JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule calling on the District Magistrate of Murshidabad and the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate at Lalbagh, dated the 26th May 1906, should not be set aside and such other order passed as to this Court may seem fit on the ground that the police-report disclose that there was the likelihood on which reliance is placed does not of a breach of the peace, which alone would give a Magistrate jurisdiction to proceed under sec. 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The initial proceeding in this case was instituted by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Lalbagh on a police-report which showed that the two parties were disputing about the possession of a tank and that they were big zemindars; and the Police stated that though there was nothing to show that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace, it was not impossible that there should be a breach of the peace. 2. This is not sufficient for the institution of the proceedings under sec. 145, Cr.P. C. The proceedings in this case were initiated on an application made on behalf of the opposite party for an order under sec. 144 of the Code. The Sub-divisional Magistrate referred the matter to the Police, and as usual the Police thereupon made a report in which it was stated that it was not impossible that there should be a breach of the peace. The police-report as it is cannot be and ought not to be the foundation of a proceeding under sec. 145, Cr. P. C. The opinion expressed by the police-officer without sufficient materials ought not to be the ground of the institution of the proceedings. The Sub-divisional Magistrate has referred to a previous Police case, but the accused in that case were acquitted on appeal, the Appellate Court holding that there was nothing done by the accused which would justify a conviction. 3. Under such circumstances we think that the order complained of should be set aside, and we direct accordingly. 4. Our attention has been drawn to certain cases by Mr. P. L. Roy who has appeared on behalf of the opposite party. We are of opinion that each case must be judged on its own merits. 3. Under such circumstances we think that the order complained of should be set aside, and we direct accordingly. 4. Our attention has been drawn to certain cases by Mr. P. L. Roy who has appeared on behalf of the opposite party. We are of opinion that each case must be judged on its own merits. In this case there was no such likelihood of the breach of the peace as should induce a Magistrate to institute proceedings under sec. 145, Cr. P. C. The rule in accordingly made absolute.