JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— We cannot satisfactorily dispose of this appeal without having a finding upon an issue which the lower appellate Court has failed to determine. The suit is one for the recovery of possession of land. The main defence raised by the defendants was that they had been in adverse possession of the land in dispute for upwards of twelve years, and consequently the plaintiff's suit was barred. When a defence of this kind is raised, the question of limitation becomes a question of title and it lies upon the plaintiff in such a case to prove that he was in possession at some time within the period of limitation and not for the defendent in the first instance to prove that he was, in adverse possession for twelve years. The rule is laid down in the case of Jafar Husain v. Mashuq Ali, [1892] I.L.R., 14 All., 193. in which EDGE, C.J. and BLAIR J., held in a similar case that before going into the question as to whether the defendants had or had not title, by adverse possession, the District Judge ought to have satisfied himself and expressed an opinion that there was prima facie proof that the plaintiff had a subsisting title at the commencement of the suit. On the question of onus of proof both the courts below appear to us to have erred. The court of first instance in the course of its judgment observes, “For the, purposes of limitation actual adverse possession for 12 years must be proved, and the onus of proof is on the defendant who sets up the plea of limitation to the detriment of the real owner's title.” The learned officiating additional Subordinate Judge falls into the same error. He says in the course of his judgment that the appellant and his karinda having admitted in their depositions that the land in the claim once belonged to the plaintiff's village and mahal, “this amounts clearly to an admission of the plaintiff's title.” Such an admission we may point out is no more than an admission, that the land in dispute at some time or other, not necessarily within the period of limitation, did belong to the plaintiff. Then later on he observes, “Such being the case, the onus of proving adverse possession for more than 12 years lay on the defendant,” and consequently he held that the defendant had failed to prove adverse possession. The land which is the subject-matter in dispute in this litigation appears to be land which has been submerged by the overflow of a stream, called the Kasi River, and Mr. Sundar Lal on behalf of the respondent has pointed out the difficulty which in some cases would lie in the way of a person entitled to land so submerged of proving actual possession within the period of limitation, but he has to a large extent solved that difficulty by a reference to a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council to be found in the case of the Secretary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta, [1902] I.L.R. 29 Cal., 518. to the effect that where a party is dispossessed by vis major of floods the constructive possession of the land is, if anywhere, in the true owners and that so long as the land remained so submerged no title could be made against the true owner. If, therefore, the respondent can establish that he was in actual possession of the laud in dispute up to the date of its submersion, that would be apparently sufficient prima facie evidence of the possession of the plaintiff during the submersion. This issue, however, has not been decided by the lower appellate court. That court has simply found that the defendants had failed to prove their title by adverse possession. We therefore refer to the lower appellate court the following issues under the provisions of section 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Was the plaintiff-respondent in possession, either actual or constructive, of the property in dispute at any time within twelve years next before the institution of the suit? 3. The court may take such relevent evidence as the parties may tender for the determination of this issue. On return of the findings the parties will have the usual ten days for filing objections.