JUDGMENT : AIKMAN, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff who is appellant here, for possession of a certain share of resumed muafi land by enforcement of his right of pre-emption. The court of first instance decreed the claim. On appeal the learned District Judge set aside the decree and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff conies here in second appeal. The suit was based on a custom of pre-emption as recorded in the wajib-ul-arz. Paragraph 13, chapter 2 of that document contains provisions as to pre-emption or pre-mortgage, when a share of the ordinary khalsa land is sold or mortgaged. Chapter 3, paragraph 2 contains provisions to the effect that if any transfer of the resumed muafi land is made in favour of a stranger, the right of pre-emption of co-sharers shall arise as regards that transfer (basurat intikal arazi badast shakhs ghair ke, shafa hamara uspar aid hai.) The learned District Judge has held that these words import that the condition as to preemption or pre-mortgage in respect of the revenue-paying land govern the muafi land also, save that the co-sharers in general have a right to pre-empt muafi land, whereas in the case of khalsa land there is a gradation among the co-sharers. In my opinion the view taken by the learned District Judge is right. I think the general word (intikal) and the words “shafa hamara “refer back to occasions of pre-emption set forth in the earlier clause. 2. If this view is not taken, there is nothing to indicate any special conditions for pre-emption and the whole of the Muhammadan Law must be imported. I do not think it is likely that Hindu co-sharers intended this. Assuming that the rules of the Muhammadan Law apply, the plaintiff does not show in his plaint that he has complied with the conditions necessary for the relief he asks for. If the view of the learned Judge as to the applicability of clause 13, chapter 2 is right, the plaintiff is out of court in as much as he allowed an order for foreclosure to be made absolute, which according to the ruling of the Full Bench in Gaya Bharthi v. Lakhnath Rai, 1897] I.L.R., 20 All., 103., in construing a similar wajib-ul-arz has the effect of extinguishing his right. For the foregoing reasons this appeal fails and I dismiss it with costs, including fees on the higher scale.