Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Judicial Commissioner (September 28, 1900), reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow (October 13, 1898). The Subordinate Judges judgment contained the following — " The plaintiff claims a share in the estate of her father, Darogha Mir Wajid Ali, who died on December 14, 1876, when the plaintiff was a minor. The ordinary period of limitation, computing from the original cause of action, expired during her minority. She claims exception from that period under the last paragraph of s. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act XV. of 1877, by virtue of which she can sue within three years from the cessation of her disability as a minor. Under the Indian Majority Act IX. of 1875, s. 3, paragraph 1, she would be deemed to have attained her age of majority on the completion of her twenty-first year." On the evidence he found that the plaintiff was born sometime at the close of 1871, and attained the age of majority at the end of 1892. The suit was brought in August, 1896, i.e., after three years from her majority, and therefore was barred. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner said — " As to the date of the plaintiffs birth and the date on which she attained her majority, it is now urged that in drafting the. plaint, the 1st Zikada, 1289 Hijri, was by mistake inserted for the 1st Zikada, 1290 Hijri, which corresponds to December 22, 1878, the fact that there were two months of Zikada in that year having been overlooked. It is said that the plaintiff attained her majority on September 4, 1894, so that on calculation her birth was in 1873, but the first month of Zikada in that year was wrongly taken as that in which her birth occurred." They came to the conclusion that the plaint contained a mistake, and that on the evidence December 22, 1873, was the date of the plaintiffs birth. De Gruyther, for the appellants. C. W. Arathoon, for the respondent Nanhi Begam. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This appeal raises a single question of fact, upon which the Courts in India have differed. De Gruyther, for the appellants. C. W. Arathoon, for the respondent Nanhi Begam. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This appeal raises a single question of fact, upon which the Courts in India have differed. The suit was brought on August 29, 1896, and the object of the suit was to recover the share to which the plaintiff (the first respondent) claimed to be entitled in the estate of her father Darogha Mir Wajid Ali, a Mahomedan of the Shiah sect. Her title was disputed upon many grounds not now in question. The only controversy left is as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. It was undoubtedly barred unless the plaintiff is entitled to the extension of time allowed by s. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. The plaintiff during her minority was under the guardianship of her mother, whereby the period of minority was extended to twenty-one years; and the section just referred to gave her three years from the date at which she attained her full age within which to bring her suit. The question, therefore, is whether she has shewn by sufficiently trustworthy evidence that she came of age within three years before commencing her suit. And that is the question on which the Courts in India differed. There are a few facts, and some dates, about which there is no doubt. The plaintiffs mother Moghal Jan lived for some years under Mutah marriage with Darogha, but on September 11, 1874, he married her by Nikah. Before the latter date she bore him a number of children, of whom some are said to have died in infancy, whilst three, a son and two daughters, survived, the plaintiff being the youngest of the three. Darogha died on December 14, 1876. On June 21, 1871, Darogha executed a codicil to his will, by which he shewed that he had already made provision in the will for the son of Moghal Jan, Amir Hasan by name, and now made provision for Munni Begam, the elder of the two daughters; and the will is framed in terms which have been rightly held to shew that at that time the plaintiff was not yet born. On May 29, 1875, Darogha made another will, in which he made provision for the plaintiff, as well as for her brother and sister. On May 29, 1875, Darogha made another will, in which he made provision for the plaintiff, as well as for her brother and sister. Thus it is clear that the birth of the plaintiff took place between June 21, 1871 and May 29, 1875. But, unfortunately, that is almost the only thing that is clear. The plaintiffs case, as stated in paragraph 7 of her plaint, was that she attained her age of twenty-one years on January 1, 1894, which would make the date of her birth to be January 1, 1873, and that is the date of birth sworn to by all her witnesses. Her witnesses were three in number, her mother Moghal Jan, her brother of the whole blood Amir Hasan, and her half-brother Tasadduk Husain, a son of Moghal Jan by a previous husband. [@ page LRIA 4] The mother said that the plaintiff was in her twenty-sixth year at the date when she gave her evidence. She said that the plaintiff was born on the 1st of the month Zikad; she added, " on the 1st Zikad of every year I tie a knot in a thread to celebrate her birthday.....I have already tied twenty-five knots in that thread." In cross-examination she said that at the date of the Nikah the plaintiff was in her second year, but almost immediately afterwards she said that at that date the plaintiff " was in the fourth year, a month less, it may be; three knots had already been tied." The examination of this witness was taken before a Commissioner, and it appears that an interval of several hours occurred before her re-examination, and then she sought to explain the contradiction in her previous evidence by saying, "When my Nikah took place she was in her second year and she was about four at the time of Darogha Wajid Alis death." Amir Hasan declared that at the time he was speaking the plaintiff was aged twenty-five years and five months. He followed his mother in saying that the last knot tied on the plaintiffs thread was the twenty-fifth, and in saying that the plaintiff was about four years old at the death of their father. He further confirmed his mother in saying that a thread with knots was kept to shew his own age, similar to that of his sister. He followed his mother in saying that the last knot tied on the plaintiffs thread was the twenty-fifth, and in saying that the plaintiff was about four years old at the death of their father. He further confirmed his mother in saying that a thread with knots was kept to shew his own age, similar to that of his sister. Tasadduk repeated the story about the practice of tying knots, and also said the plaintiff was about two years old at the time of the Nikah. That is the whole of the plaintiffs evidence. Their Lordships fully recognize that in India it is difficult to prove such facts as the date of birth, after a lapse of many years, and that it would be unreasonable to require such a class of evidence as would justly be demanded in this country. But the evidence must be such as to carry reasonable conviction to the mind. The evidence for the plaintiff is not only extremely scanty in amount, but extremely unsatisfactory in character. Moghul Jan directly contradicted herself as to the age of the plaintiff at the date of the Nikah. The story about the knots on the thread, indicating the plaintiffs age, broke down, because both mother and son said the knots tied were twenty-five in number, whereas if the birth took place at the time alleged, they ought to have been twenty-six. A like story was told about the knots on Amir Hasans thread indicating his present age. That story is entirely inconsistent with the statement of his age in his petition for cancellation of the certificate of guardianship, dated November 1 and 2, 1887. The case on the other side was that the plaintiff was born in the latter end of 1871. In support of that case there were also three witnesses called of whom it is enough to say that their evidence is as unsatisfactory as that of the plaintiff’s witnesses. The Subordinate Judge, who tried the case, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove her story as to the date of her birth. He further thought that it was shewn that the birth took place at the end of 1871, and he dismissed the suit. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner on appeal reversed that decision, and thought that on the evidence the plaintiff’s suit was shewn to be in time. He further thought that it was shewn that the birth took place at the end of 1871, and he dismissed the suit. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner on appeal reversed that decision, and thought that on the evidence the plaintiff’s suit was shewn to be in time. But the Court came to that conclusion by adopting a suggestion, apparently made for the first time in that Court, that confusion had been made between the 1st Zikad 1289, corresponding to January 1, 1878, and the 1st Zikad of the next Mahomedan year, corresponding to a later date in the same English year 1878. This point is purely one of fact, and there is no evidence to support it. If it had been put forward by the witnesses, and they had said that they had been thus misled, it might have carried weight; on the other hand, it might have been displaced by cross-examination. It appears to their Lordships very dangerous to adopt such a conclusion in a Court of Appeal, merely on the suggestion of the legal gentlemen representing one of the parties. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner further con sidered that some of the witnesses for the defence tended to support the plaintiffs case, but it appears to their Lordships that that evidence is too vague and unsatisfactory to lend material support to either case. Their Lordships agree with the Subordinate Judge to the extent of holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that she attained her full age within three years before the commencement of the suit. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Judicial Commissioners Court should be discharged with costs. The first respondent will pay the costs of the appeal.