Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (August, 12, 1903), affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (East). The question decided relates to the management of certain endowed property consisting of a temple and lands assigned for the support of its services. On the death of the last holder the management of the temple and the endowed property devolved by inheritance on his male issue, consisting of eight sons, four by each of his two wives. A son of each wife managed in alternate years till 1880, when it was agreed by all the sons that the four by the second wife, including the appellant, should cede their turns to the respondent, a son by the elder wife, who thereupon became entitled to five years of management, and the remaining three members of the senior branch to one year each. At the end of the appellants year of management disputes and differences arose between him and the respondent; and thereupon the suit was brought to recover possession of the disputed villages with mesne profits, and of certain jewellery and books of account. The defence did not deny the course of management alleged; it was, however, urged that the agreement by which this course had been adopted was revocable. It was denied that the issue of the second wife had, in fact, transferred or delegated their right to manage to the respondent; and it was pleaded that such transfer or delegation, if proved in fact, was invalid in law It was also denied that the respondent was entitled for any term to exclusive possession ; that the appellant was in possession of all the accounts claimed, and that the mesne profits were as great as alleged in the plaint. The Subordinate Judge found that the evidence proved a course of management as alleged in the plaint, and that this arrange ment was not revocable at will. He found that the appellant had delivered possession to the respondent of the temple, villages* and the temple properties, other than the jewellery, at the end of his term in July, 1899; and that the appellant subsequently unlawfully obtained possession of the villages, and carried off the accounts belonging to the temple. He found that the appellant had delivered possession to the respondent of the temple, villages* and the temple properties, other than the jewellery, at the end of his term in July, 1899; and that the appellant subsequently unlawfully obtained possession of the villages, and carried off the accounts belonging to the temple. He was of opinion that the scheme had been altered by the delegation in fact to the knowledge of the appellant of their rights to manage by the members of the junior branch in favour of the respondent, and that the altered scheme was binding on the appellant, and had ever since been acquiesced in by the appellant and all parties. He con sidered that the claims of the junior branch were barred by limitation in consequence of the adverse exercise of the rights to manage as against them for a period exceeding twelve years prior to suit. In accordance with these findings he made a decree directing the delivery of possession of the villages in dispute, of the movable property, and of the books of account claimed, and also the payment of the mesne profits. In appeal the High Court affirmed the finding of fact that the scheme of management was settled as stated in the plaint, and also the finding that the said scheme was not revocable. It also held that the claims of the junior branch were barred by limitation. On the question of delegation of their rights, it was found as a fact that such delegation had been made and acted on for a long series of years. There was evidence of a document having been drawn up evidencing the delegation. This document was lost, and was admittedly not stamped at the time of execution. The High Court decided that in the absence of the document no other evidence could be admitted of its contents, but was o opinion that a course of action extending over a long term of years in which the appellant had acquiesced sufficiently proved the alteration alleged by the respondent in the original scheme of management. Cohen, K.C, and W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the members of the junior branch of the family had lost their right to their turns of management by the operation of the law of limitation. Cohen, K.C, and W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the members of the junior branch of the family had lost their right to their turns of management by the operation of the law of limitation. On the case set up by the respondent, his exercfse of their right was not adverse to them. Reference was made to Act XV. of 1877, s. 28, and Sched. II., art. 124. The Court, moreover, found that the respondent managed during his tenure of office, not for himself alone, but on behalf of all the members of the senior branch with their consent. He did not, therefore, acquire any adverse right against them, and they could withdraw, each for himself, the assent which he had given. There had been no completed transfer of rights, and the arrangement come to amongst themselves was revocable. A trustee cannot substitute another person for himself as trustee, and if he purports to do so the arrangement between them is not binding, and the appellant was at any time entitled to object to it. Eights to management did not, either by operation of the law of limitation or by actual transfer, vest in the respondent alone to the exclusion of the other members of the family or any of them. The turns by which the trustees held the management were liable to alteration at the will of any one of their number, and were not absolutely and permanently binding on them. There was no emolument attached to the trust, and therefore a Civil Court was not competent to declare that the trustees should in rotation enjoy rights of management for a definite period see Sri Raman Lalji Maharaj v. Sri Gopal Lalji Maharaj. (( 1897) I. L. R. 19 Allah. 428.) Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Be Gruyther, for the respondent, con tended that the respondent had validly acquired the right to manage as vested in the junior branch. Although Hindu text writers treat offices of the kind in question in this suit as indivisible, yet modern custom and decided cases sanction their partition by means of the coparceners enjoying their office separately in rotation. The two branches of the family had assented, as they were entitled under the Hindu law to do, to a scheme of management as detailed in the plaint and concurrently found by the Courts. The two branches of the family had assented, as they were entitled under the Hindu law to do, to a scheme of management as detailed in the plaint and concurrently found by the Courts. That arrangement was validly made, and the scheme so assented to was not revocable at the will of the appellant, and could only be altered as the original scheme of management was altered, by the will of all the members agreeing thereto, or by the Court in a suit or other proceeding properly framed for that purpose. A long-established practice under that agreement fully proves it and entitles the respondent to act as the delegate of the junior members. Reference was made to Mancharam v. Pranshankar (( 1882) I. L. R. 6 Bomb. 298.); Maynes H. L. ss. 439, 468 (6th ed. pp. 568 and 612) ; Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee (( 1889) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 137.); Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi. (( 1904) L.R. 31 Ind. Ap. 203,208.) Cohen, K.C., replied, citing Trimbak v. Lakshman. (( 1895) I. L. R. 20 Bomb. 495, 501.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. In the village of Kottoor, in the Zemindari of Sivagunga, there is a Hindu temple dedicated to the public worship of the deity in whose honour it was founded, and endowed with the revenue of three villages. The office of manager of this temple is hereditary in a family of which the appellant and respondent are both members, but the family has no beneficial interest in the property or in the income of the temple. The office of manager was formerly vested in one Mayandi Chetti, who was grandfather of the respondent and great-grand father of the appellant. On Mayandis death the office devolved by inheritance on his male descendants by his two wives. There were four by each wife, or eight in all. One member of each branch took the management for one year in alternate succession until the year 1881- 1882. About that time the members of the junior branch renounced or relinquished their claim to the office in favour of the respondent, who is a member of the senior branch. There were four by each wife, or eight in all. One member of each branch took the management for one year in alternate succession until the year 1881- 1882. About that time the members of the junior branch renounced or relinquished their claim to the office in favour of the respondent, who is a member of the senior branch. During the nineteen years immediately preceding the institution of this suit, in each cycle of eight years, there has been a settled order of succession among the members of the senior branch. The respondent has had five turns, and the appellant and the other two representatives of the senior branch one turn each. In accordance with this arrangement the appellant held the office of manager of the temple, and the property belonging to it, from 1st Adi of the year Vilambi (July 15, 1898) to 30th Ani of the year Vikari (July 13, 1899). On the expiration of that year it was the respondents turn to hold office for the next three years—one year in his original right and two years in right of the junior branch. The appellant handed over the temple to the respondent, but he kept back the jewels and retained or retook possession of the three villages with which the temple is endowed. The respondent then brought this suit to recover the jewels and the villages, with mesne profits. The appellant did not dispute the facts alleged by the respondent, but he set up various defences on points of law. Both the Subordinate Judge and the High Court decided against him. In their Lordships opinion the case is a very simple one. They think the unbroken usage for a period of nineteen years is as against the appellant conclusive evidence of a family arrangement to which the Court is bound to give effect. Twice during the period of nineteen years the appellant has, in his proper turn, enjoyed the position of manager for a year. The arrangement seems to have been a perfectly proper arrangement con ducing to the due and orderly execution of the office. It was one which the Court would no doubt have sanctioned if its authority had been invoked. It was one which, in their Lordships opinion, the parties interested were competent to make without applying to the Court. The arrangement seems to have been a perfectly proper arrangement con ducing to the due and orderly execution of the office. It was one which the Court would no doubt have sanctioned if its authority had been invoked. It was one which, in their Lordships opinion, the parties interested were competent to make without applying to the Court. If the appellant wishes to set it aside and to have a new scheme settled, he must take proper proceedings. If he has any ground for attacking the management of the temple or the administration of the property attached to it, the Courts are open. But it is not for him, at his will and pleasure, to disturb an arrangement of which he has on more than one occasion taken the benefit. It is plain that the arrangement was not intended to be merely temporary, nor can it be regarded as precarious. It must hold good until altered by the Court or superseded by a new scheme effected with the concurrence of all parties interested. The argument on behalf of the appellant seems to have been founded on a mistaken analogy. The manager of the temple is by virtue of his office the administrator of the property attached to it. As regards the property, the manager is in the position of a trustee. But as regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it, he is rather in the position of the holder of an office or dignity which may have been originally conferred on a single individual, but which, in course of time, has become vested by descent in more than one person. In such a case, in order to avoid confusion or an unseemly scramble, it is not unusual, and it is certainly not improper, for the parties interested to arrange among themselves for the due execution of the functions belonging to the office in turn or in some settled order and sequence. There is no breach of trust in such an arrangement, nor any improper delegation of the duties of a trustee. The members of the junior branch are not before the Court. Their rights, if they have any, are not affected by this suit. The appellant cannot be allowed to put himself forward as their champion to disturb an arrangement with which they seem to be quite content. The members of the junior branch are not before the Court. Their rights, if they have any, are not affected by this suit. The appellant cannot be allowed to put himself forward as their champion to disturb an arrangement with which they seem to be quite content. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal must be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.