JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff, Raghu Nath, to pre-empt the sale of a village called Kusauli. The sale in question was made by Badle, the father of the plaintiff, to the defendant, Musammat Rabat Began. Badle was the owner of the entire mahal and also the lambardar. Another suit was instituted by one Mahadeo, who is a co-sharer in another mahal, for pre-emption of the same sale, and in that suit he impleaded Raghu Nath. His suit was dismissed. The suit of Raghu Nath was decreed in the Court of first instance but on appeal was dismissed. Hence this appeal. 2. The terms of the wajib-ul-arz under which the plaintiff, appellant claims the right to pre-empt is in the following terms:— “When a share of any lambardar is to be sold or mortgaged, then the members of his family can first claim pre-emption, and in case of their refusal other co-shares may do so.” In this case the sale was carried out by the lambardar and the plaintiff-appellant is his son, and therefore clearly comes within the language of the wajib-ul-arz as a member of his family. The provision of the wajib-ul-arz is most remarkable and unusual. Why it should empower parties to pre-empt the share of a lambardar only is not apparent, but such is the language of the document and we are bound to interpret it. The learned District Judge came to a somewhat startling conclusion as regards the rights of Raghu Nath. He found that in as much as the plaintiff is the son of the vendor and a member with his father of a joint Hindu family, he could not claim pre-emptive rights in a property sold by his father unless he could establish that the sale was carried out for immoral or illegal purposes. This is a remarkable view of the law. By the wajib-ul-urz, members of the family of the lambardar are expressly given the right to pre-empt, and in view of this it cannot be said that because a party desiring to pre-empt is a member of the family he cannot, according to the Hindu law, claim pre-emption. As to the question of immorality it is in no way relevant. By the wajib-ul-urz, members of the family of the lambardar are expressly given the right to pre-empt, and in view of this it cannot be said that because a party desiring to pre-empt is a member of the family he cannot, according to the Hindu law, claim pre-emption. As to the question of immorality it is in no way relevant. The question as to the right of members of a joint Hindu family other than the member, who is the recorded co-sharer, to claim pre-emption is discussed in the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gandharp Singh v. Sahib Singh, [1884] I.L.R., 7 All., 184., and it was there held that the members of a joint undivided Hindu family other than the member who was recorded in the Collector's books as a sharer in the Mahal, are co-sharers for the purposes of pre-emption in the sense of the wajib-ul-arz which was the subject of consideration in that case. This authority was cited by the learned District Judge. His comment upon it is that that ruling does not in my opinion refer to a case in which a co-sharer coming in for pre-emption has no share in existence at the time he chooses to pre-empt.” We are unable to grasp the meaning of this comment. The learned District Judge also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellant had been guilty of collusion along with Musammat Rabat Begam and had therefore debarred himself of his right to pre-empt. We are at a loss to understand how the alleged collusion between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant, Musammat Rahat Begam, can prejudice the rights of the plaintiff in respect of pre-emption. In this case a right to pre-empt is expressly and clearly given to a member of the family of the lamhardar. The appellant is such member. In our opinion, therefore, this appeal must be allowed. In this case a right to pre-empt is expressly and clearly given to a member of the family of the lamhardar. The appellant is such member. In our opinion, therefore, this appeal must be allowed. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the learned District Judge and restore the decree of the Court of first instance with this modification that we fix the 1st of November, 1906, as the date for payment of the purchase money instead of the 6th of December, 1903, fixed by the first Court's decree, and direct that on payment of the purchase money on or before that date the plaintiff-appellant shall be entitled to possession of the property and also his costs of this appeal and his costs in the Court below. On failure to pay that amount within the time aforesaid, his suit will stand dismissed with costs in all Courts.