JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— The facts of this case are stated in the judgment of the learned District Judge, but it will be convenient to give a few of the salient facts upon which the questions raised in this appeal largely depend. One Ram Harakh, the father of Hanuman, defendant No. 1, executed a mortgage in favour of the plaintiffs' father, who is dead, of a one-anna share in a village called Utrasot; and also a one-anna four-pie share in a village called Jhugia, to secure a sum of Rs. 1,252, payable in three years. The plaintiffs, after the death of their father, instituted a suit on foot of this mortgage to raise the amount of the mortgage-debt and obtained a decree for sale and an order absolute. The defendant No. 1, Hanuman, was not impleaded in that suit, and he thereupon instituted a suit for a declaration that his share in the property, which was ancestral, was not liable to sale in execution of the decree obtained by the plaintiffs. As the law was then understood, a Hindu son could obtain such a declaration on proof of the fact that he had not been impleaded by the mortgagees. He was not required to prove that the debt for which the property was mortgaged was contracted for immoral purposes. Notwithstanding the decree so obtained by the defendant, Hanuman, the plaintiffs proceeded to sell the entire share in the two villages and they themselves purchased both shares, obtained sale certificates and possession on the 12th of December, 1902. Jugal Kishore, defendant No. 4, held a simple money decree against Hanuman, defendant No. 1, and his father, and in execution of that decree caused a six-pie share of the village Utrasot and also the equity of redemption in a plot of ground also in this village to be sold and himself purchased. When mutation of names was applied for, a contest arose between the plaintiffs-respondents and Jugal Kishore and ultimately mutation was effected in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. Jugal Kishore then sued for possession of the six-pie share of Utrasot, which was then in the possession of the plaintiffs and obtained a decree on the 17th of December, 1903, and, in execution of that decree, possession was given to him. Jugal Kishore then sued for possession of the six-pie share of Utrasot, which was then in the possession of the plaintiffs and obtained a decree on the 17th of December, 1903, and, in execution of that decree, possession was given to him. This decree is a most important document in the case, because the defendants rely, upon it as operating as res judicata in the present case. It is contended on behalf of the defendants-appellants that if the plaintiffs-respondents relied upon their mortgage of the 20th of January, 1886, as binding upon the mortgagee's son by reason of his pious duty as a Hindu son to satisfy his father's debts, they ought to have “raised it in that suit. It was found in that suit that the sale to the plaintiffs-respondents of the six-pie share, that is, the share of Hanuman, defendant No. 1, was not valid, in as much as there was a binding decision of the Court in favour of Hanuman to the effect that his share, of the property was not liable to sale in execution of the earlier decree of the plaintiffs-respondents. We think there might be force in this contention were it not for the language of the decree itself. Though the Munsif held that the sale of Hanuman's share was a nullity he expressly reserved by his judgment all questions touching the rights of the plaintiffs-respondents as mortgagees, and accordingly he gave Jugal Kishore a decree for possession “subject to any right which the present plaintiffs, (i.e., the plaintiffs-respondents) might have over the property.” Now the effect, as it seems to us, of this decree, was to leave the plaintiffs-respondents as regards their mortgage exactly in the position in which they stood before, what we may term, the abortive sale, to them, was carried out. That sale, so far as regards the six-pie share, was held to be and must be treated by us now as a nullity, but no decision whatever was passed as to their rights as mortgagees. Those rights, whatever they were, were expressly safeguarded. That sale, so far as regards the six-pie share, was held to be and must be treated by us now as a nullity, but no decision whatever was passed as to their rights as mortgagees. Those rights, whatever they were, were expressly safeguarded. This being so, the plaintiffs-respondents were in a position to proceed against Hanuman with a view to establish his obligation to satisfy his father's debt and the liability of his share of the property, also to satisfy it so far as it remained unsatisfied by the sale of the other portions of the property carried out in their favour. In view then of the reservation, to which we have referred in the decree of the Munsif, dated the 17th of December, 1903, there appears to us to be no force in the argument that the provisions of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure bar the right of the plaintiffs-respondents to institute the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. The decision of the learned District Judge was, we think, on this question correct. 2. The only other question which has been pressed in argument before us, is contained in the fourth ground of appeal, namely, that the plaintiffs having acquired half of the property cannot under any circumstances sue to recover more than half of the mortgage-debt. The contention is that the mortgaged property is liable rateably to satisfy the mortgage-debt and that the plaintiffs-respondents having purchased half, must be treated as having exonerated the other half from all liability to a moiety of the debt. For this contention reliance is placed upon the decision in the case of Bisheshar Dayal v. Earn Sarup, I.L.R., 22 All, 284. in which it was decided that when a mortgagee buys at auction the equity of redemption in a part of the mortgage property, such property has, in the absence of fraud, the effect of discharging and extinguishing that portion of the mortgage-debt which was chargeable on the portion so purchased. In that case, however, the property which was so purchased by the mortgagee was purchased at a sale in execution of a decree obtained by a third party. The case here is entirely different. The plaintiffs,-respondents filed their suit to have their mortgage-debt satisfied by sale of all the property subject to the mortgage. In that case, however, the property which was so purchased by the mortgagee was purchased at a sale in execution of a decree obtained by a third party. The case here is entirely different. The plaintiffs,-respondents filed their suit to have their mortgage-debt satisfied by sale of all the property subject to the mortgage. A portion only of that property was at first sold and failed to satisfy the mortgage-debt. In such a case it is clear, we think, that the balance of the mortgaged property is liable to satisfy whatever balance remained due after the first sale. 3. We, therefore, on the two points which have been raised in argument, hold that the Courts below were right and we dismiss the appeal with costs including fees in this Court on the higher scale.