JUDGMENT 1. The question raised in this appeal is not altogether free from difficulty. It arises in this way: A certain proprietor who had got his name registered under the Land Registration Act died, and he was succeeded by his heirs, and these heirs, without getting their names registered under Act (VII, B. C. of 1876), assigned over the rent due to the proprietor and to themselves to the Plaintiff. They also parted with their proprietary Interest In favour of a third party. The Plaintiff sought to recover the rent assigned over to him In respect of the period both antecedent and subsequent to the death of the proprietor; and the question was raised whether he could maintain such a suit, having regard to the provisions of sec 78 of Act VII (B. C.) of 1876. Both the Courts below, as also Mr. Justice Mitra, on Second Appeal, have held that the terms of sec. 78 do not stand in the way of the Plaintiff suing for the recovery of this rent. Sec 78 runs thus:-" No person shall be bound to pay rent to any person claiming such rent as proprietor or manager of an estate or revenue-free property in respect of which he is required by this Act to cause his name to be registered or as mortgagee unless the name of such claimant shall have been registered under this Act." The section contains, as It were, a penal provision-a provision which debars a person, who claims as proprietor, and who is required by the Act to cause his name to be registered, from recovering rent, if the tenant does not choose to pay such rent to him. Obviously, therefore, that section has no application to the case of a person in the position of the Plaintiff; for, he does not claim the rent as proprietor, nor is he a person who is required by the Act to cause his name to be registered. But then it may be said, as it has been said before US, that, if the assignor himself was, under this section, under a legal disability to claim the rent, because his name was not registered, he could not, simply by reason of the assignment, confer upon the assignee a right higher than what he possessed. But then it may be said, as it has been said before US, that, if the assignor himself was, under this section, under a legal disability to claim the rent, because his name was not registered, he could not, simply by reason of the assignment, confer upon the assignee a right higher than what he possessed. No doubt, this is an argument which deserves some consideration; and at one lime, we were disposed to think that this argument should be given effect to; but on further consideration, having regard to the fact that sec 78 of Act VII of 1876 is the only provision which prohibits a proprietor from bringing a suit for recovery of rent against a person who is not bound to pay him such rent unless he gets his name registered, it seems to us that the Plaintiff, being a person who does not come within this prohibitory section, cannot be said to be under the same legal disability as his assignor was. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion, though not without some hesitation, that the view adopted by Mr. Justice Mitra ought not to be dissented from. We may add that so far as the rent that was proved to have been due during the life-time of the late proprietor is concerned, there cannot be any question that the Plaintiff is entitled to it, notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 78 of Act VII (B. C.) of 1876. And as an authority for this view, we may refer to the observations of the learned Judges who decided the case of R. Belchambers v. Nawab Sir Syed Hussan Ali, 2 C.W.N. 493 (1898) the particular passages that we have in view being found in pp. 495 and 497. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.