JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J.:— Ali Hasan, the appellant in this case, has been convicted of an offence under section 464 of the Penal Code, 1860. It appears that the appellant was a literate constable, and as such, was employed in the Police Office at Allahabad. His duties were of course chiefly clerical, but he must have had every opportunity of becoming a ware of the various orders which were passed in ordinary course at the Police station. 2. It appeal's from the evidence that Amir, the husband of a woman, named Mussammat Piari, was anxious to discover her whereabouts. Sometime in June, the woman had left her husband, and a petition was presented at the Police station asking that a search should be made for her and alleging that she had gone away with some other person and had taken property with her belonging to her husband, and at the same time offering a reward of Rs. 10 if she were found, and the property recovered. It also appears that during the course of events, Amir employed a pleader to assist him in discovering the whereabouts of Piari. The pleader's name was Ali Zohad, father of accused. The two documents, which the appellant is alleged to have forged, are set out in the evidence and referred to as exhibits A and B. Exhibit A is as follows:— “By order of the Superintendent of Police of Allahabad. “Perused the order No. 107, dated as regards the missing of Mussammat Piari. She was on the report No. 35 entered in the general diary of this station arrested in the evening on the 9th July, 1905 and is in the custody of Mussammat Sibni, wife of Ghisu, weaver. The petitioner has been informed by order. It is, therefore, “Ordered that the Sub-Inspector be by an order, directed to hand over the woman to the petitioner and search be stopped.” “Dated 17th July, 1905.” 3. Exhibit B is as follows:— “The Sub-Inspector of Kydganj be directed to hand over to the petitioner the woman, if found. The muharrir concerned do carry out the order to-day. It is, therefore, “Ordered that the Sub-Inspector be by an order, directed to hand over the woman to the petitioner and search be stopped.” “Dated 17th July, 1905.” 3. Exhibit B is as follows:— “The Sub-Inspector of Kydganj be directed to hand over to the petitioner the woman, if found. The muharrir concerned do carry out the order to-day. Dated the 18th July, 1905.” The case for the prosecution is that the appellant, in order to assist his father, and to bring the business in which he was engaged to a successful issue, fabricated these two documents intending that the police officer or officers to whom they were directed would act on them as genuine documents and that the wife, Mussammat Piari, would be handed over by the police to her husband. 4. The defence is two-fold, first, that exhibit A was in fact a copy of an original order which had been passed by the Superintendent of Police sometime between the 10th and the 15th July, and that it was not fabricated at all, and that the second document merely followed as a matter of course upon the first, and that even if he were not authorized to issue the second order, no criminal offence was committed, and that he committed at most an error of judgment. I think it is clearly shown by the evidence that for some reason or other, Mussammat Piari was not willing to go to her husband, that the latter was very anxious to get her into his custody whether she liked to return to him or not, and it was with this object in view that he employed Ali Zohad to present the petitions. Sometime prior to the date of the alleged offence the woman had been found by the police and handed over by them into the care of another woman, some relation of her own. On the question of fact I have come to the conclusion that the documents are not genuine. Mr. Douglas Straight in his evidence expressly denies that he ever made any such order as exhibit A. There is no doubt that on the 17th July, he expressly refused to make an order of its nature or purport. Mr. On the question of fact I have come to the conclusion that the documents are not genuine. Mr. Douglas Straight in his evidence expressly denies that he ever made any such order as exhibit A. There is no doubt that on the 17th July, he expressly refused to make an order of its nature or purport. Mr. Douglas Straight certainly would not knowingly make an order of that nature, and the only possibility would be that inadvertently and _ at the suggestion of some of his subordinates he might have made an order sometime between the 10th and the 15th that the Mussammat should be delivered over to her husband. I have already said that the appellant, states expressly that Mr. Straight did make such an order and that exhibit A is a copy of it. He says that the order was made after a report had been made by a Sub-Inspector announcing the discovery of the woman and that she had been placed in the custody of her relative. Neither the report nor this order is forthcoming. 5. Upon cross-examination Mr. Douglas Straight first of all stated that he had no recollection of the report being brought under his notice, but evidently after his memory was refreshed, he stated that it was brought under his notice, but he could not say when. Now it is quite clear that exhibit A is not a copy of any order made by the District Superintendent of Police, in the true sense of the expression. In the first place it is dated the 17th July, a date on which it is clear no such order was made by the District Superintendent of Police. It is said, however, that this is merely the date of the issue of the copy of the order, but on referring to the rest of the exhibit A it contains a number of other matters, a reference to the perusal of other orders and also a statement that “the petitioner has been informed by an order,” all of which go to show that exhibit A is not in any sense of the word a copy of any order actually made by the District Superintendent of Police. It would occur to me that where an order is issued from the office of the District Superintendent of Police, it would in truth and in fact be a real copy of that order bearing the same date which the order of which it was a copy bore. 6. It is suggested that it may be the practice of the office of the Superintendent of Police of Allahabad that any official issuing an order can take, the order actually passed and issue another order in different language and bearing a different date and which is in fact not the order of the District Superintendent of Police, but what the person issuing the order conceives to be the purport of it. If such be the practice, it is a very inconvenient practice. But no evidence has been given to show that such a practice exists, and in the absence of such evidence I will certainly assume that when an order is issued, it is a true copy of the order actually passed by the officer. Looking then at the document, exhibit A, on the face of it, it does not appear to be a genuine document. On the 17th July, the same date on which the appellant states that he innocently issued exhibit. “A” his father was at the office of the District Superintendent of Police, presenting the petition which the latter expressly rejected, on the grounds that the petitioner should go to the Civil Court to get back his wife. On the 18th, the next day, the appellant by his own admission issued the order, exhibit B, without any authority save such authority as he would have had if the order of which exhibit A purports to be a copy, actually existed. Now the fact that the appellant was employed as a clerk in the Office of the Police at Allahabad, would render it reasonably probable that he would know of the various orders passed by the District Superintendent of Police, but it is still more probable that he would have learnt the fate of a petition presented by his own father the day before concerning the matter which, on the 17th, he himself had issued, exhibit “A.” Taking ail the evidence into consideration, I do not believe the story told by the appellant that Mr. Douglas Straight ever made any such order, as the order alleged to have been made by him between the 10th and the 15th July, and of which exhibit A is said to be a copy. 7. The second ground of defence is an entirely legal ground and has been argued at, some length both by the Government pleader and Counsel for the appellant. It is contended on behalf of Ali Hasan, that even assuming that he fabricated the two documents, he has not committed forgery. Under section 468 the making of a false document with any of the “intents” thereiu mentioned, is forgery, and section 464 sets forth when a person is said to make a false document within the meaning of the Code. Heading these sections together, if it can be said that Ali Hasan fraudulently made exhibits “A” and “B” with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made with the authority of the District Superintendent of Police, knowing that they were not made with his authority and intended thereby to commit fraud or that fraud should be committed, he is guilty of forgery. I find on the evidence that the documents are false and that Ali Hasan made the documents with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made with the authority of the District Superintendent of Police, and that he knew they were not made with the authority of the District Superintendent of Police. I find further that he intended to deceive the officer to whom the supposed orders should come for execution, and by these means he intended that Mussammat Piari should be illegally handed over to the custody of his father's clieut. The question is, whether on this state of facts he is guilty of forgery. I think the answer must be in the affirmative. 8. The word ‘fraudulently’ is defined by section 25 as follows— “A person is said to do a thing ‘frauduleulty’ if he does that thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise.” 9. There clearly was deceit. The meaning of the word “fraud” is given in Webster's Dictionary as “deception deliberately practised to gain unlawful or unfair advantage.” The meaning of “defraud” is also given in the same Dictionary as follows:— “to deprive of some right, interest, or property by a deceitful device.” 10. There clearly was deceit. The meaning of the word “fraud” is given in Webster's Dictionary as “deception deliberately practised to gain unlawful or unfair advantage.” The meaning of “defraud” is also given in the same Dictionary as follows:— “to deprive of some right, interest, or property by a deceitful device.” 10. The accused by fabricating these two documents not only intended to deceive the police officer into acting upon bogus and invalid orders but he also sought to prevent Mussammat Piari retaining her freedom and going where she pleased. A number of authorities have been cited as to the meaning of the word “fraud” and the expression “intent to defraud” in the Penal Code, 1860. In more than one of those cases the words of Sir James Fitz James Stephen in his History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. II, p. 121, are cited, “whenever the words fraud or intent to defraud or fraudulently, occur in the definition of a crime, two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime; namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive, or in some cases mere secrecy; and secondly, either actual injury or possible injury, or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk of possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy.” In the case now Under consideration had the fabricated documents been acted upon the appellant would have derived the advtange that his father's client would have succeeded in his object by means of appellant's deceit, a result which never would have been obtained if it were known that genuine order for the handing over of the woman had ever, been made. On the other hand the woman would have lost the right she had to remain at liberty to wander as she chose. It would be difficult and it is unnecessary to attempt to measure the gain to the appellant or the loss to the woman. 11. If then Sir James Fitz James Stephen is Correct in his view as to the elements which are essential to the commission of a crime in which the words “fraudulently” or “with intent to defraud” occur in the enactment defining the offence, such elements are present in the case under consideration. 12. 11. If then Sir James Fitz James Stephen is Correct in his view as to the elements which are essential to the commission of a crime in which the words “fraudulently” or “with intent to defraud” occur in the enactment defining the offence, such elements are present in the case under consideration. 12. I do not think that I would serve any useful purpose by reviewing the numerous authorities that have been cited in the course of the arguments. I have given them my best consideration. They cannot all be reconciled. But I do not think that I have disregarded any previous decision binding on me. I am supported in the view I have taken by the Full Bench Rulings in Queen-Empress v. Soshi Bhushan, I.L.R., 15 All., 210.; Queen-Empress v. Abbas Ali , I.L.R., 25 Cal., 512.and the majority of the Court in Kotamraja Venketrayadu v. Empervr, I.L.R., 28 Mad., 90.). In the case before the Allahabad and Madras High Courts the charges against the accused were in respect of false certificates presented by students for the purpose of attending lectures or entering the Universities. In the Calcutta case the accused attempted to use a false certificate of competency as an Engineer. It would certainly be an alarming state of the law if a man could deliberately fabricate a false order for the purpose of having another person arrested under, the supposed authority of a District Superintendent of Police and be guilty of no offence under the Penal Code. The appeal is dismissed. 13. It appears that the accused is “on bail: he must surrender and serve out the remainder of his term.