JUDGMENT : KNOX, J.:— Pandit Raghunath Prasad, respondent, was plaintiff in the suit, out of which this second appeal arises. He asked to be put in possession of certain land together with a sum off money, representing his share of the materials of the house which had stood on that land and which according to him, the defendant had sold. 2. The property in dispute was originally the property of one Maharaj Lalji Mal. Both the appellant and respondent are descendants of the said Maharaj Lalji Mal. The dispute touching this property having arisen between them, the matter was eventually compromised and the compromise was embodied in the decree, bearing date 4th August, 1903. By the terms pi that compromise the respondent gave the house to the appellant. But at the time he gave it he tried to encumber his transfer by a condition to the effect that Khiali Ram was not empowered, to alienate the property without first consulting and obtaining the consent of the respondent. There was also a further limitation expressed in the deed of compromise and reproduced in the decree to the effect that the property should not be liable to sale in payment of debts incurred by the appellant. The respondent alleging that the appellant had transferred the property, removed the materials of the house, and sold them without first obtaining the consent of the respondent. The respondent accordingly sued to have the land restored and a portion of the value of the materials returned to him. The balance of the value of the materials, he says, he remitted on the ground that Khiali Ram was a person in poor circumstances. Both the Courts below granted the respondent the decree he asked for. In second appeal here, as in the Courts below, it is contended that the condition purporting to restrain the appellant from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property is void. The lower appellate Court brushed this objection aside holding that the condition in restraint was not an absolute condition but that it only restrained the appellant from selling without the respondent's permission. The distinction is not in my opinion one to which effect can be given, and in the arguments before me the view taken by the learned District Judge was not supported. The distinction is not in my opinion one to which effect can be given, and in the arguments before me the view taken by the learned District Judge was not supported. The line of argument adopted here was that the condition being one embodied in a legal document was binding upon those who were parties to the decree. In this way the learned vakil for the respondent tried to distinguish the case from the precedent of this Court contained in Bhairon v. Parmeshri Dial, [1881] I.L.R. 7, All, 516.. It is true that in that case the dispute was between certain strangers who had attached the property in execution of a decree obtained against the heirs of one of the parties to the compromise on the one: hand and representatives of the second party to the compromise on the other. The learned Judges who decided that case held that the restrictions, very similar to those which are to be found in the decree of 4th August, 1903, were restrictions opposed to the policy of the law and could in no way fetter the estate which had been transferred. In section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act the rule is laid down that a condition restraining alienation is void. Then follow certain exceptions. Among those exceptions I do not find any such exception as the learned vakil for the respondent seeks to establish. It would have been easy to have included it if such had been the intention of the Legislature. The plea taken in appeal that the condition against alienation is void must prevail. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decrees of both the Courts below are set aside, and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs in all Courts.