Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court at Madras (March 13, 1903), affirming a decree of the District Court of Ganjam (September 22, 1900). The question decided in the appeal is whether the adoption of the first respondent by the second respondent as a son to her husband Kannepalli Venkata Narasu, deceased, was a lawful and valid adoption. The adoption in suit was made on June 10, 1898, by Venkata Ratnamma of Pucha Venkata Ramana. On that date Venkata Ratnamma executed a deed of adoption, and also a deed by which she transferred the major portion of her husbands estate to the adopted son, retaining the remainder in her own possession for life. The suit was instituted on October 7, 1899, under the circumstances stated in the judgment of their Lordships, by members of the family interested to obtain a declaration as to its invalidity. The defendants were Venkata Ratnamma and the adopted son. The validity of the adoption was challenged on the grounds (inter alia) that it was made without the authority of Venkata Narasu, the husband of the second respondent, and that the assent of two remote collaterals did not avail to supply that omission. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 64 The respondents contended that the second respondent had full power and authority from her husband to adopt the first respondent, and relied thereon, and also on the said assent. The High Court had "no hesitation in agreeing with the District Judge in finding that the second defendants husband did authorize his wife to adopt to him." They continued " The authority, as proved by the witnesses, was in general terms requiring her to adopt so as to continue his line and to provide for his spiritual benefit. He did not indicate any particular person for adoption either by name or otherwise, and placed no restrictions whatever on his wifes discretion. " Such being the case, the question is whether the authority so given was exhausted by the first adoption, or whether, on the death of the son then adopted, the authority of the husband survived so as to enable the widow to make the present—that is, a second adoption. " Such being the case, the question is whether the authority so given was exhausted by the first adoption, or whether, on the death of the son then adopted, the authority of the husband survived so as to enable the widow to make the present—that is, a second adoption. We are not aware of any judicial decision which would bind us to hold that the husbands authority, in circumstances like the present, is so completely worked out by the first adoption as to prevent the widow from acting upon it when necessity arises for a fresh adoption, the estate being still vested in her, and being liable to be divested by such adoption. We are of opinion that the husbands authority held good for the second adoption also. The object and purpose of the authority given by the husband was to perpetuate his family as well as to secure his spiritual benefit, and it would be unreasonable to hold that an accident such as the early, death of the boy first adopted should be allowed to frustrate the fulfilment of his object and to preclude the widow from making another adoption in the absence of any legal impediment to her doing so. When the general intention of a Hindu to be represented by an adopted son is clear, as in this case, there seems no reason why effect should not be given to such intention, if it is possible to do so without contravening the law. Each case must be decided on its own merits, without applying too strict a rule of construction in regard to powers of this description. " We are supported in our view by the decision of Sir Thomas Strange in Veerapermall Pillai v. Narrain Pillai(( 1891) 1 Str. 91.), where a widow was held entitled to adopt a boy in furtherance of her husbands general intention in lieu of another indicated by him, but who was not available the same principle has been adopted by the Bombay High Court in Lakshmibai v. Rajaji(( 1897) I. L. R. 22 Bomb. 996.), where the boy who was indicated for adoption not being available, the adoption of another w7as upheld. 996.), where the boy who was indicated for adoption not being available, the adoption of another w7as upheld. " It would appear from the note 3 at p. 14 of Morleys Digest that instances have occurred in which a widow has made a second adoption on the failure of the first by death in fulfilment of a single injunction or authority from her husband, the object of such injunction being unattained unless the child live. Another instance of the husbands general intention being acted on by the widow without disapproval, even where the husband did not directly give authority for the adoption, is to be found in Ramasawmi Aryan v. Vencataramaiyan from this Presidency reported in L. E. 6 Ind. Ap., p. 196. So that the practice of the community has been in accordance with our view of the law." In this view of the case it became unnecessary for the learned judges to decide whether the assent of the sapindas validated the adoption or not. They nevertheless thought that the assent was given in terms too general and at a time too remote to be of any use. Do Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that on the evidence there was no sufficient proof of Venkata Narasu ever having given to his wife any authority to adopt. Assuming that an authority to adopt was given in the terms deposed to by the witnesses, it was not sufficient to authorize the adoption in suit. It was general in terms to adopt a son. That power was exhausted as soon as an adoption had been made under it. It did not extend to authorize a second adoption after the death of the adopted son. That was a contingency not contemplated by the grantor, Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 65 and the power to make a second adoption could not arise by implication. A power to adopt must be strictly followed. A second adoption had no religious motive, for the salvation of the ancestor, which was the religious motive for adoption, was secured by the adoption of the first son, even if his death followed very soon afterwards, as in this case. Reference was made to Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 397, 433); Mutsaddi Lal v. Kundan Lal (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. Reference was made to Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 397, 433); Mutsaddi Lal v. Kundan Lal (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 55.); Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi (( 1900) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 128.) ; Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee (( 1892) L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 108.) ; Chowdhry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh (( 1869) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 350.); Teeloke Chundur Race v. Gyanchunder Raee (( 1847) S. D. A. Beng. 554.); Gournath Chowdhree v. Arnopoorna Chowdhrain (( 1852) S. D. A. Beng. 332) ; Mohendrolall Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee (( 1864) Corytons Rep. 42.) ; Purmanund Bhuttacharuj v. Oomakant Lahoree (( 1828) 4 Sel. Rep. 318.) ; Amirthayyan v. Ketharamayyan (( 1890) I. L. R. 14 Madr. 65.); Sri Balusu Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshmamma (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 113, 142); 1 Stranges Hindu Law, 78, 79; Maynes Hindu Law, 6th ed. par. 114, p. 143; Lakshmibai v. Rajaji (I. L. R. 22 Bomb. 996.) ; Shamchunder v. Narayni Dibeh ((1807) 1 S. D. A. Beng. 209.); 1 Morleys Digest, p. 14, note 3 ; Narayanasami v. Kuppusami (( 1887) I. L. R. 11 Madr. 43.) ; Ramasawmi v. Venkataramaiyan (( 1879) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 196, 202.) ; Sreemutty Dossee v. Tarrachurn Koondoo (( 1865) Bourkes Rep. A, O. C. 48, 55) ; Parasara Bhattar v. Rangaraja Bhattar. (( 1880) I. L. R. 2 Madr. 202.) It was next contended that the assent to the second adoption given by the two sapindas, who were remote collateral relations of the husband, did not validate the adoption in suit. It was not shewn that any discretion had been exercised in giving permission to adopt. The terms of the assent were very general, and it was not shewn to have been acted on within a reasonable time after it had been given see West and Buhler, H.L. p. 967 ; Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy (12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 397, 441) ; Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (( 1876) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154, 188, 193); Rajah Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkata Ramalakshmi Narsayya (( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 1.); Karunabdhi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar. (( 1880) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. Ind. Ap. 397, 441) ; Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (( 1876) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154, 188, 193); Rajah Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkata Ramalakshmi Narsayya (( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 1.); Karunabdhi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar. (( 1880) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 173, 177) W. C. Bonnerjec, for the respondents, contended that the power of adoption given in this case was effectual to validate the adoption in suit. It was a question of the nature and extent of the power given in this particular case. There was no necessity to refer to other cases. Each case must be decided on its own circumstances. There was nothin in the authority given by Venkata Narasu to confine the power of adoption within the limits of a single exercise, or to necessitate the construction that by one adoption the power was exhausted. As long as a previously adopted son was dead, the power existed to make a fresh adoption. In the case cited on the other side from ( 1852) S. D. A. the direction was confined to adopting one son, and the power so given must be restricted according to its terms. Here the terms were general, and there was no authority or reason for restricting them. Reference was made to the synopsis in Stokes Hindu Law Books; Golapchandra Sarkars Tagore Lectures, 234 ; Surendra Nandan v. Sailaja Kant Das Mahapatra(( 1891) I. L. R. 18 Calc. 385, 392.); Lakshmibai v. Rajah(I. L. R. 22 Bomb, 996.), which was a case governed by the Mitakshara, and not the Mayukha. The District Judge was right in deciding that the assent of the three sapindas was sufficient to validate the adoption, even if it were not strictly or at all within the power given by the husband. There was no law that only the immediate reversioners could give the required assent of the sapindas. It was contended that the adoption in suit was in all respects legal, valid, and effectual. De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 66 SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. In this case there is no dispute about the facts, but two questions of law arise, both of which are of considerable importance. De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 66 SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. In this case there is no dispute about the facts, but two questions of law arise, both of which are of considerable importance. Venkata Narasu, a Brahmin landowner in the district of Ganjam, in the Madras Presidency, died intestate and without issue on February 6, 1861, leaving the second respondent, Venkata Ratnamma, his widow and sole heiress, him surviving. Before his death he verbally authorized his wife to adopt to him, and it is found by the learned judges of the High Court that the authority was " in general terms, requiring her to adopt so as to continue his line, and to provide for his spiritual benefit. He did not indicate any particular person for adoption, either by name or otherwise, and placed no restrictions whatever on his wifes discretion." Twenty-four years after her husbands death, on May 1, 1885, the widow adopted a son of one of her sisters, but this child died in February, 1886, and twelve years later, on June 10, 1898, she adopted the first respondent. Prior to making this second adoption she obtained the consent of the elder representatives of two branches of her husbands family. The representatives of two other branches refused their consent, and on October 7, 1899, brought the present suit to set aside the second adoption, as having been neither authorized by her husband nor made with the consent of his sapindas. Upon these facts the first question which their Lordships have to determine is whether the authority to adopt given by the husband was exhausted by the first adoption ; or whether, on the death of the son first adopted, the authority of the husband survived so as to empower the widow to make a second adoption. So far as their Lordships have been informed, there is no decisive text of the ancient Hindu lawgivers upon this point. The earlier English authorities express conflicting views. So far as their Lordships have been informed, there is no decisive text of the ancient Hindu lawgivers upon this point. The earlier English authorities express conflicting views. Sir P. Macnaghten, writing in 1824, at p. 175 of his Considerations on the Hindu Law, says— "If a woman be empowered by her husband to adopt a son, and if she does adopt one accordingly, it has never, I believe, been declared by any writer that this power can go beyond the adoption of one, or, without special authority from the husband, be extended to the adoption of another if the first adopted should die." Sir William Macnaghten, writing in 1829, is less positive— "It is a disputed point," he says," whether a widow having, with the sanction of her husband, adopted one son, and such son dying, she is at liberty to adopt another without having received conditional permission to that effect from her husband. According to the doctrine of the Dattaka Mimansa, the act would clearly be illegal; but Jagannatha holds that the second adoption in such case would be valid, the object of the first having been defeated " Hindu Law, i. 86. Sir Thomas Strange, writing in 1830 as to the law prevalent in Madras, says — "There exists nothing to prevent two successive adoptions, the first having failed, whether effected by a man himself, or by his widow or widows after his death, duly authorized" Hindu Law, i. 78. There are not many reported cases on the point. In Morleys Digest (i. 14), published in 1850, there is a note to the effect that " instances have occurred in which a widow has made a second adoption on the failure of the first by death, in fulfilment of a single injunction or authority from her husband, the object of such injunction being unattained unless the child live." Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 67 The case of Gournath Chowdhree v. Arnopoorna Chow drain (( 1852) S. D. A. 332.) is a distinct authority that where a widow is directed to adopt a son, she cannot adopt a second if the first adopted son dies. This case was decided by the Bengal Sudder Court in 1852, and is cited in modern text-books as establishing the proposition. This case was decided by the Bengal Sudder Court in 1852, and is cited in modern text-books as establishing the proposition. The issue to be determined in the case is thus stated in the report— "There being no permission in the unoomuttee puttur" (or deed of adoption) " to adopt (children) one after another, is it proper, according to the shaster, to adopt one (child) after the death of another ? " The bywusta of the pundit to whom this question was submitted by the Court was— “The deed put in does not restrict the adoption to one son only, and therefore, on the death of the previous adopted son, another may be adopted." In their judgment the learned judges first cite the passage from Sir William Macnaghten quoted above, omitting the last sentence relating to Jagannathas opinion, and go on to say— "As it is a principle of Hindoo law that, without permission, no son can be adopted, it is a fair legal inference that a second adoption on the death of the first child, when the husband is no longer alive to grant permission to adopt, cannot be valid." Their Lordships are unable to attach much weight to this decision. It discards the opinion of the pundit, refers to no previous decisions, does not attempt to discuss the conflicting views of the vernacular authorities cited by Macnaghten, and rests upon an inference which begs the whole question. Whether, and how far, this case is still followed in Bengal, it is not necessary now to inquire. For the purposes of this appeal it is enough to say that it is not a binding authority in Madras. The learned judges of the High Court, one of whom is a Hindu lawyer of great distinction, in their judgment say— "The cases in Calcutta to which our attention has been drawn adopt what appears to us to be too artificial a rule of construction in that they practically disregard the question of intention;" and they hold that " when the general intention of a Hindu to be represented by an adopted son is clear, as in this case, there seems no reason why effect should not be given to such intention, if it is possible to do so without contravening the law." The practice of the community, they add, has been in accordance with this view. As regards this particular case, they say— " The object and purpose of the authority given by the husband was to perpetuate his family as well as to secure his spiritual benefit, and it would be unreasonable to hold that an accident such as the early death of the boy first adopted should be allowed to frustrate the fulfilment of his object, and to preclude the widow from making another adoption in the absence of any legal impediment to her doing so." Their Lordships agree with the learned judges of the High Court in the opinion that the main factor for consideration in these cases is the intention of the husband. Any special instructions which he may give for the guidance of his widow must be strictly followed; where no such instructions have been given, but a general intention has been expressed to be represented by a son, their Lordships are of opinion that effect should, if possible, be given to that intention. This more liberal rule has been followed by the High Court of Bombay, as well as in Madras, and is not without support Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 68 in Bengal. In a compara tively recent case reported, Surendra Nandan v. Sailaja Kant Das Mahapatra (I. L. R. 18 Calc. 385.) the learned judges of the High Court at Calcutta say, at p. 392 — "Looking at the religious efficacy that ensues from the adoption of a son by a widow to her deceased husband, we think the Court should not be too astute to defeat an adoption, but should rather do its utmost to support it unless such adoption is clearly in excess or in breach of the power to make it." The limitations to the application of the rule are indicated in the judgment of this Committee in the Ra7iinad Case (12 Moo, Ind. Ap. Ap. 397, at p. 443,), in which their Lordships say — "Inasmuch as the authorities in favour of the widows power to adopt with the assent of her husbands kinsmen proceed in a great measure upon the assumption that his assent to this meritorious act is to be implied wherever he has not forbidden it, so the power cannot be inferred when a prohibition by the husband either has been directly expressed by him, or can be reasonably deduced from his disposition of his property, or the existence of a direct line competent to the -full performance of religious duties, or from other circumstances of his family which afford no plea for a supersession of heirs on the ground of religious obligation to adopt a son in order to complete or fulfil defective religious rites.5 In the present case it is abundantly clear that the husband desired to be represented by a son after his death, and that he placed no specific limitation on the power to adopt, which he entrusted to his widow. His object was twofold—to secure spiritual benefit to himself, and to continue his line. Both these objects are meritorious in the view of the Hindu law, and both are in consonance with the feelings known to prevail throughout the Hindu community. In the absence of a natural son, both can be obtained only by adoption. Funeral rites may be performed, and certain spiritual advantages secured, to the deceased by a near male relative ; but it is stated in the Dattaka Chandrika, a work of some authority in Southern India (s. 1, pi. 22), that— " Although by reason of the nephews possessing the representation of the filial relation, he may be the means of procuring exemption from exclusion from heaven, and so forth; still, as the celebration of name and the due perpetuation of lineage would not be attained, for the sake of the same, the constituting him (an adopted son) is indispensable." In his able argument on behalf of the appellants, Mr. De Gruyther contended that, by the adoption of the first adopted son, all the spiritual benefit to be derived from the Act was secured to the deceased, and that the adoption of a second boy was, therefore, supererogatory and could not be held to be justified by the husbands sanction. De Gruyther contended that, by the adoption of the first adopted son, all the spiritual benefit to be derived from the Act was secured to the deceased, and that the adoption of a second boy was, therefore, supererogatory and could not be held to be justified by the husbands sanction. This contention is disposed of by the judgment of Romesh Chunder Mitter J. in the case of Ram Soondur Singh v. Surbanee Dossee (( 1874) 22 Suth. W. R, 121,), in which a similar argument was put forward— "Is there anything," says that learned judge, "in the general Hindu law in support of the contention . . . . ? No passage from any of the treatises on the Hindu law, and no texts of the Hindu shaster have been cited. As far as I am aware there is none in its support. On the other hand, the broad proposition for which the learned counsel contends will in a great many cases defeat the essential object for which every Hindu desires to adopt, viz., the continuance of the spiritual benefit to be conferred upon him after his death. An adopted son attaining an age of sufficient maturity and by performing the religious services enjoined by the shasters, cannot exhaust the whole of the spiritual benefit which a son is capable of conferring upon the soul of his deceased father; because these services are enjoined to be repeated at certain stated intervals, and the performance of them on each successive occasion secures fresh spiritual benefit to the soul of the deceased father. .... I am, therefore, of opinion that the contention.... is opposed to the general principles of the Hindu law." Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 145 ( 1905- 1906) Kannepalli Suryanarayana V. Pucha Venkata Ramana 69 These observations apply with the greater force to the present case, as the boy first adopted died when little more than two years of age. For the reasons stated, their Lordships agree with the High Court that the adoption of a second boy in this case was valid, and that the widows authority to adopt was not exhausted by the first adoption. For the reasons stated, their Lordships agree with the High Court that the adoption of a second boy in this case was valid, and that the widows authority to adopt was not exhausted by the first adoption. In the view which they take of the case it is not necessary for their Lordships to consider the second question raised upon this appeal, viz., whether, if the widows authority had been held to have been exhausted, there was sufficient con sent on the part of the husbands sapindas to validate the second adoption. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court of Madras ought to be confirmed and the appeal dismissed. The appellants must pay the respondents costs of the appeal.