JUDGMENT Ghose, C.J. - This is an appeal, under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, from an order of Mr. Justice Rampini discharging a Civil Rule No. 3859 of 1905, and differing from the opinion expressed by Mr, Justice Mookerjee who thought that the rule should be made absolute. The Appellant obtained a rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the applicant's appeal should not be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, on the ground that the applicant had sufficient cause, within the meaning of sec. 5, cl. (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, for not presenting his appeal within the said period. Admittedly, the appeal was about three months out of time, and the applicant desired to have deducted in his favour the time during which he was engaged in prosecuting an infructuous application for review before the District Judge. Mr. Justice Rampini, however, declined to extend the period, as prayed, and the opposite party has raised the preliminary objection before us that no appeal lies against the order complained of by the Appellant, that order not being a "judgment " within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. The definition of the word "judgment" was enunciated by Couch, C.J., in the case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. 8 B.L.R. 433 (452) (1872). This definition has never been departed from, but has always been followed. And we think that that definition should be followed for the purposes of the present case. Sir Richard Couch observed :- "We think that 'judgment' in cl. 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." Now, applying this definition to the order passed by Mr. Justice Rampini, it seems to us that the order merely debars the Appellant from reviving his appeal, which by operation of law was a dead appeal, against a decree which had finally determined the respective rights and liabilities of the parties thereto. Justice Rampini, it seems to us that the order merely debars the Appellant from reviving his appeal, which by operation of law was a dead appeal, against a decree which had finally determined the respective rights and liabilities of the parties thereto. The rule that had been granted was discharged; and it put an end, not to the defunct appeal, but to a proceeding in which the Appellant sought to have that appeal admitted and registered, though already time-barred. The proceeding in question was something distinct and independent: it did not, and could nor, involve any question or consideration of the rights and liabilities of the parties. It may no doubt be said that an order which terminates a proceeding is a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15, but it must be a proceeding, as we understand it in the course of a suit or in relation thereto, and in which some question or other as to the right or liability of any party is raised, and not a proceeding in respect of a matter which had already come to termination by operation of law or otherwise. 3. Our attention has been called to certain other cases in which the leading case, to which reference has been made, was considered. We think the weight of authority is in favour of the view we have expressed, though none of the cases are precisely in point. 4. In Kishen Pershad Panday v. Tiluck dhari Lall ILR 18 Cal. 182 (1872), in which all the previous cases on the subject were discussed, it was held that an order of a Judge in the Privy Council department refusing to extend the time within which security is required to be furnished for the costs of the Respondent, and directing the appeal to be struck off, is not a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. The question that was before the Judge was whether the applicant had succeeded in making out a case of sufficient cause for the indulgence of an extension of time. In this respect, the decision arrived at that no appeal lay under cl. 15, is a distinct authority for the view we take in the present appeal. 5. In Mohabir Pershad v. Adhikari Kunwar ILR 21 Cal. 473 (1894), the view adopted was that a refusal to exercise the discretion giveu by sec. In this respect, the decision arrived at that no appeal lay under cl. 15, is a distinct authority for the view we take in the present appeal. 5. In Mohabir Pershad v. Adhikari Kunwar ILR 21 Cal. 473 (1894), the view adopted was that a refusal to exercise the discretion giveu by sec. 608 of the Code to a Judge or Bench of Judges to order security for costs was not appealable under cl. 15 of the Letters Fatent. It was pointed out that such refusal affects no right or liability by determining any question which affects the merits of the dispute between the parties in any sense. The decision of the senior Judge, Mr. Justice Norris, discharging the rule, was held to be not open to appeal. 6. Then, in the recent case of Mulji Virji v. Bangabashi Saha 9 C.W.N. 502 (1905) the matter was one of review, and the Court (Maclean, C.J., and Holmwood, J.), on a consideration of the authorities, held that the order of a single Judge (the other Judge having left the Court) refusing an application for review-on the ground that no case had been made out for rehearing the appeal-was not a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. In delivering judgment, the learned Chief Justice said :-" The case had already been tried on the merits. The judgment was given on those merits and that was the judgment which decided the rights of the parties, and that stands good. In these circumstances, it would be going too far to hold that this is a 'judgment' within the meaning of the section (cl. 15)." 7. Reliance, however, was placed by the learned vakil for the Appellant on the case of Brij Coomaree v. Ramrick Das 5 C.W.N. 781 (1901), where the point was whether an order made by Mr. Justice Stanley refusing to stay the issue of probate and the discharge of the Receiver appointed in a probate action was appealable under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. Mr. Justice Stanley's: views were expressed in the following terms : -" Lender these circumstances, I shall not take the responsibility of staying the execution of the decree. Justice Stanley refusing to stay the issue of probate and the discharge of the Receiver appointed in a probate action was appealable under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. Mr. Justice Stanley's: views were expressed in the following terms : -" Lender these circumstances, I shall not take the responsibility of staying the execution of the decree. It is pointed out to me that if I do not put some stay on the grant of probate, probate will be handed to the Plaintiff forthwith and an appeal will be rendered nugatory, To prevent this, I will give an opportunity to the Defendant of filing his petition of appeal and also of appealing against this order. I shall discharge this rule with costs but I shall give the Defendant a fortnight from this date to make such application to the Court of Appeal as she may be advised and I shall stay issue of probate for one fortnight from this date and also the order discharging the Receiver." On appeal against the order of Mr. Justice Stanley, Maclean, C.J., in giving his judgment which was concurred in by Banerjee and Hill, JJ., observed:-"In my opinion, the order of July 4th has decided the very important question, very important in this particular case, that notwithstanding the appeal-for although such appeal had not actually been filed when Mr. Justice Stanley's judgment was delivered, it proceeds upon the footing that one was about to be filed immediately-the Respondent was entitled to the immediate control of the estate, a decision which, if the appeal be successful, would, as I have already said, possibly render it absolutely infructuous, and the case, to my mind, falls within the definition of a judgment given by Sir Richard Couch and is consistent with the observation of the Privy Council in the case of Hurish Chinder Chowdhry v. Kali Sunderi Debi ILR 6 Cal. 579 (1881) : on apeal: L.R. 101. A. 4 : S.C. ILR 9 Cal. 482 (1882). 8. In the circumstances related, it is sufficiently obvious that very little assistance can be derived from the decision that Mr. Justice Stanley's order amounted to a judgment. The order which is the subject of the present appeal, and which discharged the rule obtained by the Appellant, was altogether different in its nature and effect from the order dealt with in the case to which we have just referred. Justice Stanley's order amounted to a judgment. The order which is the subject of the present appeal, and which discharged the rule obtained by the Appellant, was altogether different in its nature and effect from the order dealt with in the case to which we have just referred. The case, therefore, cannot be accepted as an authority for the proposition put forward by the learned vakil for the Appellant. 9. We observe that in another portion of his judgment in the case of Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Das 5 C.W.N. 781 (1901), the learned Chief Justice remarked that the definition of the word 'judgment' as given in the case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. 8 B.L.R. 433 (1872) is not exhaustive. Possibly, it is not; but still we are unable to say that an order refusing to enlarge the time for preferring an appeal, which was already dead at the time, can be regarded as a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15. 10. We have also been referred to certain decisions of the Madras High Court. None of these de (sic) appear, on examination, to be (sic) in point or to embody any principle according to which the present appeal can be admitted for consideration on the merits. We, therefore, refrain from discussing those decisions as it would serve no useful purpose to do so. 11. For these reasons already stated, we are of opinion that the preliminary objection must prevail and without expressing any opinion upon the merits of the appeal, we direct that it be dismissed. 12. We make no order as to costs. Harington, J. 13. I only desire to add to the judgment to which I am a party that, in my opinion, the Appellant ought, pending the disposal of his review, to have made his application for extension of time within which to file the appeal before the time for appealing had run out. Had he done so, he would, if his application were refused, have still been able to enter his appeal. I think that the rule that parties should make their applications for extension within time should be adhered to whenever possible. Caspersz, J. I concur.