JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— We cannot satisfactorily dispose of the appeal without referring an issue to the learned District Judge. The suit is one for the recovery of damages for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment and was brought under the following circumstances:— One Suraj Prasad was the occupancy tenant of the property which is the subject-matter of this litigation. Ho gave a lease for a term of 30 years to one Lallu. Lallu died, and his widow sub-let the property to the defendant, Ori Lal. Ori Lal then assigned his interest to the plaintiff on the 4th of September, 1896, in consideration of a payment of Rs. 320. In the assignment there is a convenant which we may describe as a covenant for quiet enjoyment which is the basis of this litigation. Ori Lal convenanted that “if for any reason any part of the cultivatory holding should go out of the possession of the transferee or if the transferee should not get possession of the holdings of Suraj Prasad……in such case he would pay to the plaintiff all the damages which may be due to him in respect of the past or future up to the end of the term of the lease.” On the 30th of September, 1899, the plaintiff was ejected by the heirs of Suraj Prasad under the Rent Act. Suraj Prasad could not grant a lease which would extend beyond his own life, and consequently the heirs were successful in their ejectment proceedings. The plaintiff then instituted the present suit, asking for damages for the breach of the convenant to which we have referred. 2. The Court of first instance gave a decree to the plaintiff awarding as damages, portion of the purchase money which was paid by him with interest. On appeal the learned District Judge dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove any damage. 3. We are at a loss to understand how he came to entertain this view seeing that in his judgment he stated that if the plaintiff had been allowed to remain in possession for the whole term, he would have reaped much advantage. 3. We are at a loss to understand how he came to entertain this view seeing that in his judgment he stated that if the plaintiff had been allowed to remain in possession for the whole term, he would have reaped much advantage. His language is “Now it is clear from the terms of the sale-deed and from the terms of the purchase that the plaintiff was well aware that he was purchasing rights, the existence of which was doubtful, and that the purchase was a speculative one. He stood to gain a great deal and at the same time by inserting the clause as to damages took care to stand to lose nothing.’ Taking the fields which the plaintiff admits were in his possession, I find that the shikmi rent was Rs. 255 per annum, while the head rent was Rs. 136-12-0. The net profits are Rs. 118-4-0 or Rs. 354-12-0 for the time the plaintiff was in possession. In other words, he has already realised more than the whole of his money, and if he had remained in possession for the full time of his lease he would have realised 5 or 6 times of the purchase money. In spite of this he comes into court and asks for the return of the whole of the purchase money without any deduction with interest, etc.” The learned District Judge appears to us to have missed the point of the case and to have gone astray in his application of the law to the facts established. There is no allegation of fraud or want of bona fides in the transaction which was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant. The simple question for the court to determine is what are the rights of the parties under the assignment of the 4th of September, 1896. The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for breach of the covenant which the defendant entered into in that assignment, and it is immaterial to consider whether or not the plaintiff made a good bargain. The learned District Judge has overlooked or at least has attached no importance to the fact that the plaintiff has been ejected, by title paramount and has lost the enjoyment of the land for a period of ten years. The learned District Judge has overlooked or at least has attached no importance to the fact that the plaintiff has been ejected, by title paramount and has lost the enjoyment of the land for a period of ten years. The covenant in the assignment is clear and express and is a covenant for the payment of such damages as the plaintiff might sustain by reason, of his loss of the enjoyment of the property for any portion of the term. It, therefore, comes to be simply a question of the assessment of damages. The measure of damages in such a case is the loss which the plaintiff will sustain by his deprivation of the enjoyment of the land for the residue of the term, that is, for about ten years, in other words, the value of the unexpired term of the lease. The fact that the plaintiff made a profitable bargain and has realised considerable profits in the past does not deprive him of his right to recover damages for the breach complained of. As we cannot in second appeal determine what are the damages which should be awarded, we must refer this issue to the learned District Judge, namely:— What is the value of the unexpired part of the term of the lease, that is, the term from the date of the dispossession of the plaintiff up to the end of the term granted by the lease made by Suraj Prasad? 4. The Court will, in assessing the damages, have regard to what we have said and may take such relevant evidence as the parties may respectively adduce in support of their contentions. On return of the finding the usual ten days will be allowed for filing objections.