JUDGMENT Geidt, J. - The subject of the present litigation is the parcel of land which the Plaintiffs leased to the Defendant under a registered kabuliyat in the year 1301, B. S. The kabuliyat was for a term of 9 years and there was a provision that at the expiration of the term of the present lease the Defendant would execute a fresh kabuliyat. The Plaintiffs brought this suit to eject the Defendant from the holding alleging that they themselves are the raiyats and the Defendant an under-raiyat under them, that the term of the kabuliyat has expired and that therefore under the provisions of sec 49 (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act they are entitled to eject him. The lower Appellate Court has decreed the Plaintiffs' claim and the Defendant has appealed. 2. The first ground taken in this appeal is in effect this: That under the clause of the kabuliyat which I have mentioned the Defendant is entitled to retain the holding and therefore not liable to ejectment. Now, the term of the kabuliyat is, as I have mentioned, 9 years and the present suit was brought after the expiration of that term: Prima facie therefore the Plaintiffs are entitled to eject the Defendant unless the clause which I have quoted protects him. There is admittedly no lease at present in existence under which the Defendant Is entitled to hold the land. It may be that if there were no special provisions in the Bengal Tenancy Act relating to this matter, the Defendant might possibly succeed in a suit for specific performance of contract. But sec. 85, cl. (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides that "A sublease by a raiyat shall not be admitted to registration if it purports to create a term exceeding nine years." 3. Now, as a lease for 9 years or more would not be valid unless it were in writing registered, the effect of that provision Is to render void any sub-lease by a raiyat which is for a term exceeding 9 years; and if I were to give effect to the contention of the learned pleader for the Appellant, I should be virtually evading the provisions of the sub-section which I have quoted. 4. It is argued for the Appellant that cl. 4. It is argued for the Appellant that cl. (2) of sec, 85 is meant for the protection of superior landlords only and not for the protection of raiyats who grant a sub lease and in support of this view I am referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Mondal v. Eshan Chandra Banerjee I. L. R. 29 Cal. 148 (1901) in which it was held that cl. (3) of that section could be enforced only IN a suit by the landlord and not in a suit by a raiyat, and a similar view was taken in the case of Madan Chandra Kapali v. Juki Karikar 6 C. W. N. 377 (1902) following the former case. 5. The ground on which the learned Judges In the case reported in Gopal Mandol v. Eshan Chandra Banerjee I. L. R. 29 Cal. 148 (1901)based their decision was that if sub-sec. (3) of sec. 85 were read in any other way than as being meant for the protection of the landlords, it would enable a raiyat who had received a bonus on the creation of a sub-lease to confiscate that bonus when the term of nine years has expired and the learned Judges declined to attribute to the legislature any intention of confiscating rights that had accrued before the passing of the Act. But this objection as the Judges in that case have pointed out, does not apply to sub-sec. 2. That was a section dealing with sub-leases created after the commencement of the Act. The wording of the sub-section is clear and free from any ambiguity and there is no need to put on it the limited construction which has been placed on sub-sec. (3). 6. It appears to me that the Plaintiffs were entitled to eject the Defendant at the expiration of the term of 9 years and that the provision which I have quoted does not protect the Defendant. 7. The second ground taken is that if sec. 85 applies and the lease is void then the Plaintiffs are entitled only to eject the Defendant under cl. (b) of sec. 49, because, there Is no written lease and the term has not been fixed. But the remarks which I have already made are sufficient to dispose of this objection. 7. The second ground taken is that if sec. 85 applies and the lease is void then the Plaintiffs are entitled only to eject the Defendant under cl. (b) of sec. 49, because, there Is no written lease and the term has not been fixed. But the remarks which I have already made are sufficient to dispose of this objection. The kabuliyat so far as it subleases the holding for a term of nine years is perfectly valid. The Defendant held under that lease; it was a written lease and on the expiration of its term he is liable to be ejected. 8. Then a third objection Is raised that under sec. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the Plaintiffs could not sue to eject the Defendant because they have got co-sharers; but the finding of the Munsif is that the Plaintiffs alone are entitled to the 16 annas of the holding. That is a finding of fact based on evidence before the Munsif and the Subordinate Judge, and although it is true that that Hebanamah under which the Plaintiffs alleged that they acquired the holding has not been proved the evidence on which the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is based is in my opinion sufficient to warrant the conclusion at which he has arrived. 9. There is also a fourth ground of appeal, which if It were valid would render the consideration of the first three grounds wholly unnecessary, namely, that the Subordinate Judge has not determined what the nature of the Plaintiffs' holding is. The Defendant set up to be an occupancy raiyat and he therefore set up that the Plaintiffs had a higher status than that of an occupancy raiyat. But the only issue framed on this point was with reference to the Defendant's status. The third Issue runs as follows:-What is the nature of the Defendant's holding 1 No issue was framed as to the nature of the Plaintiffs holding though of course the one Is necessarily involved in the determination of the other. 10. But the only issue framed on this point was with reference to the Defendant's status. The third Issue runs as follows:-What is the nature of the Defendant's holding 1 No issue was framed as to the nature of the Plaintiffs holding though of course the one Is necessarily involved in the determination of the other. 10. In the 10th ground of appeal the Appellant alleges that the Hebanamah on which the Plaintiffs leased their title had been produced by the Plaintiffs and showed that their jote was a mourasi mokurari jote and that when the attention of the Munsif was drawn to this fact, the Plaintiffs were allowed to withdraw the document whereas the Munsif ought to have taken steps to have that document replaced on the record when it was brought to his notice at the time of the argument that the Plaintiffs had without his permission taken back the document from the record. 11. Now, the Hebanamah at the best would be a piece of evidence on which Defendant could rely. I have looked at the list of documents tendered by the Plaintiffs and admitted in evidence but I do not find this document on that list. It also appears from the order of the Munsif, dated the 6th December, that the taking of evidence in the case was finished on the 2nd December and the case was postponed for argument until the 6th December. The Defendant had been asked to admit the Hebanamah. He refused to do this. The Plaintiffs did not prove it and; as far as I can see, therefore, the document could not go upon the record and the Plaintiffs were entitled and indeed were bound to take it back. The Mnnaif In his order to which I have alluded remarks that the request to have the Hebanamah recalled is a most unreasonable prayer at that stage of the case. With this remark I fully agree. If it was a piece of evidence on which the Defendant relied it was due to their own action that the evidence was not put on the record at the time at which it could properly have been received. I am, therefore, unable to consider that the Appellant, has any substantial ground of grievance as is mentioned in the tenth ground of appeal. I am, therefore, unable to consider that the Appellant, has any substantial ground of grievance as is mentioned in the tenth ground of appeal. All the points urged on behalf of the Appellant therefore fall and this appeal is dismissed with costs.