JUDGMENT Mitra, J. - This is a very simple case. The record of the proceedings before the District Magistrate of Backergunge, which is laid before us for revision, is as follows:-- Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea produced before me as a prisoner arrested in course of an affray with the Police was repeatedly ordered by me to keep silence while I was passing orders in h is case after the case was decided. As he disobeyed (T.E. 17-4) I order him under sec. 480, Cr. P.C., to pay under sec. 228, I.P.C., a fine of Rs. 200 (two hundred only) or in default to go to jail for one week. (Sd.) T. Emerson 14-4-06, Given an opportunity of apologising but refuses. (Sd.) T. Emerson. 14-4-06. There is nothing else on the record except the Table of Contents and the Title Page. The only paper noted in the table of contents being "the Proceedings" to which was subsequently added "the judgment of Appellate Court." 2. In considering this case we must omit from the proceedings the words "As he disobeyed, T.E., 17-4," as they were added and added very improperly three days later, viz., on the 17th April. No Magistrate can add to or alter the proceedings or judgment after they are signed and published. It is especially irregular when made in the absence of the accused and without notice to him. 3. Now, sec. 480 of the Code of Procedure empowers a Court to cause a person who has committed an offence described in sec. 228, I.P.C., in the presence of the Court to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day, the Court may take cognisance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees. The procedure must necessarily be summary, but the Legislature has guarded the rights of the subject by making it imperative on the Court dealing with a person summarily under sec. 480 "to record the facts constituting the offence, with the statement, (if any) made by the offender, as well as the finding and sentence." Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 481 further lays down "If the offence is under sec. 480 "to record the facts constituting the offence, with the statement, (if any) made by the offender, as well as the finding and sentence." Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 481 further lays down "If the offence is under sec. 228, I.P.C., the record shall show the nature and stage of the judicial proceeding in which the Court interrupted or insulted was sitting and the nature of the interruption or insult." To guard further more effectively the rights of the subject, sec. 486 gives a right of appeal from every sentence under sec. 480. 4. The directions contained in sec. 481 are clearly mandatory and the omission to record the particulars mentioned in sec. 481 has always been held to be fatal to the proceedings. A full and clear record as contemplated by sec. 481 is not only a guarantee of the coolness and judicial temper of the presiding officer but also affords materials for the Appellate Court to proceed on. It is conceded before us, and it cannot but be conceded that the proceedings of the District Magistrate in this case are too laconic and contravene the directions of the law. 5. In re Panchananda Tambiran (1869) 4 Mad. H.C.R. 229 the High Court set aside the sentence of fine imposed in a proceeding for contempt of Court as there was no specific record of the matters indicated by the Code. In Queen-Empress v. Paiambar Bakhsh ILR (1889) All. 361 Straight, J., said that Courts when resorting to the use of sec. 480 would do well to strictly follow the procedure laid down in it. In that case the irregularity in not passing a sentence before the rising of the Court was considered to be a mere irregularity, but the proceedings were otherwise perfectly in order. In re Pol-lard (1889) L.R. 2 P.C. 106 the Judicial Committee laid down as a general rule that in a case of contempt of Court the charge should be distinctly stated and opportunity should be given to the accused of being heard before sentence is passed. 6. In the present case we cannot but, with the record of the Magistrate's Court before us, characterise the proceedings as illegal. We shall not refer to the irrelevant matters attempted to be placed before us either by the Petitioner Surendra Nath Banerjea by his affidavit or the explanation of the Magistrate. 6. In the present case we cannot but, with the record of the Magistrate's Court before us, characterise the proceedings as illegal. We shall not refer to the irrelevant matters attempted to be placed before us either by the Petitioner Surendra Nath Banerjea by his affidavit or the explanation of the Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge who tried the appeal in the lower Court has referred to irrelevant matters and has partially based his judgment on matters not contained in the record of the Magistrate's Court. It is not proper or safe to supplement the record of a contempt case by such matters. But basing our decision on the record itself as it was on the 14th April, we are of opinion that the order of the Magistrate cannot be supported and on this ground alone we are prepared to make the rule absolute. 7. We may, however, observe that not only was no record made of what Surendra Nath Banerjea said or did causing interruption to the learned Magistrate as required by the law, but it does not appear from the record that he was doing anything more than writing the judgment. The judicial proceeding-- the trial of Surendra Nath Banerjea for an offence under sec. 188, I.P.C., was practically over at the time. If the Magistrate was writing his order, he could do so in the absence of the accused. The presence of the accused at that time was not at all necessary and if the Magistrate found the accused who had not an opportunity given to him for being defended by Counsel using words which caused interruption, he should have asked the accused to sit elsewhere until the writing of the order was finished. We cannot find any justification for the proceedings for contempt of Court in the circumstances of the case. 8. The principal ingredient of an offence under sec. 228, I.P.C., is intentional insult or interruption. Merely uttering of words and not keeping silent can hardly be construed as intentional insult or interruption caused by an undefended prisoner during the course of a judicial proceeding against him and there are no materials on the record for a conclusion adverse to the accused. The right conclusion to draw seems to us to be that the interruption, if any, caused by Surendra Nath Banerjea was not intended as a material interruption to any judicial proceeding. The right conclusion to draw seems to us to be that the interruption, if any, caused by Surendra Nath Banerjea was not intended as a material interruption to any judicial proceeding. Both, therefore, on the ground of illegality in the proceedings and absence of proved legal intention to interrupt the learned Magistrate, we set aside the order complained of and direct that the fine, if paid, be refunded.