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1906 DIGILAW 170 (CAL)

Ayenuddin Nasya v. Srish Chandra Banerji

1906-07-31

body1906
JUDGMENT 1. The question raised in this appeal is one between two rival claimants to two occupancy holdings, which at one time were owned by one Dharmo Narain Das. He mortgaged them to the Plaintiff Company sometime before the year 1898. In that year, the Plaintiff obtained a mortgage-decree against the widow of Dharmo Narain Das and, in execution thereof, purchased the two holdings on the 14th November 1899. On the 13th November of the same year, however, one of these two jotes or rather the right, title and interest of Dharmo Narain Das in one of them as they existed at that time, were brought to sale in execution of a rent decree obtained by some one or other of the fractional shareholders of the estate in which the holdings were situate and, at that sale, the landlord decree-holder made the purchase. This was followed up by a purchase of the other holding in similar circumstances on the 17th November of the same year, that purchase also being made by a fractional landlord. These two persons, subsequently, that is to say, on the 24th January 1900, gave a lease of their purchase interest to the present Defendants. And, according to the Plaintiff's case, they were dispossessed by these persons shortly after their lease. We observe here that in the plaint presented by the Plaintiff Company, the occupancy holdings of Dharmodas were stated to be transferable holdings. This, however, was denied by the Defendants, and thereupon, an issue was raised in the Court of first instance, whether the holdings in question were transferable according to custom or usage. The Munsif found that the holdings were not transferable according to custom or usage and accordingly dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. On appeal, however, the District Judge has come to a different result. He is of opinion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the question of the transferability of the holdings does not properly arise in this case, and, finding the other matters raised between the parties in favour of the Plaintiff Company, he has allowed them a decree reversing that of the Court of first instance. The main point that has been discussed before us in this appeal is, whether the question as to the transferability of the holdings owned by Dharmodas properly arises in this case. The main point that has been discussed before us in this appeal is, whether the question as to the transferability of the holdings owned by Dharmodas properly arises in this case. No doubt, if the question was between the assignee of the interest of Dharmodas, the tenant, and the landlord, the Plaintiff could not recover possession of the holdings without proving that they were transferable according to custom or usage. But the position of the parties to this suit is substantially different. No doubt, on the 13th November and on the 17th November 1899, the holdings were brought to sale at the instance of some one or other of the part proprietors in execution of the decrees obtained for their shares of the rent due upon the holdings in question; but, as already. indicated, all that could be sold and, indeed, all that was sold was what may be described as the right, title and interest of Dharmodas, as they existed at the time when the sales were held; and it is obvious, therefore, that though the purchases on the 13th and 17th November 1899 were made by some of the landlords, they, by their purchases simply stepped into the shoes of Dharmodas, and they could not take any higher position than what Dharmodas himself could take upon the dates when the sales were effected. And when they leased the lands to the present Defendants, they could only lease to them what they were entitled to lease, namely, the right, title and interest of Dharmo Narain as they existed at the date when the lease was granted. On the other hand, we have it, as already noticed, that the raiyat had already pledged the two properties in question to the Plaintiff Company; and they, in execution of the mortgage-decree that they had obtained against the legal representative of Dharmo Narain, brought the two properties to sale and purchased the same themselves. That being so, the co-sharer landlords, when they made the two purchases on the 13th and 17th November 1899, did so subject to the mortgage-decree which the Plaintiff Company held, and subject also to the sale which took place at their instance. That being the position of the parties, it seems to us that the question whether the holdings owned by Dharmo Narain were transferable according to custom and usage does not properly arise in this case. That being the position of the parties, it seems to us that the question whether the holdings owned by Dharmo Narain were transferable according to custom and usage does not properly arise in this case. If Dharmodas were the Defendant In this suit, and his right, title and Interest had not been sold away in the manner in which they were sold and purchased by the Defendant's lessors, it is apparent that it would not be open to him to raise such a question against the Plaintiff. He would have been estopped by his own acts and conduct. [See Bhagirath Changa v. Sheikh Hufizuddin 4 C.W.N. 679 (1900)]. As already mentioned, the position of the Defendants not being that of the landlord contesting the title of an assignee from Dharmodas, we are of opinion that it is not open to them to take a higher stand than Dharmodas could, and to raise the question of the transferability of the holdings in this case. In this connection, we may also refer to the case of Ambica Nath Acharjee v. Aditya Nath Moitra 6 C.W.N. 624 (1902), and to an unreported decision of this Court in S.A. 655 of 1897, Basarat Mondol v. Sabulla Mondol 2 C.W.N. eelxxix (1898), where, in somewhat similar circumstances, it was held by this Court that the question of transferability cannot, properly, be raised. Upon these grounds, we are of opinion that the judgment of the District Judge is right and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.