Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (March 30, 1898), affirming a decree of the Second Subordinate Judge of Tirhoot (April 5, 1896). The suit was brought under the circumstances detailed in their Lordships judgment praying that the sale in question be set aside as " illegal, irregular, fraudulent and ultra vires." The relief sought was recovery of possession with mesne profits. The sale was made under Bengal Act VII. of 1880, which has since been superseded by Act I. of 1895. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that both the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue in exercise of their powers of revision had jurisdiction to cancel the certificate and to set aside the sale ; and if they had rightly exercised the jurisdiction vested in them in passing those orders such orders were binding j upon the parties, and he held that by those orders the appellants right the property purchased by him was entirely extinguished. The High Court, in affirming this decision, said “The law allows the Civil Court to reverse a sale under certain circumstances ; but there is nothing in the law authorizing a Civil Court to reverse the order of a Revenue Court which sets aside a sale. We cannot question its decision on a question of limitation any more than it would be possible for us in a suit to determine that a decree made in another suit was barred by limitation, and that the decree was therefore without jurisdiction. If authority were required for this last proposition, we would refer to the decision of a division bench of this Court reported in I. L. R. 2 Calc, p. 289. The well-known case of Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri Chowdhry (( 1881) L. R, 8 Ind. Ap. 123.) also supports the proposition that an erroneous decision on a question of limitation cannot be treated as invalid unless it be set aside in a way provided by law. "A similar reasoning would prevent our entertaining any objection to the Commissioners order on the ground that he had not heard the purchaser. Ap. 123.) also supports the proposition that an erroneous decision on a question of limitation cannot be treated as invalid unless it be set aside in a way provided by law. "A similar reasoning would prevent our entertaining any objection to the Commissioners order on the ground that he had not heard the purchaser. If the purchaser was aggrieved on this account, there is no doubt that he could have found an appro priate remedy in the procedure of the Revenue Courts; but whether that be so or not, we cannot treat as invalid an order made by the tribunal to which the Legislature has entrusted the power of making such order. We have no power to enquire into the circumstances under which the order was made, or into the propriety of the order." Cohen, K.C., and C. W. Arathoon, for the appellant, contended that the Revenue Court had acted without jurisdiction in annulling the sale. They had moreover acted improperly, for there had been no proper adjudication on the allegation of fraud and collusion, and the matter had been decided after the appeal was barred by limitation and in the appellants absence and without proper notice to him. The Courts below had based their decisions entirely on those of the Revenue Courts, and had not investigated the questions at issue. Reference was made to ss. 16, 17 and 24 of Act VII. of 1880 ; Nilmani Burnick v. Puddo Lochan Chuckerbutty (( 1866) Beng. L. R. supp. vol.); Sadhusaran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal (( 1886) I. L. R. 14 Calc, 1, 9. F. B, 379,) De Gruyther for the respondent, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. In this case special leave to appeal was granted on the ground that substantial questions of law arose upon the decisions of the Courts in India, which had given concurrent judgments in favour of the original respondent, the plaintiff in the suit. The suit was brought by the plaintiff to set aside the sale of a village called Subhankarpore, stated to be worth a lakh of rupees, the property of the plaintiff, which had been put up to auction under the provisions of Bengal Act VII. of 1880—the Public Demands Recovery Act—and purchased for Rs.1100 by Maharaj Ganeswar Singh, whose estate is. represented by the present appellant. of 1880—the Public Demands Recovery Act—and purchased for Rs.1100 by Maharaj Ganeswar Singh, whose estate is. represented by the present appellant. The sale was made in execution of a certificate granted by a Deputy Collector in respect of a fine imposed on the plaintiff for failure to comply with a notice issued under s. 16 of Bengal Act IX. of 1880—the Cess Act. The sale took place on September 19, 1893, and the purchaser was put in possession of the village on December 5 following. On January 2, 1894, the plaintiff presented a petition to the Commissioner of the division, alleging that he had no knowledge of the proceedings which had led to the sale, and that they ought to be set aside and the sale cancelled as irregular, fraudulent, and collusive. The Commissioner, after hearing the vakils for both parties, by his order of December 12, 1894, admitted the appeal, on the ground that the evidence for the petitioner made out " a prima facie case of fraud, or at any rate of irregularities, which prevented the petitioner from obtaining knowledge of the proceedings against him, and caused the sale of his estate at a most inadequate price "; and he referred it to the Collector " to reply specifically to the allegations of the petition." No report was apparently made by the Collector, probably because the purchaser, in his turn, appealed to the Board of Revenue against the Commissioners order, with the result that the Board, by an Order of May 9, 1895, decided that the fine was unjust, and had " no hesitation in setting aside the certificate for its recovery." On February 4, 1896, the Commissioner passed a formal order annulling the sale, on the ground that "it was brought about fraudulently and without legal justification." Upon these proceedings before the Revenue authorities being put in evidence before the Subordinate Judge of Tirhoot, in whose Court the suit was pending, he passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that, the certificate and sale having been set aside by a competent tribunal, the purchasers claim to the property could not be maintained. This decree was confirmed on appeal by the High Court at Calcutta. This decree was confirmed on appeal by the High Court at Calcutta. The questions argued before their Lordships were three in number First, that the Revenue authorities had no jurisdiction to make the orders on which the decree of the Civil Court was based ; secondly, that the appeal to the Commissioner was barred by limitation ; and thirdly, that the defendant was not allowed to adduce full evidence in support of his case. Upon the first question their Lordships entertain no doubt. In the case of Sadhusaran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal (I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1, 9.) the High Court of Calcutta has held that Bengal Act VII. of 1880 applies to cases of road and other cesses; and, that being so, it is necessary to look to that Act in order to ascertain the extent of the jurisdiction conferred upon the higher Revenue authorities over the proceedings of their subordinate officers. This appears to be of the widest possible character. Sect. 17 provides that " the Commissioner may in any case in which he thinks fit, revise any order passed by a Collector, or Deputy Collector, or Assistant-Commissioner, or Extra Assistant-Commissioner." In the opinion of their Lordships this applies to orders made after as well as before sales in execution of certificates issued under the Act. And s. 24 enacts that " all Collectors, Deputy Collectors, Assistant-Commissioners, and Extra Assistant-Commissioners shall, in the performance of their duties under this Act, be subject to the general supervision and control of the Commissioners of Divisions and the Board of Revenue." These extensive powers were no doubt given to prevent any abuse of authority under the extremely stringent and summary procedure authorized by the Act, and are, in their Lordships opinion, amply sufficient to justify the orders of which complaint is now made. Upon the second question, it is quite true that under s. 12 of the Act a person who denies his liability to pay the amount for which a certificate has been made and filed against him is allowed thirty days within which he may petition the Collector to set aside the certificate either in whole or in part; that thereupon the Collector must proceed to determine the liability of the petitioner; and that under s. 16 an appeal from the Collectors order may be preferred within thirty days from the making of the order. But this was not the procedure under which the order now complained of was made. The Commissioner acted in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under s. 17; and it would defeat the object of the Legislature if the periods of limitation applicable in ordinary cases were held binding upon him when so acting. The third point was that the defendant was not permitted to bring forward full evidence in support of his case. Their Lordships entirely agree with the learned judges of the High Court that it is " an elementary principle which is binding on all persons who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers, that an order should not be made against a mans interest without there being given to him an opportunity of being heard." In his order of February 4, 1896, annulling the sale, the Commissioner says " it is quite unnecessary to hear the purchaser before disposing of this petition," the ground of his decision being that the effect of the order of the Board of Revenue cancelling the certificate was to render the sale null and void; and that, there being " no question as to the illegality of the sale," the formal order which he was asked to make followed as a matter of course. This is not a sufficient reason, though it may be doubted whether the purchaser was prejudiced by the irregularity. But, however this may be, it seems to their Lordships that the proper remedy of the purchaser, if aggrieved by this order having been made in his absence, was to apply to the Revenue authorities for t a rehearing, and that it is now too late to ask for a remand on that ground. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed, and the decree of the High Court, dated March 30, 1898, confirmed. The appellant must pay the respondents costs of the appeal.