JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of a certain sum of money due upon two promissory notes. It appears that Gopi Mohun De, Hara Chandra De, Baisnab Charan De and Ramjiban De, were members of a joint undivided Hindu family. Gopi Mohan had the charge of the management of the zemindaries, which the family possessed, while Hara Chandra De was the managing member of a trading business which they owned. One of these promissory notes was signed by Gopi Mohan for self and for Hara Chandra, and the other note, by Hara Chandra alone. The Court of Appeal below has found as a fact that the money advanced under the note executed by Hara Chandra was borrowed for the purposes of the joint trading business, and that the money that was lent under the other promissory note was for a certain joint family purpose; and, in this view of the matter, that Court has given the Plaintiff a decree against all the Defendants, namely, Gopi Mohan, Romesh Chandra, son of Hara Chandra (he being dead), Baisnab Charan and Ramjiban. On appeal to this Court by two of the Defendants it has been contended on their behalf that the Court of Appeal below was wrong in law in giving a decree against them, they being no parties to the promissory notes in question. It has been argued that the two notes are promissory notes within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and that, having regard to the provision of secs. 26, 27 and 28 of that Act, no body, who was not a party to those notes, could be held liable. On looking at the documents now before us, we may take it that they are promissory notes within the meaning of sec. 26, 27 and 28 of that Act, no body, who was not a party to those notes, could be held liable. On looking at the documents now before us, we may take it that they are promissory notes within the meaning of sec. 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; but it will be observed, on a reference to the sections upon which reliance has been placed by the learned vakil for the Appellants, that they refer to cases of an ordinary agenoy: they hardly touch an agency like that with which we are concerned, namely, where a member of a partnership business is authorized to enter into a contract on behalf of all the partners for the purpose of the partnership business, or where the managing member of a joint-undivided Hindu family may raise a loan or contract debt for the purposes of the joint family. The argument of the learned vakil for the Appellant really amounts to this, that those sections of the Negotiable Instruments Act have the effect of embodying in the Act substantially the same provisions as are to be found in sec. 23 of the Bills of Exchange Act (1882) in England. It will, however, be observed that, though it may be taken that the Negotiable Instruments Act has been framed on the same lines as the Bills of Exchange Act, yet the provisions of sec. 23 of that Act have not been extended here, and, in the absence of such a clear provision as is to be found in the said section, we are unable to hold that the effect of secs. 26, 27 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that, even if a loan be contracted by the karta of a joint undivided Hindu family for the purpose of their joint business or for the purpose of meeting a family necessity, none but those who are actually parties to the transaction is liable. We are of opinion that the argument advanced before us cannot be sustained; and we may observe that the view that we have just expressed finds support from the cases of Krishna Ayyar v. Krishna-sami Ayyar I. L. R. 23 Mad. 597 (1900) and Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu 7 C W. N. 725 (1903). For these reasonss we think that this appeal should be dismissed, and with costs.