JUDGMENT : Stanley, C.J.:— The only question in this case turns upon the meaning of one or two sections of the Agra Tenancy Act, (Act No. II of 1901). The appellants brought a suit against the respondent for profits. This suit was dismissed by the first Court and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal and costs awarded to the defendant which amounted to a sum considerably under Rs. 100. The respondent proceeded to execute his decree for costs but was resisted by the appellants who set up the plea of limitation. The Assistant Collector, who was an Assistant Collector of the first class, disallowed the plea and thereupon an appeal was preferred to the District Judge. He held that no appeal lay. Hence this appeal. 2. The provisions of the Act which bear upon this question are sections 175, 176 and 177 read in conjunction with the fourth schedule to the Act. Section 175 provides that “no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Court under this Act except as hereinafter provided.” Section 176 runs as follows: “An appeal shall lie to the Collector from the decree or order of an Assistant Collector of the second class in the following cases— (a) from a decree in any of the suits included in group (A) of the fourth schedule; (b) from an order or any of the applications “included in group (D) of the fourth schedule; (e) from an order relating to the trial of a suit or application.” Group (D) of the fourth schedule fixes the period of limitation for, amongst others, applications for the execution of decrees. Then follows section 177 which provides that “an appeal shall lie to the District Judge from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class in any of the suits included in group (A) and group (B) of the fourth schedule “subject to certain conditions. 3. The language of these sections appears to be clear and specific. Section 175 prescribes that no appeal shall lie except in the cases subsequently provided for. Section 176 allows of an appeal to the Collector from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the second class in any of the suits included in group (A) and from an order on any of the applications included in group (D) of the fourth schedule. Section 176 allows of an appeal to the Collector from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the second class in any of the suits included in group (A) and from an order on any of the applications included in group (D) of the fourth schedule. This section confines the right of appeal to decrees or orders of an Assistant Collector of the second class. The subsequent section gives the right of appeal to the District Judge from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class—not from the decree or order of such Assistant Collector—and the section is wholly silent as to appeals from orders on any applications included in group (D) of the fourth schedule. 4. It appears to be manifest from the plain meaning of these sections that the Legislature did not intend and did not provide for appeals from the orders of an Assistant Collector of the first class on an application for the execution of decrees. The use of the words decree or order in section 176 coupled with the reference to the applications included in group (D) of the fourth schedule and the omission of the word order as also of all reference to applications included in group (D) in section 177, to my mind unmistakably shows that it was not in the contemplation of the legislature to allow an appeal from an order as distinguished from a decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class. But a Bench of this High Court took a contrary view in the case of Kharag Singh v. Pala Ram, 1905] I.L.R., 27 All, 31. In an earlier case which is reported in a foot note to the report of the case of Kharag Singh v. Pala Ram, namely, execution second appeal No. 275 of 1903, our brother Banerji held that an appeal does lie to the District Judge from an order of an Assistant Collector of the first class in a case such as the present. This ruling was acted on by our brothers Blair and Banerji, in the case of Kharag Singh v. Pala Ram. In coming to their decision the learned Judges invoked the aid of section 193 of the Agra Tenancy Act, as also section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This ruling was acted on by our brothers Blair and Banerji, in the case of Kharag Singh v. Pala Ram. In coming to their decision the learned Judges invoked the aid of section 193 of the Agra Tenancy Act, as also section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 193 provides that “the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to the procedure in all suits and other proceedings under this Act so far as they are not inconsistent therewith” and subject to the modifications and additions stated in the section. By section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure a ‘decree’ is defined as follows:—’ decree ‘means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed, or defence set up, in a Civil Court when such adjudication so far as regards the Court expressing it, decides the suit or appeal. An order rejecting a plaint, or directing accounts to be taken or determining question mentioned or referred to in section 244 but not specified in section 588 is within this definition: an order specified in section 588 is not within this definition.” In the course of their judgment in Kharag Singh v. Pala Ram, the learned Judges say, “The contention on behalf of the respondent is that by necessary inference the provisions of section 193 provided for an appeal to the District Judge in those cases in which the order of an Assistant Collector of the first class amounts to a decree. There can be no question in the present case that the order passed by the Assistant Collector was an order within the meaning of section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order under that section is by virtue of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure included in the term “decree,” so that though the section does not in itself deal with appeals at all, it seems to us that by applying to the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 the procedure enacted in the Code of Civil Procedure, it confers upon such orders the status of decrees, and consequently there is a right of appeal from such orders under section 177.” I am wholly unable to accept this reasoning. In the first place section 193 of the Agra Tenancy Act expressly provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall only apply so far as they are not inconsistent with that Act. To attach to the expression ‘decree’ as used in section 177 of the Agra Tenancy Act the meaning given to it in section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would be to do violence to the express and clear language of the Agra Tenancy Act. That Act by section 176 and section 177 draws a clear distinction between decrees and orders, and it is contrary, as it seems to me, to the proper rules of construction to attach to an order passed on an application for execution the meaning which has been attached in the case under review. In View of the plain and unequivocal language of the Agra Tenancy Act, I am unable to accept the ruling in the case of Kharag Singh v. Pala Ram. 5. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Knox, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading the decision of the learned the Chief Justice and agree with the reasoning and in the result arrived at. The marked difference between the language used in sections 175, 176 and 180 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 and that used in section 177 makes no other conclusion possible but that it was never the intention of the Legislature to give a right of appeal from orders passed by Assistant Collectors of the first class in suits. The right of appeal is in every case the creation of statute, and I cannot bring myself to believe that if it had been intended by Legislature to give a right of appeal from orders passed by Assistant Collectors, of the first class, that they would have left their intention to be inferred from the provisions of section 193. The definition given of ‘decree’ in section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is as the learned Chief Justice has pointed out inconsistent with the language used in section 177 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. I would dismiss the appeal with costs. Aikman, J.:— I also am of opinion that this appeal must fail. An application was made to an Assistant Collector of the first class to execute a decree for costs. The judgment-debtors objected that the application was time-barred. I would dismiss the appeal with costs. Aikman, J.:— I also am of opinion that this appeal must fail. An application was made to an Assistant Collector of the first class to execute a decree for costs. The judgment-debtors objected that the application was time-barred. The Assistant Collector overrated the objection. The judgment-debtors preferred an appeal to the District Judge from the order of the Assistant Collector overruling their objection. The learned District Judge held that although the value of the subject matter in the suit in which the decree was passed, exceeded one hundred rupees, yet no appeal lay to him as the amount decreed for costs was less than one hundred rupees. Accordingly, having regard to the provisions of section 177 (a) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, he dismissed the appeal. The judgment-debtors come here in second appeal, contending that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that no appeal lay to him. 6. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion, though not for the reason given by the lower appeallate Court, that no appeal lay to the District Judge. 7. Section 175 of the Tenancy Act enacts that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Court except as provided by the Act. This section, it will be seen, draws a distinction between appeals from decrees and appeals from orders. 8. The next succeeding section deals with appeals from decisions of an Assistant Collector of the second class and allows an appeal to the Collector in the following cases:— (a) from a decree in any of the suits included in group (A) of the fourth schedule; (b) from an order on any of the applications included in group (D) of the fourth schedule; (c) from an order relating to the trial of a suit or application. 9. The applications included in group (D) comprise applications for the execution of decrees, so that an appeal is allowed from an order of an Assistant Collector of the second class or an application for execution. 10. The sections of the Act which deal with appeals from decisions of an Assistant Collector of the first class are sections 177, 178 and 179. 11. 10. The sections of the Act which deal with appeals from decisions of an Assistant Collector of the first class are sections 177, 178 and 179. 11. By the first of these sections an appeal is allowed from certain decrees, and by the last two sections from certain orders, but the latter do not include orders passed on applications to execute decrees. Here then we have an Act which draws a distinction between appeals from decrees and appeals from orders; which allows appeals from orders passed by Assistant Collectors of the second class on applications to execute decrees, but which does not specify such orders amongst the orders of Assistant Collectors of the first class from which appeals are allowed. It appears to me that according to all rules of construction the only conclusion to be drawn from the language of the Act is that it does not allow an appeal from an order of an Assistant Collector of the first class passed on an application to execute a decree. With all deference to the opinion of the learned Judges who decided the case of Kharag Singh v. Tola Ram, [1905] I.L.R., 27 All., 31.. I cannot agree with them in holding that the difficulty is got over by reference to section 193 of the Act, first, because I hold that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are in this respect inconsistent with the provisions of the Tenancy Act, and next, because the definition of ‘decree’ in the Code of Civil Procedure on which reliance is placed, relates only to decisions of a Civil Court and not to decisions of a Rent Court. 12. It is a matter of regret to me that I am forced to come to this conclusion. It is not easy to see why the propriety of an order of an Assistant Collector of the first class holding that an application to execute a decree, it may be for thousands of rupees, which is barred by limitation should not be liable to be questioned by appeal to a higher Court. 13. Under the previous Pent Acts, No. X of 1859, No. XVIII of 1873, and No. XII of 1881, an appeal was allowed from orders of Assistant Collectors of the first class and Courts of corresponding grade passed on applications for the execution of decrees. 13. Under the previous Pent Acts, No. X of 1859, No. XVIII of 1873, and No. XII of 1881, an appeal was allowed from orders of Assistant Collectors of the first class and Courts of corresponding grade passed on applications for the execution of decrees. It may be that the omission in the present Act to allow an appeal in such cases is due to an oversight on the part of the Legislature, but if so, that is a matter for the Legislature and not for the Courts to remedy. 14. I concur in the order proposed. 15. By The Court.:— The order of the Court is that the appeal be: dismissed with costs.