. The only other evidence contained in the record is that of the respondent himself. He states that his allowance from the Court of Wards was not sufficient to enable him to pay the interest on the bonds, and the only property from which he could satisfy his debt was the jewellery belonging to the females of his family, the value of which, however, he did not know. He further stated that this jewellery had been pledged to Auseri Lal some seven or eight years ago, though whether before or after the deed of 1892 he could not say, and that it had not been redeemed. He stated that no fraud or undue influence was practised upon him on taking the deed of 1889 or that of 1892. The fair result of this evidence is that the respondent, through his improvidence, was in urgent need of money, and owing to his estate being under the care of the Court of Wards he was in a helpless position. There was no fraud in the matter, and no pressure was put upon the respondent by Auseri Lal or his agents to induce him to accept the conditions offered to him; and indeed the fact of the interest being reduced on the second transaction from 24 per cent, to 18 per cent, points to some negotiations having taken place between them. But it must be taken that the respondent was compelled by his circumstances to accept the terms which were offered to him both in 1889 and 1892. Their Lordships are of opinion that although the respondent was left free to contract debt, yet he was under a peculiar disability and placed in a position of helplessness by the fact of his estate being under the control of the Court of Wards, and they must assume that Auseri Lal, who had known the respondent for some fifty years, was aware of it. They are therefore of opinion that the position of the parties was such that Auseri Lal was "in a position to dominate the will" of the respondent within the meaning of the amended s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act. They are therefore of opinion that the position of the parties was such that Auseri Lal was "in a position to dominate the will" of the respondent within the meaning of the amended s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act. It remains to be seen whether Auseri Lal used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the respondent. The Subordinate Judge was wrong in deciding the case in accordance with what he supposed to be English equitable doctrine. He ought to have considered the terms of the amended s. 16 only. He also mistook the English law. Apart from a recent statute an English Court of Equity could not give relief from a transaction or contract merely on the ground that it was a hard bargain, except perhaps where the extortion is so great as to be of itself evidence of fraud, which is not this case. In other cases there must be some other equity arising from the position of the parties or the particular circumstances of the case. But, although he was wrong in the reasons for his judgment, the Subordinate Judge may be right in his findings of fact. He finds that simple interest at Rs.1. 8 per cent, per mensem (18 per cent, per annum) would not have been high, and their Lordships do not find that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner expressed any dissent from this finding. On the other hand, their Lordships think that the Subordinate Judge must be taken to have found that the charging of compound interest in the circumstances was unconscionable, and they understand the Court of the Judicial Commissioner also to have so found. Their Lordships are not disposed to differ from a concurrent finding of the Courts below, even if it be not strictly a finding of fact. The result is that their Lordships must hold that the lender used his position to demand and obtain from the respondent more onerous terms than were reasonable, and the bond sued on must be set aside. Their Lordships, however, think that in the particular circumstances of the present case justice will be met by allowing the appellants simple interest at 18 per cent, per annum on the sums advanced by Auseri Lal throughout. Their Lordships agree with the Court of the Judicial Commissioner that the letters written by the respondent or his agent, which were referred to by Mr. Their Lordships agree with the Court of the Judicial Commissioner that the letters written by the respondent or his agent, which were referred to by Mr. Bonnerjee, do not amount to a ratification of the transaction. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, dated June 3, 1902 (except so far as it directs that the bond sued on be set aside, and that the costs of the original suit be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff), be varied, and as varied stand as follows (that is to say), that it be ordered that the respondent pay to the appellants the sum of Rs.4500, with simple interest at the rate of 18 per cent, a year from February 4, 1889, to the date of payment, and the sum of Rs.1250, with simple interest at the same rate from January 13, 1892, to the date of payment, with proportionate costs on the amount decreed to be settled by the Judicial Commissioner in case of difference, and that as to the rest each party bear his own costs. There will be no costs of this appeal.