JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - Appeal No. 27. The Judicial Committee in the case of Nilratan Mandol v. Ismail Khan Mahomed 8 C.W.N. 895: s.c. ILR 32 Cal. 51. 57 (1904) says the passage is to be found at page 61- "The question here, as in other similar cases, is whether the true inference from the facts is that the tenure is permanent or precarious, the burden of proof being on the tenant." In the present case, the Munsif and the Subordinate Judge have both arrived at the conclusion that upon the facts they have found in the case they are justified in inferring that the holding in question was of a permanent and not of a precarious nature. The question then we have to decide is whether they were justified in drawing that inference. I can hardly think that so experienced a Judge in these matters as Mr. Justice Mitra, although his language is perhaps a little ambiguous, meant to hold that this was really a question of fact in the sense that he would be bound by the findings of fact of the lower Appellate Court. He knows the difference between an inference to be drawn from facts and findings of facts themselves: and if I might draw an inference from his judgment,-I think he meant to hold that the lower Courts were justified in the inference that they drew. Be that as it may, the facts in this case from which the Courts below have drawn the inference in question are practically undisputed, and they came to this: -The origin of the lease is apparently not known, if lease there were, but it appears that the tenancy was created from 50 to 60 years ago; that it was a tenancy not for agricultural purposes but that it was created with the object of allowing the tenant to build a house on it for residential purposes. 1 think the finding amounts to be that a substantial building was erected upon this small plot of land, though that conclusion is challenged before us. I think the lower Courts intended to find and did find that a substantial building had been erected. Apparently there has been no interruption whatever of the tenancy during these fifty or sixty years, and there is nothing to show that there has been any alteration whatever in the rent, which apparently was very small. I think the lower Courts intended to find and did find that a substantial building had been erected. Apparently there has been no interruption whatever of the tenancy during these fifty or sixty years, and there is nothing to show that there has been any alteration whatever in the rent, which apparently was very small. It is true that there have been no dealings with the property except a dealing of a somewhat compulsory nature, namely, that it was sold in execution of a decree, and one of the Defendants was the purchaser under that sale. Those are the facts of the case; and it is contended that the Courts below were not justified in drawing the inference that they did. I think they were; and I am not disposed to think that we should interfere. I do not think that cases are of very much assistance to us in discussions of this nature, inasmuch as each case was necessarily dealt with on its own circumstances. There are, however, two cases, the facts of which are not dissimilar from the present. In the case of Gungadhur Shikdar v. Ayimuddin Shnh Biswas ILR 8 Cal. 960 (1882), the head-note is this and it is borne out by the judgment: "where it is conceded that lands were not let out for agricultural purposes, but that they had apparently been let out more than sixty years before suit for building purposes, the Defendant's ancestors having erected thereon a house more than sixty years before suit, and having, with the Defendants, resided there from first to last "as is in the case now before us "the Court is at liberty to presume that the land was granted for building purposes and that the grant was of a permanent character." There the Court (consisting of Chief Jutice Garth and Mr. Justice Mitter) says "If the land had originally been granted for agricultural purposes, then the Defendants would probably have had another answer to the suit, namely, that they had acquired a right of occupancy. Justice Mitter) says "If the land had originally been granted for agricultural purposes, then the Defendants would probably have had another answer to the suit, namely, that they had acquired a right of occupancy. But as the circumstances under which the original grant was made tend to show that it was made for building purposes, the Courts below were at liberty to presume that the grant was of a permanent nature." There is one other case which, as I have said, is very near the present,-perhaps a rather stronger case in favour of the tenant- Durya Prasad Misser v. Brindaban Sookul 7 B.L.R. 159: s.c. 15 W.R. 275 (1871). There the head-note is "the Plaintiff permitted B. to erect a thatched dwelling-house with mud walls on a piece of land belonging to the Plaintiff, and B. dwelt in it for more than forty years: Held, that B. had an assignable interest in the house and land, which could therefore be seized and sold in execution of a decree against B. and that the purchaser who had obtained possession could not be dispossessed at the suit of the Plaintiff." As I have said I do not think that cases in which the facts are different afford much assistance in these discussions. Each case must depend on its own circumstances. But I think upon the facts found in this case the Courts below were justified in the inference they have drawn. 2. The appeal, therefore, fails and must be dismissed with costs. This judgment, it is conceded, will govern Appeal No. 26 of 1900, which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Holmwood, J. I agree.