JUDGMENT : Stanley, C.J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover the amount due on foot of a Promissory Note of date, the 18th of March, 1904, executed by Bachchu Lal, now deceased, and his son, the defendant-appellant, Jai Kumar. The circumstances under which the note was given are as follows:— Bachchu Lal was in the service of the plaintiff as assistant treasurer of the Bank of Bengal, the plaintiff being the treasurer. In addition to Government money he had in deposit with him from time to time money belonging to the plaintiff and also money belonging to the Bank, and he used to keep a receipt and disbursement account in respect of these moneys. It is alleged in the plaint that Bachchu Lal from time to time took money out of the amount so in deposit with him, to meet his own requirements, and sometimes entered his name as debtor in respect of the sums to taken and sometimes omitted to do so. On the 18th of March, 1904, a sum of Rs. 881-8-9 was due by him in respect of moneys so taken. Of this sum the plaintiff remitted a sum of Rs. 31-8-9. This left a balance due of Rs. 850. It appears that on the 17th of March, 1904, Bachchu Lal was attacked with plague to which he succumbed on the 19th. The plaintiff on the 18th of March, 1904, required him to make good the sums which were owing by him but not finding it convenient to pay the amount he gave the Promissory Note which is the subject matter of the suit, his son, Jai Kumar, joining with him in executing it. There is no allegation in the plaint that Bachchu Lal embezzeld any money and in the defence filed by Jai Kumar and Sumer Chand, his brother, there is a statement that Bachchu Lal did not embezzle or appropriate any money, but they set up a defence to the effect that the Note was given to stifle the prosecution of Bachchu Lal and therefore was illegal and could not form the basis of a suit. 2. 2. The court of first instance took this view of the situation and dismissed the plaintiff's claim, but upon appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge, he overruled the decision of the lower court and gave a deeree to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 830. He came to a distinct finding that the Note was not given for the purpose of stifling a prosecution but that it was given to satisfy a legal liability under which Baehehu Lal lay to the plaintiff If the debt so contracted by Bachchu Lal was not a debt of an immoral nature, his sons, as pious Hindu sons, would be under an obligation to satisfy it out of any ancestral property to which they may be entitled, but the allegation is that the debt was an illegal and immoral debt and a debt in respect of which a suit could not be maintained. We are of opinion that in view of the finding that the Promissory Note was given to satisfy a bona fide claim which the plaintiff had against Bachchu Lal and was not given to stifle a prosecution, it was a debt which was binding upon Bachchu Lal and was not, in any way, of the nature of an immoral or illegal debt. It is difficult to see how the giving by a Hindu debtor of security to his creditor for the payment of a just claim can, from any point of view, be regarded as an illegal or immoral debt for which his sons would not be liable. If authority were necessary upon this question we might refer to one or two cases decided in the courts in England and also in this country. In the case of Keir v. Leeman, [1816] 72 R.R., 298 at p. 311., Tindall, C.J., laid down the law as follows. If authority were necessary upon this question we might refer to one or two cases decided in the courts in England and also in this country. In the case of Keir v. Leeman, [1816] 72 R.R., 298 at p. 311., Tindall, C.J., laid down the law as follows. “We have do doubt that in all offences which involve damages to an injured party for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature to compromise, or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit.” In the case of Flower v. Sadler, [1882] 10 Q.B.D., 572., it was held that in order to render-illegal the receipt of securities by a creditor from his debtor, where the debt has been contracted under circumstances which might render the debtor liable to criminal proceedings, it is not enough to show that the debtor was thereby induced to abstain from prosecuting. In that case Lord Coleridge, C.J., quoted with approval the language of Tindail, C.J., which we have quoted; and Cotton, L.J., in the course of his judgment observed:— “It seems to me that there is a distinction between getting a security for a debt from the debtor himself and getting it from a third person who is under no obligation to the creditor. A threat to prosecute is not of itself illegal and the doctrine contended for does not apply where a just and bona fide debt actually exists, where there is a good consideration for giving a security and where the transaction between the parties involves a civil liability as well as possibly a criminal act. In my opinion a threat to prosecute does not necessarily vitiate a subsequent agreement by the debtor to give security for a debt which, he justly owes to his creditor.” This is a clear and cogent statement of the law in England. In the case of Kessowji Tulsidass v. Hurjivan Mulji, [1887] I.L.R., 11 Bom., 566. it was held that “a man to whom a civil debt is due may take securities for that debt from his debtor, even though the debt arises out of a criminal offence and he threatens to prosecute for that offence provided he does not in consideration of such securities agree not to prosecute; and such an agreement will not be inferred from the creditor using a strong language. He must not, however, by stifling a prosecution obtain a guarrantee for his debt from third parties.” 3. For the foregoing reasons we think that the decision arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge is not open to objection. We dismiss the appeal with costs including fees in this court on the higher scale.