JUDGMENT : AIKMAN, J.:— On the 18th of January, 1888, Khem Singh, Tika Singh and Hulasi Singh, executed a mortgage of their 10 biswa share of mauza Karimpur, in favour of one Sohan Lal. On the 3rd of July, 1891, the same mortgagors took a loan from Tara Chand, the father of the present appellants, and as security, hypothecated one biswa out of the ten biswa share mortgaged to Sohan Lal. In 1894, Tara Chand wishing to recover his money, brought a suit for sale of the one biswa share mortgaged to him and as was incumbent on him by law, he impleaded Sohan Lal and other prior mortgagees to whom it is unnecessary to refer. On the 7th of January, 1897, Tara Chand got a decree authorising him to sell the one biswa share mortgaged to him subject to the condition of his paying off the prior mortgages. He paid off Sohan Lal and the other prior mortgagees and brought to sale the one biswa share. The proceeds of that sale were sufficient to discharge Tara Chand's own mortgage but were insufficient to recoup him for the amounts which he had paid in redemption of the earlier mortgages. The defendant-respondent, Har Dayal, purchased from the mortgagors the remaining nine biswas. The present suit was brought by Tara Chand, who died during the pendency of the litigation, and is now represented by his sons, the present appellants, to recover by sale of the nine biswas what had been paid to redeem the mortgage of the 18th of January, 1888. The defendant, Har Dayal, raised various pleas in bar of the suit. The court of first instance repelled these pleas and decreed in plaintiff's favour. The defendant appealed, contending that the present suit was barred by the provisions of explanation 2, section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge sustained this plea and dismissed the suit. Against the decree of the lower appellate court the present appeal has been preferred. In my opinion it must succeed. The facts of the case relied on by the lower appellate court are entirely different from those of the present case and the decision has no bearing on the question at issue. Against the decree of the lower appellate court the present appeal has been preferred. In my opinion it must succeed. The facts of the case relied on by the lower appellate court are entirely different from those of the present case and the decision has no bearing on the question at issue. The object of the previous suit was to recover the money due under the mortgage of the 3rd of July, 1891, by sale of the property hypothecated in that mortgage. That was the only relief claimed and that was the only relief decreed. As a necessary preliminary to getting that decree the plaintiff had to pay off the prior mortgages. When he did pay those off, he became clothed with all the rights of the prior mortgagees. If in that suit he had asked for the sale of the nine biswas and if that had been refused, the present suit would, of course, have been barred, but I hold that it was not incumbent on him to ask for the sale of any property other than that comprised in his own mortgage, and I doubt whether he could have clone so. It is conceivable that the sale of the property mortgaged to the plaintiff might be sufficient to defray not only the plaintiff's own mortgages but also the prior incumbrances. Again it is conceivable that at the time of the suit on the second mortgage, it might be impossible to decree a sale under a prior mortgage, as at that time the property might not be saleable under the terms of the prior mortgage. By paying off the prior mortgage, Tara Chand, as said above, became clothed with the rights of the prior mortgagee and he is entitled to recover by the sale of the property mortgaged in the earlier mortgage what he paid to redeem it. Other legal pleas based under sections 43, 244 and 595 were taken by the respondent, but they are all equally without force. I allow the appeal with costs and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate court with costs, I restore that of the court of First instane. I extend the time for payment of the decretal amount up to the 12th of December, 1906.