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1906 DIGILAW 110 (CAL)

Mritwjoy Roy Chowdhry v. Kenatullah Narya

1906-05-21

body1906
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit in enjectment. The land, which is the subject-matter of this suit, was granted to one Nazar Kotwal many years ago as a service tenure, the condition being that he was to hold it in lieu of services to be performed by him as a chowkidar. Nazar Kotwal died in the year 1308, B. S. Thereupon, the present suit was brought to eject certain persons, the Defendants in the suit, who were holding the land as tenants under the said Nazar Kotwal. The Court of Appeal below has dismissed the suit upon the ground that the Defendants, by holding the land for more than 12 yours as tenants under Nazar Kotwal, acquired a right of occupancy, and that, at any rate, they could not be ejected without a notice to quit. There can be no doubt that the interest which Nazar Kotwal had under the grant made by the Plaintiff, landlord, came to an end upon his death, and the landlord was entitled, upon the tenure having thus come to an end, to enter into possession. We fail to see how the Defendants could, simply by holding the land under Nazar Kotwal, upon payment of rent to him, acquire a right of occupancy as against the landlord, unless it be that the occupation of these men as raiyats commenced at a time anterior to the grant made to Nazar Kotwal. There is no finding to that effect by the lower Appellate Court, and the only passage in the judgment of the Court of first instance, as bearing upon this matter to which our attention has been called by the learned vakil for the Respondents, is wholly insufficient to make out the position to which we have just referred. But, in order to make it quite sure, we called upon the learned vakil for the Respondents to tell us if there is any precise evidence on the record of this case showing that, as a matter of fact, the Defendants came in upon the land as raiyats before the grant was made to Nazar Kotwal; for, if they had then came in, they would be, as it were, acquiring, during the period that Nazar Kotwal was in occupation in lieu of services, a right of occupancy in the laud in question. But the learned vakil has failed to lay before us any such evidence. It appears to us that the fallacy in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge lies in the assumption that he supposed that Nazar Kotwal's tenancy was a middleman's tenancy, and it was upon that supposition that he thought that the Defendants could acquire a right of occupancy in the land in question. We need hardly say that the mere fact that these Defendants held under Nazar Kotwal upon payment of rent for more than 12 years would not necessarily show that at the time when the grant was made by the landlord to Nazar Kotwal, it was the intention of the parties that his (Nazar Kotwal's) tenancy should be that of a middleman. The whole question in a case like this would be-what was the character of the tenancy in its inception? If, in its inception, it was a middleman's interest, and if Nazar let out the lauds to cultivating raiyats, the latter might acquire rights of occupancy therein; but if, at the time of the grant, it was intended that the grantee was to hold it himself and enjoy the proceeds thereof in lieu of the services to be rendered by him, it could not be said, simply from the fact that he sublet the land to somebody else, that that person would acquire a right of occupancy against the landlord. Then, as regards the question whether the Defendants were entitled to notice to quit, if the tenancy of Nazar Kotwal came to an end upon his death, and the landlord was entitled to re-enter into possession, he would be perfectly justified in treating the Defendants, who held under Nazar Kotwal, as trespassers. And we find that this view is in accord with the judgment of this Court in the case of Ansar Ali Jemadar v. C. E. Grey 2 C. L. J. 403 (1905) (the particular passage which we have in view being found in page 406). For these reasons, we are of opinion that the judgments of both the Courts below should be set aside, and a decree entered for the Plaintiff for khas possession. ID the circumstances of the case, each party will bear his own costs in all Courts.