JUDGMENT : Knox, J.:— Notice was served upon Mr. Sarvadhicary, an Advocate of this Court, to shew cause why his name should not be removed from the roll of Advocates of this Court or such other order passed as, to the Court, shall seem meet. 2. The cause which led to the issue of this rule was that under date June the 1st, 1906”, a publication appeared called the Cochrane. It contained an article entitled “Honourable High Court.” To the publication is appended a foot-note to the effect that it is “printed by A. Gani and published by Mr. Sarvadhicary, Barrister-at-Law”. In the rule which issued it is set out that this publication contains scandalous and unbecoming remarks in reference to certain Judges of this Court before whom Mr. Sarvadhicary practises, and that in publishing the said paper Mr. Sarvadhicary has been guilty of conduct unworthy of a Barrister. 3. In shewing cause the Advocate concerned began by taking exception to the jurisdiction of the Court. He contended that section 8 of the Letters Patent of the 17th of March, 1866, gave: the Court no power over Barristers and that the Advocates contemplated by section 8 were only those Advocates whom this Court might by Rule 183 of the Rules of Court admit to the Roll of Advocates. But that the contention has been raised it would seem hardly necessary to answer it. Section 7 of the ‘Letters Patent in express words authorises and empowers this Court to approve, admit and enrol such Advocates as to them may seem meet. Section 8 gives the Court power to make rules for the qualification and admission of proper persons and empowers the Court to remove or suspend from practice on reasonable cause Advocates so enrolled. Under the power so given the Court has made a Rule, rule 180, permitting Barristers of England or Ireland to present an application for admission to the Roll of Advocates. Even so no Barrister lias, merely by reason that he has been called to be a Barrister the right to expect that his application will, as a matter of course, be granted. Rule 182 provides that the application be considered by the Chief Justice and Judges present for the time being in Allahabad and thereupon they may, if they think fit, order that the applicant be admitted to the Roll of Advocates of this Court. Rule 182 provides that the application be considered by the Chief Justice and Judges present for the time being in Allahabad and thereupon they may, if they think fit, order that the applicant be admitted to the Roll of Advocates of this Court. Moreover, the concluding words of section 8 effectually dispose of this objection. They are as follows:— “No person whatsoever but such Advocate” (viz., an Advocate admitted under Rule of this Court) “shall be allowed to act or plead for or on behalf of any suitor in the said High Court”. The right of any Barrister to appear in this Court rests upon his being admitted to the Roll of Advocates to this Court and not upon his being called to the Bar. 4. We overruled this objection. 5. The Advocate concerned then argued that under rule 197 of the Rules of the Court his case must be tried by the Chief Justice and Judges present for the time being in Allahabad. We overruled this objection also. Rule 2 empowers a Bench of three Judges to hear and decide all charges against Advocates in respect of professional or other misconduct for which an Advocate may be removed or suspended from practice. Rule 197 provides for cases in which the Chief Justice and Judges may for good cause and without charge or trial suspend or remove from the roll of Court any Advocate of the Court. The rule has no application to the case before us. 6. The advocate concerned next attempted to justify the matter which appeared in the Cochrane under date June, the 1st, 1906; The line of argument which he adopted was that(1) what he had set out therein was set out by him in his capacity of Editor and not in his capacity of Advocate of this Court; (2) that what's was contained in the paper were mere opinions expressed in all honesty by an Editor without malice and with a view to correct errors; (3) that nothing had been said in a contemptuous way, and that (4) the only misconduct of which this Court could take) notice was misconduct on his part with reference to clients. 7. We shall first deal with the last two of these contentions. 8. A very similar contention was put forward In re Weare, [1893] L.R., 2 Q.B.D., 439. and brushed aside by Lord Esher with the following remarks. 7. We shall first deal with the last two of these contentions. 8. A very similar contention was put forward In re Weare, [1893] L.R., 2 Q.B.D., 439. and brushed aside by Lord Esher with the following remarks. “It is argued that if an offence committed by a Solicitor is not an offence in his character as a Solicitor, or having relation to his character as a Solicitor, then, however, monstrous it maybe the Court has not authority to strike him off the rolls because the act is not done in his capacity as a Solicitor. That would seem to me to be a very strange doctrine if it were true that a person convicted of a crime however horrible must, if it be not connected with his professional character be allowed by the Court still to be a member of a profession which ought to be free from all suspicion.” The offence in this case was a personally disgraceful offence. 9. We know of no authority and the Advocate concerned has referred us to none to shew that the misconduct intended by rule 2 bears the limited meaning which he seeks to put upon it. Section 8 of the Letters Patent empowers the Court to remove and suspend upon “reasonable cause,” words which have a much wider range than mere misconduct. It is wholly unnecessary for us to point out that the profession of an Advocate is an honourable profession, and that this Court is concerned in seeing that those who are on the roll of Advocates maintain by their acts and conduct not merely the honour of the body to which they more immediately belong, but also the honour of the Court of which by reason of their enrolment they form an integral part. Any act which tends to discredit or bring into contempt the order of Advocates or the Court amounts to misconduct of which this Court can take notice. Acts which on the part of a private individual offend against the dignity of the Court or are (Calculated to prejudice the course of justice and are in his case.contempts of Court do not cease to be acts of misconduct because they are committed by an Advocate. Rather are they aggravated in as much as the Advocate is bound to uphold and maintain the dignity of the Court. Rather are they aggravated in as much as the Advocate is bound to uphold and maintain the dignity of the Court. Acts which scandalize the Court as libels on its integrity, on the integrity of its Judges, (officers and proceedings are all instances of such misconduct Ex parte Turner, 3 Moot., D. & D., 523.; Reg v. Castro, L.R., 9 Q.B., 219.. A case very much in point is the Lechmere Charlton case, 2 Myl & Cr., 316.. In that case Mr. Lechmere Charlton, a Barrister, sought (as the attempt has been made in this case) to distinguish a letter, written after a case was concluded, reflecting upon the conduct of a Master in Chancery as being both unexpected and inexcusable, and couched in threatening terms, as an act done by him not as a mere Barrister but as a gentleman. He maintained that he has a right to ask (or what would become, he said, of the boasted independence of the British Bar) “if a counsel thus insulted, tricked and defeated is not to be allowed to complain of the deception that has been practised upon him in the manner that one gentleman usually complains of the ill-treatment that he has received from another, without being hoisted up for contempt of a superior Court, and an upright and enlightened Judge.” He freely declared that he harboured no sort of ill-will towards Master Brougham, that it was of his judicial conduct alone that he complained and which he hoped would have ‘been corrected. Lord Chancellor COTTENHAM in giving judgment held that “Every writing, letter, or publication which has for its object to divert the course of justice is a contempt of the Court. It is for that reason that publication of proceedings which have already taken place, when made with a view of influencing the ultimate result of the cause, have been deemed contempts. It would be strange, indeed, if the Judges of the Court were the only persons not protected from libels, writings and proceedings, the direct object of which is to pervert the course of justice. It would be strange, indeed, if the Judges of the Court were the only persons not protected from libels, writings and proceedings, the direct object of which is to pervert the course of justice. Every insult offered to a Judge, in the exercise of the duties of his office, is a contempt; but when the writing or publication proceeds farther, and when, not by inference, but by plain and direct language, a threat is used the object of which is to induce a judicial officer to depart from the course of his judicial duty, and to adopt a course he would not otherwise pursue, it is a contempt of the very highest order.” 10. The Advocate concerned not only admits but attempts to justify the following passages in the Cochrane of the 1st of. June, 1906:— I. “For the Chief Justice is in the potestas of that gentleman who sits with him. The non-Chief Justice proposes, and the Chief Justice dittoes. One day when he had to act alone knowing we believe his talent was not adequate he invited Mr. Justice Burkitt and thus he sat and Sir William Burkitt worked for him. This was objected by the Counsel. So our Honourable Chief Justice was angry. Had our Honourable gentleman been as independent as his predecessors respectively, Sir John Edge and Sir Arthur Strachey, he would have never openly taken help. Another instance of his dependence was that he is not confident of his ability. For when he writes a judgment he sends it to another Judge for correction who examines; we had shown to our readers an instance in which the Chief wrote a letter to Mr. Blair stating that he sent a judgment to him and requested him that he should, correct the judgment, insert proper words and then return it to him. Thus helped as he is, he must give help when it is necessary, so when Mr. Balir assailed the Counsel who was in his bad book, by saying hold your tongue and others and when the remarks were dittoed, our Honourable Chief Justice shielded them punishing the Counsel, although the quarrel was started by Mr. Blair and he was entirely to blame. So we can say without the fear of contradiction, that our Honourable Chief Justice is not an independent man.” II. Blair and he was entirely to blame. So we can say without the fear of contradiction, that our Honourable Chief Justice is not an independent man.” II. “There is another reason that induces us to think that he “(alluding to Mr. Justice Richards)” has never studied our law properly for the reason that a lawyer does nothing that goes against him. Having asked a respectable Counsel to hold his tongue, which is a defamatory expression, one might be impressed with the idea that he has never received any legal education. By employing the expression he has shown that he is not at all a lawyer, and a Judge not qualified enough.” III. “We do not know whether the associates of our Honourable gentleman “(again alluding to Mr. Justice Richards)” have made the London public houses their favourite resorts whence they have learned it and our Honourable gentleman learned it from them to honour the High Court Counsel, and this is the only Way in which he honours them.” IV. “If he once say my Lord you please do the same (hold your tongue) then our Honourable Chief Justice who might not be qualified enough for the due discharge of the routine of work, but he is the most competent, in hurling his unerring javelin at the Counsel will too readily do so inflicting a deep wound which will not cure in the process of time which will fester and bleed afresh and the wound only heals up, when the aggrieved party courts death. So our readers can easily see that we have a;wonderful Chief Justice who punishes an assailed and not an assailant with miraculous readiness and activity. He punishes not the wrong doer, but the wronged and thus he upholds justice. Can you furnish a parallel to this, our readers? We can confidently say not at all.” 11. So our readers can easily see that we have a;wonderful Chief Justice who punishes an assailed and not an assailant with miraculous readiness and activity. He punishes not the wrong doer, but the wronged and thus he upholds justice. Can you furnish a parallel to this, our readers? We can confidently say not at all.” 11. Up to the close of the case and even after the learned Government Advocate whom we called upon on behalf of the Bar and as amicus curiae had commented on the scandalous tone in which these publications were couched, the Advocate concerned expressed no regret of any kind but strenuously maintained that he was “fully prepared to justify” and did “justify all he had written.” After reading and weighing carefully each word contained in these passages we can only express our astonishment and regret that any person of light and learning can still maintain as did the Advocate concerned that he had said nothing and written nothing in a contemptuous way. We are not dealing with an ignorant person but with an Advocate who, as he himself tells us has received his education in the University of Edinburgh, was a student of the Society of Grays' Inn and was called to the Bar therefrom. 12. We have no alternative but to condemn every one of these passages as being scandalous writing and the writer as having in writing and in publishing them been guilty of misconduct unworthy of an Advocate of this Court. 13. The Advocate concerned sought to justify and defend what he had written by calling our attention to other issues of the Cochrane and by arguing that because there was not a single Judge of whom he had not said something bad but also something good, and that the two must be considered in the light of a set off one against the other. We regret to have to say it but we must say it that this attempt at explanation merely aggravates the misconduct. As the learned Government Advocate pointed to us at the hearing and as we have afterwards been at the pains of verifying these so-called expressions of praise are in every instance almost used as a foil to set off in a more conspicuous and aggravated manner scandalous matter that the Advocate was bent on publishing. The files are on the record and speak for themselves. 14. The files are on the record and speak for themselves. 14. We need hardly add that we had much rather that our attention had not been called to these passages. But it was the Advocate concerned who compelled us to look at them and to consider them. Our attention being called to them we can only adopt in the words of Mr. Justice HOLROYD, Rex v. Davison, 4 B and Ald., 329. that “in the case of an insult to himself it is not on his own account that the Judge commits, for that is a consideration which should never enter his mind. But though he may despise the insult, it is a duty which he owes to the station to which he belongs, not to suffer those things to pass, which will make him despicable in the eyes of others. It is his duty to support the dignity of his station, and uphold the law, so that, in his presence, at least, it shall not be infringed.” 15. Hitherto we have not said anything about the reckless want of truth that disfigures each one of the passages set out above from the Cochrane of the 1st of June, 1906. 16. The Advocate concerned has made no attempt to support the statements contained in those passages by evidence of any kind. It is true that he has filed an affidavit, but the only fact affirmed in that affidavit is that on the 19th April, 1906, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice RICHARDS did use the expression “Hold your tongue” when the Advocate was arguing a case before him. 17. Regarding the first part of the passage No. 1, an attempt was made to justify it on the ground that it was an opinion. As regards the second part we understand that the Advocate found in a book, to which he obtained access by reason of its being in the library of the Court, a letter which was not addressed to him, but to another gentleman. That letter he admits having perused, without authority from either the writer or the person addressed and having perused it he considers that he acted meritoriously in not forwarding it to the Secretary of Slate but in returning it with a letter of his own to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice who was the writer. That letter he admits having perused, without authority from either the writer or the person addressed and having perused it he considers that he acted meritoriously in not forwarding it to the Secretary of Slate but in returning it with a letter of his own to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice who was the writer. We have always understood that in any civilised country it is considered a dishonourable act to peruse a private letter not intended for the reader's perusal and addressed to another person. Such conduct is understood everywhere as conduct unworthy of any person who claims the status of a ‘gentleman. But for the admission made by the Advocate concerned we should have found it difficult to believe that any one admitted to the Honourable Society of the Inns of Court could have considered it proper to do such an act and still less having done it to attempt to justify his conduct. Moreover, the incident here mentioned is a good instance of the way in which acts in themselves proper have been distorted by the Advocate concerned in order to bring the Court into contempt with the outside public. It has long been the established practice of this Court that where two or more Judges have heard a case and are agreed as to the general tenor of a judgment that one Judge should prepare the judgment and submit it for the opinion and criticisms of his fellow Judge or Judges. These criticisms are duly considered and, if accepted, the judgment issues as the Judgment of the combined Court. It is an instance of this nature that the Advocate concerned has distorted, and we fear we must say it, has wilfully distorted. The extracts II, III and IV where they reflect upon the Hon'ble the Chief Justice or the Judge referred to are, the Advocate concerned considers, sufficiently explained by the remark that they are opinions. 18. Regarding the first and second contentions raised it is hardly necessary for us to follow the Advocate into the flimsy duality of persons which he attempts to set up. We are in this case concerned with Mr. Sarvadhicary, Barrister-at-Law, who has subscribed the article. It is in our opinion an article intended;to scandalize the Court in the eyes of the public and the writer is responsible for it as an Advocate of this Court. 19. We are in this case concerned with Mr. Sarvadhicary, Barrister-at-Law, who has subscribed the article. It is in our opinion an article intended;to scandalize the Court in the eyes of the public and the writer is responsible for it as an Advocate of this Court. 19. Two days after the case had been argued and judgment reserved, the Advocate tendered to the learned Chief Justice who was taking applications, the following petition:— “That in respect to the proceedings which have been taken by the Court against your petitioner under section 8 of the Letters Patent your petitioner has since himself considered the whole matter and taken the advice of some friends and he begs now to express his unfeigned and deep regret at the publication of matter considered to be derogatory to the Hon'ble Judges and calculated to bring the administration of justice into contempt. 2. “That your petitioner regrets that he acted without deliberation and upon sudden impulse in writing the article which has given rise to proceedings against him. 3. “That your petitioner was under the honest impression that in writing the article which on maturer consideration he does not now seek to justify he was not acting as an Advocate but irrespective of his belief or impression in the matter he now withdraws all offensive and derogatory remarks about this Court and expresses his unqualified regret in so far as his conduct has appeared to the Judges of this Hon'ble Court as unbecoming an Advocate and as otherwise than duly respectful to them, and trusts that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to accept this apology.” 20. Looking to the tone of this belated apology we feel ourselves unable to accept it. Moreover we cannot lose sight of the fact that this is not the first time this Advocate has been found guilty of misconduct. He was suspended for three months for disrespect shown to a Judge in open Court and only re-admitted, to practise upon his tendering an apology to the Court. Notwithstanding this he, in the article under consideration, refers to the incident in the following terms:— “The quarrel was started by Mr. Blair (the Judge to whom disrespect was shown) and he is entirely to blame.” 21. To accept the apology now tendered would be to use the words of Mr. Notwithstanding this he, in the article under consideration, refers to the incident in the following terms:— “The quarrel was started by Mr. Blair (the Judge to whom disrespect was shown) and he is entirely to blame.” 21. To accept the apology now tendered would be to use the words of Mr. Justice Wills “a stretch of charity which would degenerate into absurd and ridiculous weakness.” 22. We are unanimous in arriving at the conclusion that Mr. S.B. Sarvadhicary has been guilty of gross misconduct in publishing an article containing the passages set forth above. 23. The order of the Court is that Mr. S. Sarvadhicary be suspended from practice for a period of four years with effect from this date.