JUDGMENT : Stanley, C.J.:— This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge of Allahabad reversing a finding of the Subordinate Judge that an alleged will of a Muhammadan lady, one Musammat Badr-un-nissa, was not executed by her or any one on her behalf nor had she any knowledge of the will or of its contents. The plaintiffs are sons of the daughters of Musammat Badr-un-nissa and claimed her property as legattees under her will. The defendants are the widow and daughters of a predeceased son and they deny the validity of the will. 2. In their plaint the plaintiffs alleged that on the 23rd of November, 1902, Musammat Badr-un-nissa disposed of by will to the plaintiffs one third of her property and died on the succeeding day. The defendants in their written statement set up the case that Musammat Badr-un-nissa was at the time of her death an old lady of about 70 years and very weak and infirm and that on the date the alleged will was executed was not competent to make a will. They also denied that she ever executed the alleged will or that it was read out or explained to her or that she understood its meaning. 3. The following issues amongst others were framed upon the pleadings, namely, whether or not Musammat Badr-un-nissa executed the will in dispute, and if so whether or not she knew its contents, and executed it whilst in possession of her senses. The learned Subordinate Judge reviewed the evidence at considerable length and came to the conclusion that “Musummat Badr-un-nissa did neither get this will, dated the 23rd of November, 1902, written nor had she any personal knowledge of the contents thereof, nor did the said Musauamat in her senses instruct any person as to the formal execution and completion of this will, nor did the Musammat affix her mark to it”. 4. 4. On appeal the learned District Judge reversed this decision but he held that it was not proved that the testatrix signed the will herself and it is not alleged that any body else signed for her.” In the course of his judgment he observed that evid-dence had been produced to prove that the will was actually signed but that in view of the class of witnesses produced to prove this and the serious conflict in their evidence and also of the mark which Badr-un-nissa is alleged to have made which is strong and clear and firm and not at all such as an old woman, who was suffering from fever and was practically at the point of death, could possibly make, that the plaintiffs had entirely failed to prove that Badr-un-nissa herself signed the will. He held however that Badr-un-nissa had a disposing mind when she gave final instructions to Mr. Rahmat-ul-lah, a Vakil, for the preparation of her will and that these instructions were embodied in the will and that this will was accepted by Badr-un-nissa relying on Rahmat-ul-lah's having faithfully carried out her instructions and that the will was therefore legally valid. 5. The learned District Judge relied upon the authority of the decisions in the case of Parker v. Felgate, [1883] L.R., 8 P.D., 171. and Perera v. Perera, [1901] A.C., 354. In the first mentioned case it was held that if a testatrix has given instructions for her will and it is prepared in accordance with them the will will be valid, though at the time of execution the testatrix merely recollected that she had given those instructions but believed that the will which she was executing was in accordance with them. This decision was approved of in the case of Perera v. Perera. In both these cases the wills were duly executed, in the first by a party on behalf of the testator by her direction and in the other by the testator himself. In neither case would the will have been valid if it had not been signed. In England since the Wills Act no will is valid unless it is signed “by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction. In neither case would the will have been valid if it had not been signed. In England since the Wills Act no will is valid unless it is signed “by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction. In the case of Perera v. Perera the law of Ceylon was applicable and there also the law requires that a testator's signature shall be made or acknowledged in the presence of witnesses. Before the Wills Act in England, a will reduced into writing during the life-time and by the direction of a testator was sufficient for the disposition of personal estate though it had not been signed and was never actually seen by the testator. Allen v. Manning, 2 Add. 490. and Be Taylor, 1 Hag. 641. and the cases to which we have referred are useful as showing that a will prepared in accordance with the instructions of a testator and to which he expressed approval believing that his instructions Avere carried out would be valid if the will did embody the instructions. Now according to the Muhammadan Law, a will may be made either verbally or in writing and no special form or solemnity for making or attesting a will is prescribed. It is sufficient if a will can be proved to have been really and truly the will of the testator. 6. The learned District Judge has found that although the will in this case is not proved to have been signed by the testator or any one on her behalf, yet the document does represent her real will and he has found that she was competent at the time to make a will. It has been argued before us that this being the case the finding that the will was not signed is immaterial. We think that in view of the Muhammadan Law there is force in this contention. The will was found by the lower appellate court to be the genuine last will of the testatrix and was made at a time when she was competent to make a will. These findings are binding upon us in second appeal and in view of them the appeal cannot be supported. The will was found by the lower appellate court to be the genuine last will of the testatrix and was made at a time when she was competent to make a will. These findings are binding upon us in second appeal and in view of them the appeal cannot be supported. We dismiss the appeal but having regard to the fact that the respondents set up the case that the will was executed by the testatrix and entirely failed to prove this we allow no costs of this appeal.