Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Courts (April 11, 1902), affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow (October 12, 1900) of ejectment against the appellant. The title to the Taluqa of Samarpaha in the district of Rae Bareli, in Oudh, was in dispute in this appeal. The rival claimants were the appellant, who based his title on an alleged adoption of his father, Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh, and the respondent, who claimed to succeed as next heir under Act I. of 1869, s. 22, clause 6. The last male owner was Thakur Basant Singh, who died in 1857, and was succeeded by Thakurain Daryao Kunwar, his widow, not in right of her husband, but in her own right, at whose death on November 13, 1893, the disputed succession opened. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 156 ( 1905- 1906) Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh V. Raja Rameshar Bakhsh Singh 71 To a suit by the respondent claiming as statutory heir as above stated, and alleging that the defendant Sher Bahadur Singh had been illegally placed in possession of the taluqa by the Revenue authorities, the defendant pleaded in effect that the provisions of s. 22 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, did not apply to the succession to taluqdars who were women, but if they did he, as the adopted son, and not the respondent, was the Thakurains heir, and that at all events the respondent was not entitled to oust him from possession of the estate without having in the first instance obtained a declaration that his, the defendants, adoption was invalid, and that the right to obtain such declara tion had long since been barred by limitation. He further averred that his adoption was valid under the Hindu law and the customs of the thakurs of the Bais clan. The respondent replied denying the adoption, and alleging that there was no necessity to sue to set it aside. He further averred that his adoption was valid under the Hindu law and the customs of the thakurs of the Bais clan. The respondent replied denying the adoption, and alleging that there was no necessity to sue to set it aside. The Subordinate Judge decided, amongst other things—(1.) that Sher Bahadur had been formally adopted as the son of Basant Singh on April 25, 1858, but that the said adoption was invalid in law without the consent of the husband; he found that the special custom set up was not proved, and that no permission to adopt had, in fact, been given by Basant Singh to his wife (2.) that the suit was not barred by limitation and (3.) that the succession was governed by Act I. of 1869, s. 22, under clause 6 of which the respondent was the next heir to the Thakurain. He accordingly decreed ejectment with mesne profits. Upon the question of limitation the ground of the decision was that as the plaintiff was suing for possession of the estate, and not for a declaration that the defendants adoption was invalid, his right to sue was not barred, as his cause of action accrued on November 13, 1893, when the Thakurain died. The material passage of the judgment bearing on this point is as follows ?— "It has been urged on behalf of the defendant that the present suit is barred by article 118, Schedule II., Act XV. of 1877 as the adoption of the defendant became known to the plaintiff and his ancestors more than six years before the institution of this suit. Article 129 of Act IX. of 1871 provided a period of twelve years for suits to establish or set aside an adoption from the date of the adoption (or at the option of the plaintiff) from the date of the death of the adoptive father. That article has been broken up into two articles 118 and 119 under the present Act XV. of 1877. of 1871 provided a period of twelve years for suits to establish or set aside an adoption from the date of the adoption (or at the option of the plaintiff) from the date of the death of the adoptive father. That article has been broken up into two articles 118 and 119 under the present Act XV. of 1877. Article 118 provides a period of six years for suits to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid or never in fact took place from the time when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff and article 119 provides the same period for suit to obtain a declaration that an adoption is valid, from the time when the rights of the adopted son as such are interfered with. In interpreting article 129 of Act IX. of 1871 their Lordships of the Privy Council held in Jagadamba v. Dakhina (L. R. 13 Ind. Ap. 84.) that the words to set aside adoption meant suits in which the validity or invalidity of an adoption was brought into question and applied to all suits in which the suitor could not succeed without displacing an apparent adoption in virtue of which the opposite party was in possession. The principle enunciated in the above case was re-affirmed by their Lordships in Mohesh Narain v. Taruck Nath. (( 1892) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 30.) The above decisions were given with reference to article 129 of the old Act of 1871. I have not been referred to any authoritative decision of their Lordships on the scope of article 118 of the present Act (XV. of 1877). It is contended on behalf of the defendant that the principle enunciated in the above rulings is applicable to cases governed by the existing law. On the other hand it is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the words in article 118 denote exclusively a suit confined to a declaration, and exclude a suit for possession or other relief. In Parvathi Animal v. Saminatha Gurukal (( 1896) I. L. R. 20 Madr. 40.) and in Shrivanas v. Hanmant (( 1899) I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 260.) it was held that the principle Laid down by Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. In Parvathi Animal v. Saminatha Gurukal (( 1896) I. L. R. 20 Madr. 40.) and in Shrivanas v. Hanmant (( 1899) I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 260.) it was held that the principle Laid down by Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 156 ( 1905- 1906) Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh V. Raja Rameshar Bakhsh Singh 72 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Jagadambas case (1) was applicable to article 118 of the present Act and that a plaintiff could only succeed in his suit for possession if he could prove that his suit was not barred under article 118. As against the above cases there has been a strong current of decisions the other way. It was held in the following cases that article 118 of the present Act did not apply to a suit for possession of immovable property though it might be necessary for the plaintiff to prove the invalidity of an adoption Basdeo v. Gopal (( 1886) I. L. R. 8 Allah. 644.) ; Lola Parbhulal v. Mylne (( 1887) I. L. R. 14 Calc. 401.); Ghandarap v. Lachman Singh (( 1888) I. L. R. 10 Allah. 485.); Padajirav v. Ramrav (( 1888) I. L. R. 13 Bomb. 160.); Natthu Singh v. Gulab Singh (( 1895) I. L. R. 17 Allah. 167.); Fanyamma v. Manjaya (( 1895) I. L. R. 21 Bomb. 159,); Hari Lal v. Bai Rewa (( 1895) I. L. R. 21 Bomb. 376.) ; Jagannath v. Runjit Singh (( 1897) I. L. R. 25 Calc. 354.) ; Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh (( 1899) I. L. R. 27 Calc. 242.) ; Mussamat Bhagana v. Barjore Singh. (( 1898) Oudh Cases, vol. i. p. 30.) “……..There seems to be a consensus of opinion in most of the High Courts that article 118 of the present Act does not apply to suits for possession and I do not think we are justified in departing from it without the distinct authority of the Privy Council.” The Court of the Judicial Commissioner concurred in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, and that the succession to the estate in litigation was governed by Act I. of 1869, s. 22. In regard to the adoption, the Court agreed that a Hindu widow could not validly adopt without the authority of her husband; and also affirmed the findings of fact that no authority had been given by Basant Singh, and that no custom had been proved altering the general law so as to dispense with such authority. On the other question of fact as to whether Thakurain Daryao Kunwar had formally adopted Sher Bahadur on April 25, 1858, the said Court reversed the finding of the Subordinate Judge, and found that there was no formal adoption, but only a revocable nomination of a successor to the estate on the death of Thakurain Daryao Kunwar. Cohen, K.C., and IF. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that the provisions of s. 22 of Act I. of 1869 do not apply to the succession of taluqdari estates granted to women, but only to male taluqdars. The respondent was not heir to the deceased Thakurain under the Hindu law, and could only come in, if at all, as statutory heir under clause 6 of that section. The Courts below relied on Brij Indra Bahadur Singh v. Janki Kunar (( 1877) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1, 13.) as an authority the other way. But in that case the question was neither raised nor discussed, and it was assumed on all sides that s. 22 applied. Sect. 22 was not in terms made applicable to female taluqdars, whose case falls naturally under s. 23 see also s. 22, clauses 7 and 11. The defendant, as adopted son, was entitled under s. 22, clause 1, if that section applied, to succeed in preference to the respondent, who only claimed under clause 6. The main ground of appeal was that of limitation. The defendant had been de facto adopted, and the suit was barred by limitation because it necessarily raised the question of the invalidity of that adoption, in reference to which a suit to declare it was barred before the present suit was filed. Act IX. of 1871 applied, and as no suit had been brought within the time fixed by that Act—see art. 129 of its schedule—the validity of the adoption could not be questioned in this suit. Act IX. of 1871 applied, and as no suit had been brought within the time fixed by that Act—see art. 129 of its schedule—the validity of the adoption could not be questioned in this suit. The adoption was made in 1858, and the right to dispute its validity was barred and extinguished before the death of the Thakurain in 1893 ; and accordingly the title which accrued under it became complete under s. 2 of Act XV. of 1877. The principle Laid down in Jagadambas case(l), that where a suit to set aside an adoption was barred so also was any suit which in order to succeed must first get rid of the adoption, applies equally to Act XV. of 1877, Sched. II., art. 118 see Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohun Roy Chowdhry (L. R. 13 Ind. Ap. 110.); Mohesh Narain Munshi v. Taruck Nath Moitra (L.R. 20 Ind. Ap. 30, 35.) ; Parvathi Ammal v. Saminatha Guruka (( 1896) I. L. R. 20 Madr. 40.); Shrinivas v. Hanmant (( 1899) I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 260, 270); Barot Naran v. Barot Jesang (( 1900) I. L. R. 25 Bomb. 26.); Ramchandra Mukerjee v. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 156 ( 1905- 1906) Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh V. Raja Rameshar Bakhsh Singh 73 Ranjit Singh (( 1899) I. L. R. 27 Calc. 242 253..) ; Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Nilratan Mukerji, (( 1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 990, 996.) De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that he was entitled under s. 22, clause 6, of the Act, which section applied. The case in 5 Ind. Ap. 1 was exactly in point. A woman there was taluqdar in her own right, and her name was entered in lists 1 and 2 under the Act. It was held that succession to her estate was governed by s. 22. The case of female taluqdars is not excepted from that section in express terms, and there was no reason or authority for excluding them by implication. Sect. 28 only applied to taluqdars whose names are entered in list 4. He referred to Haidar Ali v. Tassaduk Rasul Khan (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 82.); Maharajah Pertab Narain Singh v. Subhao Koer. (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. Sect. 28 only applied to taluqdars whose names are entered in list 4. He referred to Haidar Ali v. Tassaduk Rasul Khan (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 82.); Maharajah Pertab Narain Singh v. Subhao Koer. (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 228, 233) As to the validity of the adoption, which was made without the husbands assent, the cases since 1816 were uniform to the effect that it was invalid, and are to be found collated in Tulshi Ram v. Behari Lal. (( 1889) I. L. R. 12 Allah. 328, 370, 381, 386) The real question in reference to the adoption was the question of limitation. The suit was in 1899. The respondent was born in 1875, attained majority in 1896, and sued within three years of attaining it. There was no cause of action until the death of the Thakurain in 1893, for she was fully entitled in her own right, and the respondent had no title until her death. If, on the other hand, time ran from the date of the adoption, there was still no right to sue to set it aside until the respondent had some vested interest opposed to it see Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tevar (( 1875) L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 169.) ; Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards. (( 1880) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 14, 21.) It was contended that Act XV. of 1877, and not Act IX. of 1871, was the applicable law of limitation. The case was governed by art. 144 of Sched. II. of the later Act. Article 118 differed in its terms from art. 129 of the earlier Act, and did not apply to a suit for possession. It only applied to declaratory suits under the Specific Belief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42 see illustration (f). There had been no acquisition of title by the appellant in virtue of an apparent adoption within the meaning of s. 2 of Act XV. of 1877. Nor could it be Laid down under Act XV. of 1877 that a plaintiff must sue for a declaratory decree before suing for possession, and that his suit for possession is barred if a declaratory action is barred see Lali v. Murlidhar (( 1901) I. L. R. 24 Allah. 195, 197); Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar (( 1894) L. R. 22 Ind. Ap. of 1877 that a plaintiff must sue for a declaratory decree before suing for possession, and that his suit for possession is barred if a declaratory action is barred see Lali v. Murlidhar (( 1901) I. L. R. 24 Allah. 195, 197); Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar (( 1894) L. R. 22 Ind. Ap. 51.); Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh (I. L. R. 27 Calc. 242, 254.); Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh (( 1897) I. L. R. 25 Calc 354, 359); Shrinivas v. Hanmant(I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 260.); Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal. (( 1902) 1. L. R. 26 Madr, 291, 297,) Cohen, K.C., replied, contending that the suit was barred by Act IX. of 1871 and could not be revived by Act XV. of 1877, and relying on the case in 24th Bombay Reports. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow. The matter in dispute is the title to the Taluqa of Samarpaha, in the district of Rae Bareli, in Oudh. The appellants claim is based on an alleged adoption. The respondent claims as next heir under Act I. of 1869, s. 22, clause 6. The last male owner of the Taluqa was Thakur Basant Singh, He died on November 12, 1857. His Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 156 ( 1905- 1906) Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh V. Raja Rameshar Bakhsh Singh 74 next heir was his widow Thakurain Daryao Kunwar. After the confiscation of proprietary rights in Oudh by the proclamation of March, 1858, a summary settlement of the Taluqa was made with her on May 10, 1858, and a sanad was afterwards granted to her. On the preparation of the lists of taluqdars in accordance with the provisions of Act I. of 1869, her name was entered in lists 1 and 2. It is not disputed that the Thakurain became taluqdar, not in right of her husband Basant Singh, but in her own right. The Thakurain died intestate on November 13, 1893. On the preparation of the lists of taluqdars in accordance with the provisions of Act I. of 1869, her name was entered in lists 1 and 2. It is not disputed that the Thakurain became taluqdar, not in right of her husband Basant Singh, but in her own right. The Thakurain died intestate on November 13, 1893. Shortly after her death, the appellants father, Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh, being found in possession and claiming under an adoption alleged to have been made in his favour by the Thakurain after her husbands death, had his name entered by the Deputy Commissioner in her place in the Revenue register. On May 27, 1899, the respondent, who attained majority in June, 1896, instituted the present suit, claiming to succeed as next heir in right of his grandfather, who was the eldest brother of the Thakurain. Both Courts decided in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed to His Majesty in Council, having obtained a certificate to the effect that the case fulfilled the requirements of s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the appeal involved substantial questions of law. Many questions were raised in the Courts below which have now disappeared, or were argued so faintly before their Lordships that it is not worth while to discuss them. The main contest throughout has been in regard to the alleged adoption of Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh. On this point there was a difference of opinion in the Courts below. The Subordinate Judge held that there was an adoption in fact, attended with the ordinary ceremonies of adoption, although it was invalid because the Thakurain had not the authority of her husband in the matter. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner held that there was no adoption in fact, but only a nomination of the defendant as the Thakurains heir, or, in other words, an adoption in a popular sense. On the appeal before their Lordships it was argued that there was at any rate an apparent adoption, and that, on that assumption, it mattered not whether the adoption was valid or invalid, because there was enough to satisfy the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1871, as interpreted by this Board in the case of Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohun. (L. R. 13 Ind. Ap. 84.) Mr. (L. R. 13 Ind. Ap. 84.) Mr. Cohen, who argued the case with great ability, relied entirely on the Act of 1871. He contended that the Limitation Act of 1877 did not apply because the appellant relied on title acquired before the passing of the Act of 1877, and his rights were therefore saved by s. 2 of that Act. He admitted that if the Act of 1877 applied, his client was out of Court. Their Lordships are unable to accede to Mr. Cohens argument. Giving full effect to the Jagadamba Case (1) and the other cases which followed it, they do not think that the immunity, such as it is, gained by the lapse of twelve years after the date of an apparent adoption amounts to acquisition of title within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act of 1877. Their Lordships think that the appeal may be disposed of on this short ground, whether the alleged adoption was or was not an apparent adoption to which the ruling in the Jagadamba Case (L. R. 13 Ind. Ap. 84.) would apply if the Act of 1871 were now in force. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to enter upon a consideration of the other difficulties in the way of the appellant. But they may observe in passing that if they had to choose between the opposite Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 156 ( 1905- 1906) Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh V. Raja Rameshar Bakhsh Singh 75 views of the Courts below as to the so-called adoption their Lordships would be disposed to prefer the view of the Judicial Commissioner. They may add that they are not satisfied that the finding of the Commissioner of Rae Bareli in 1878 in the suit between the Thakurain and the appellant (reported at an earlier stage before the Privy Council, 31. L. R., Calcutta, 645) on the issue of adoption or no adoption would not be fatal to the appellants case. Whatever objections there may have been to that issue being raised before the Commissioner on remand, both parties accepted it. It was treated as the main question in the suit. The issue was decided adversely to the appellant. The appellant abandoned an appeal to the Privy Council which he had begun, and so the decision became final. Whatever objections there may have been to that issue being raised before the Commissioner on remand, both parties accepted it. It was treated as the main question in the suit. The issue was decided adversely to the appellant. The appellant abandoned an appeal to the Privy Council which he had begun, and so the decision became final. Having regard to the language of the Code of Civil Procedure, s. 13, which deals with issues as well as suits, it would seem that the finding on the issue as to adoption must be treated as res judicata. This point, however, was only touched upon in the argument, and their Lordships therefore abstain from expressing a final opinion on the question. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.