Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1906 DIGILAW 167 (ALL)

Dost Mohammad Khan v. Upper India Bank, Limited

1906-07-06

KNOX, STANLEY

body1906
JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This is an application to have it declared that a number of villages which were included in a mortgage, executed by the ancestor of the appellant in favour of the Bank of Upper India, Limited, are not saleable in execution in view of the provisions of section 2 of Act No. XV of 1895, entitled the Crown Grants Act, 1895. The circumstances of the case are as follows:— Some years prior to 1895, the predecessor in title of the appellant mortgaged these villages along with others to secure a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 or thereabouts, advanced to him by the Bank. A suit for sale of the mortgaged property was brought, by the Bank and a decree for sale was passed on the 22nd of, January, 1895. Subsequently that decree was made absolute and portions of the property comprised in the mortgage have already been sold in execution of it. No appeal was ever preferred from the decree and the time for doing so has long since elapsed. The Act, to which we have referred, came into operation on the 10th of October, 1895, that is about 9 months after the decree had been obtained. The mortgage debt of the Bank not having been fully satisfied by the sale of the property already had, the Bank, on the 13th of September, 1901, applied for the sale of the 6 villages in question. An objection to the sale was taken by the appellant and the grounds of objection so far as they are material, or so far at least as they are relied upon in the present appeal are as follows, namely, that the villages were “granted by the Government in lieu of service on condition of rendering service and remaining faithful to Government.” It is contended that in view of section 2 of the Act in question nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act applies or can be deemed ever to have applied to any grant ok other transfer of land made by or on behalf of Her late Majesty, her heirs and successors*** in favour of any person whomsoever, and the sale by the Court in execution of the decree of the 22nd of January, 1895, of these villages is thereby precluded. The language of the grant has not been accurately stated in the objection. The language of the grant has not been accurately stated in the objection. According to the translation of it, which appears in the judgment against which an appeal is sought to be preferred, the grant was an absolute grant of certain property including the villages in question and the only condition in the grant is that the grantee should always be loyal to the British Government and should act zealously in time of trouble and disorder. It is difficult to interpret section 2 of the Crown Grants Act, but from a perusal of the preamble to the Act it is reasonably clear that the object of the Legislature in passing the Act was to validate any provisions, restrictions, conditions, and limitations over, which might be contained in any Crown Grant and which otherwise might be held to be obnoxious to the restrictions imposed in respect of grants generally by the Transfer of Property Act. We do not think that it was intended by the Legislature that unconditional grants made by the Crown free from restrictions as to alienation should not be the subject of a sale at the suit of a mortgagee. But be this as it may, it appears to us, that it is too late now for the appellant to put forward the objection which was preferred in the Court below. The decree was passed so long ago as the 22nd of January, 1895, and is a valid and binding decree. All that the executing Court has to do now is to carry out that decree. It was not open to the executing Court to question the propriety or legality of the decree, non was it open to this Court in appeal from an order of the executing Court to go behind the decree and to say that the same has no force or operation. We think, that the present application is a remarkably courageous one. Under the circumstances we cannot see our way to hold that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council, and we therefore dismiss the application with costs, including fees in this Court on the higher scale.