JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J.:— In this case Syed Sajjad Husain was charged with an offence under section 193, Penal Code, 1860. The trial was commenced by Mr. Lomas who was then acting as District Magistrate of Moradabad. After the trial had proceeded to a considerable length, Mr. Harrison took up duty as District Magistrate at Moradabad, and on the 2nd December Mr. Lomas reverted to the position he held prior to discharging the duties of District Magistrate, viz., Magistrate of the First Class for the District of Moradabad. He continued to hear the still pending case against Sajjad Husain without objection on the part of the accused or of the District Magistrate. The result of a protracted trial was a conviction followed by an appeal to the Sessions Judge. The latter set aside the conviction and ordered a re-trial on the ground that Mr. Lomas having ceased to be the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to continue the trial. The question accordingly is one of jurisdiction only. Mr. Lomas as a Magistrate of the First Class for the District of Moradabad would have had jurisdiction originally to try the case. After he was succeeded by Mr. Harrison as District Magistrate he could clearly have been entitled to try a similar case committed in the same district, and the only question is, “Did the mere fact that he ceased to be District Magistrate oust his jurisdiction to continue and conclude the trial he had commenced while he was District Magistrate”? The Criminal Procedure Code does not recognize any particular Court as being the Court of the District Magistrate. Sections 6 and 32 of the Criminal Procedure Code show that the Magistrate's Courts other than in Presidency towns consist of (1) Courts of Magistrates of the First Class, (2) Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class, and (3) Courts of Magistrates of the Third Class 2. I cannot find and my attention has not been drawn to any section of the Criminal Procedure Code which prevents a Magistrate who had and still has jurisdiction to try an offence of the nature in question from continuing a trial regularly commenced. I cannot find and my attention has not been drawn to any section of the Criminal Procedure Code which prevents a Magistrate who had and still has jurisdiction to try an offence of the nature in question from continuing a trial regularly commenced. In the case of Queen v. Abbola matam, Jear (I.L.R. 22 Mad, 47) it was held that a Head Assistant Magistrate who had been appointed to the office of Deputy Magistrate in another part of the same district might proceed with the trial notwithstanding. In that case there had been a transfer by the District Magistrate, but I do not think that anything turns on the question of transfer. On the other side the case of Chuni Lal v. Phapund Rai (Allahabad Law Journal, Vol. I, p. 315; has been cited. In that case a Magistrate who had refused to sanction a prosecution was posted as a Treasury Officer. After an appeal to the Sessions Judge against the refusal of sanction the case was sent back to him by the order of the latter. Mr. Justice Blair decided that the Magistrate was no longer competent to deal with the ease or to make an order under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. In the course of his judgment, after referring to the facta, he says: “In that capacity (Treasury Officer) it is frankly conceded by Mr. O'Oonor that he could take cognizance of no case which was not sent before him by order of the District Magistrate or of the High Court.” This concession of Mr. O'Oonor formed the basis of the decision of the learned Judge. It is said that as Treasury Officer he still retained his powers under section 476, Criminal Proceduro Code. However this may be, the learned Judge clearly gave his decision on the ground that when the case came back to the Magistrate he no longer possessed jurisdiction. I do not think, therefore, that the decision is binding on me in any way and that, I am entitled to consider the question apart altogether from thai case. In my opinion the case being of a nature that Mr. I do not think, therefore, that the decision is binding on me in any way and that, I am entitled to consider the question apart altogether from thai case. In my opinion the case being of a nature that Mr. Lomas had jurisdiction to hear and determine before he was District Magistrate, after he was District Magistrate, and when he ceased to act as District Magistrate, the mere fact that he commenced it while he was officiating as District Magistrate did not prevent him from continuing to try the case after he reverted to a Magistrate of the First Class for the district. I accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Sessions Judge and direct him to hear the appeal and determine it according to its merits.