JUDGMENT Rampini, J. - This is an appeal against an order of the District Judge of Backer-gunge, affirming an order of the Munsif of Barisal in an execution case. The facts are that a decree-holder put up a certain property to sale in execution of his decree. He bid Rs. 600 for it and should have paid the earnest money at once. He probably repented of his bargain, thinking he had bid too much. Anyhow he defaulted in paying the earnest money. The Munsif should have resold the property at once and held the decree-holder liable for any deficiency in the price at which the property sold. But he did not do so. The decree-holder then applied to withdraw the execution. The Munsif allowed his application, but passed the following order:-"This is simply a dodge to avoid payment of the earnest money. The property now sold must be first put up to sale when the next application for execution is made and the decree-holder must bid Rs. 600 for it. Subject to these conditions, I allow the decree-holder's petition and dismiss this case for want of prosecution. The costs of this execution shall be borne by the decree-holder." Subsequently after a lapse of about 6 months the decree-holder applied to be allowed to execute his decree against the other properties of the judgment-debtor. The same Munsif who had passed the previous order of the 1st December 1904 allowed execution to proceed. His order is as follows:-"However much I may condemn the decree-holder's insincerity I think there is nothing in law which would justify me in preventing the decree-holder from proceeding against the other properties of the judgment-debtors for the realisation of his dues. It is true the Court's previous order justifies the judgment-debtor's present contention, but how far that order was legal and binding upon the decree-holder is a matter of grave doubt to me. I do not think the Court has any power to direct a decree-holder to proceed in a particular way, and on his disobedience, to debar him from realising his dues by other feasible means. He may be punished for disobedience, but to tie up his hands altogether would be to override the existing law. In this view I reject the judgment-debtor's objections and allow the execution case to proceed." 2. He may be punished for disobedience, but to tie up his hands altogether would be to override the existing law. In this view I reject the judgment-debtor's objections and allow the execution case to proceed." 2. The judgment-debtor appealed to the District Judge, who dismissed his appeal holding that the Munsif's previous order was illegal and ultra vires and the decree-holder was not bound by it. 3. The judgment-debtor now appeals to this Court and on his behalf it is urged that the decree-holder was bound by the previous order of the Munsif, and that accordingly the decree-holder can only proceed against the immoveable property of the judgment-debtor previously put up to sale, and must bid Rs. 600 for it. 4. In my opinion the order of the District Judge is right. The Munsif's order of the 1st December 1904 is a very hasty order, and one which he had no authority to pass. He ought to have at once put up the property to sale again and held the decree-holder liable for any deficiency in the price realised. But he had no legal authority to fetter the decree-holder's discretion allowed him by the law to execute his decree as he pleased and the Munsif certainly exceeded his powers in ordering that when the property is put up to sale again, the decree-holder must bid Rs. 600 for it. 5. The Munsif himself on the 25th June 1905 admitted that his previous order was illegal and invalid and did not attempt to enforce it. He therefore practically withdrew it. 6. It has been said that the order of the 1st December 1904 is an order under sec. 244 and therefore a decree. This is so, in the sense that an appeal might have been preferred against it but I am unable to see that it is an order of the nature contemplated in Mungal Prosad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri L.R. 8 IndAp 123: s.c. ILR 8 Cal. 51 (1881), and in the cases in which the rule laid down in that case is followed, viz., an order finally deciding an issue fairly raised between the parties, which consequently, if not appealed against, has the effect of res judicata in all subsequent execution proceedings. The order in question is certainly not of this nature, and consequently, as held by the lower Courts, cannot bind and conclude the decree-holder. 7. The order in question is certainly not of this nature, and consequently, as held by the lower Courts, cannot bind and conclude the decree-holder. 7. I would therefore dismiss this appeal. Woodroffe, J. I agree that the Munsif should on default of the decree-holder have ordered the property to be resold and that he had no power to make the order he did upon the application to withdraw execution. It is true that in that order the Munsif states that he allowed the withdrawal of execution subject to the conditions there stated. But there is nothing to show (and it does not appear to be the fact) that the judgment-creditor agreed to be bound by these conditions if his application to withdraw was allowed. It would rather on the contrary seem that these conditions were imposed by the Munsif without reference to the judgment-creditor owing to the opinion formed by the Court that the latter's application was (what it seems in fact to have been) a device to avoid payment of earnest money and liability for any difference which might occur if a resale were held. It has been said that the matter is res judicata and that if the order was illegal it should have been set aside and as that is not the case the present application for execution should not be allowed. There is no question of res judicata here. The subject-matter of the present and former applications were not the same, and no issue now arising was adjudicated upon in the former application. What the Court did was that in disposing of an application to withdraw execution it attempted to place a prohibition on future applications to execute. An order which is not passed by consent can only be binding in respect of the immediate subject-matter of adjudication. In the present case the subject-matter was the application to withdraw execution. This might have been allowed or disallowed and if allowed might have been allowed on terms directly affecting the application itself. The Court, however, had no power after adjudicating upon the application before it to lay down a rule binding the judgment-creditor in respect of any future application he might make. Had the order been made with the consent of the judgment-creditor, a question of estoppel might have arisen. The Court, however, had no power after adjudicating upon the application before it to lay down a rule binding the judgment-creditor in respect of any future application he might make. Had the order been made with the consent of the judgment-creditor, a question of estoppel might have arisen. But as it was not, the order made had and could have no effect on subsequent proceedings and it was therefore not necessary to set it aside. By itself the order is simply inoperative and there being no bar by estoppel arising from any agreement of the decree-holder to abide by the order of the Court provided his application was granted, there is nothing to prevent the judgment-creditor from proceeding in execution against other property than that in respect of which the previous application was made. There is no doubt that the Appellant has been placed at a disadvantage by the order made, as, had the Munsif passed the right order in the first instance, the property on resale would either have fetched the sum of Rs. 600, the sum originally bid by the judgment-creditor or if a lower sum, the creditor would have been liable for the deficiency and the decretal amount which is less than this sum would have been discharged. For this result, however, the judgment-debtor is himself in part responsible. His proper remedy was to have taken steps to have the first order reversed and to have the property resold in ordinary course. He did not do so but on the contrary endeavours to support the order as a bar to the present application. In this he fails and the appeal must be dismissed.