JUDGMENT : AIKMAN, J.:— The plaintiff, who is appellant here, is the manager of a Muhammadan monastery (khankah). The respondents, Abdul Ghafur and Musammat Chhota, have a house inside this enclosure. The plaintiff's case was that the house was part of the khankah property and occupied by defendants by permission of a former manager of the khankah. The plaint states that the defendants had been asked for rent and had refused to pay and that they had been served with notice to quit and had refused to quit the house. Accordingly, the plaintiff brought this suit to eject the defendants. The defendants pleaded that the house had been built by them and that they had for about ninety years occupied the land by building a house thereon. The Court of first instance Sound that they were licensees and decreed their ejectment. On appeal the learned Officiating District Judge dismissed the suit holding that, although the defendants were licensees, the license could not be revoked having regard to the provisions of section 60, clause (b), of the Indian Easements; Act, 1882, i.e., be held that the licensees, acting upon the license, had executed a piece of work of a permanent character in the construction of which they must have incurred expense. The plaintiff comes here in second appeal, and it is contended on his behalf that the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of clause (b) of section 60, in as much as the house is described by the Judge as a kutcha thatched house. I gave considerable time to see whether counsel could discover any authorities as to what is to be considered as a work of a permanent character, but they have not been able to find any. In the leading case, Winter v. Brockwell, [1867] 8 East, 308., the work which the Court held to be of such a nature as to render the license incapable of revocation was the construction by the defendant of a skylight. In that case Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C.J., said that he thought it very unreasonable that after a party had been led to incur expense in consequence of having obtained a license from another to do an act, and the license had been acted upon, the other should be permitted to recall his license and treat him just as a trespasser for having done that very act. The Chief Justice also refers to a previous decision, in which it had been held that a license executed is not countermandable, but only when it is executory. This latter view appears to go much further than the Indian statute. 2. In my opinion the expression referred to is used to denote some work which is not merely of a temporary nature. I agree with the learned Judge of the Court below that the mere fact that the thatch of the house had to be renewed from time to time would not make the construction of a temporary character. It appears to me that it was a question for the Judge of the lower appellate Court to decide on the materials before him, whether the house answered the description in the clause relied on. That Court has found that it does and in my opinion there were materials before it for coming to that conclusion. 3. I decline to interfere and I dismiss the appeal with costs.