JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This is an appeal against a decree of a learned Judge of this Court upholding the decrees of the Courts below. The decree-holder appellant obtained a decree against one Narain Das and another on the 25th of May, 1897, in the Small Cause Court at Calcutta. On the 2nd of October, 1899, he made an application to that Court for the execution of the decree. The proceedings, however, proved abortive. He renewed his application again on the 8th of August, 1902, which was within the three years allowed by law. The form which the application took was an application for what is termed a “seal warrant”—a proceeding which is not familiar to us in this Court. An order was passed upon this application on the 11th of August, 1902—the order being in these terms:— “Receive costs for execution, but do not issue it.” This is signed by a Judge of the Small Cause Court. The decree-holder then applied for a transfer of the execution case to Bareilly, and he applied to that Court for execution on the 22nd of September, 1903. His application was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation under article 179 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. That article prescribes a period of limitation of three years from, among others, the date of an application in accordance with law to a proper Court for execution, or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order. That article prescribes a period of limitation of three years from, among others, the date of an application in accordance with law to a proper Court for execution, or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order. The learned Judge of this Court stated that there was nothing to satisfy him that there was “a bond fide application made to enforce execution” and he observes:— “This view gathers strength from an endorsement which 1 find upon an application made by the decree-holder, on which neither I nor the learned vakil for the appellant can find any date, but which was apparently put into the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta some time in August, 1902.” The appellant asks that execution costs be received to save the decree from being time-barred and the endorsement of the Judge is:— “receive costs for execution but do not issue it.” Now that an application for a seal warrant is a step in aid of execution has been decided by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jagan Nath Khan v. Brojo Nath Pal, [1901] I.L.R., 29 Cal., 581.. In that case it was held that an application for a seal warrant to the Calcutta Small Cause Court is an application made in accordance with law for execution or to take steps in aid of execution of a decree. In the course of their judgment the learned Judges, RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ., observe as follows:— “The applications for seal warrants appear to us to have been applications in accordance with Jaw of execution or to take steps in aid of execution. We are not aware that it is necessary for the holder of a Small Cause Court decree, when seeking to execute his decree, to do more than apply for the issue of a seal warrant for the attachment and sale of his debtor's property. In any case such applications would certainly seem to us to be applications made in accordance with law to take steps in aid of execution.” In view of the information which has been given to this Court in regard to the nature of seal warrants by the Registrar of the Calcutta Small Cause Court, we entirely agree in the view thus expressed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the case referred to. We now come to the documents which did not satisfy the learned Judge of this Court that a bond fide application for execution was made. We have before us a stamped document coming from the warrant department of the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta which is entitled “an application for a seal warrant against first and second defendants.” The names of the parties are then given, the date of the decree of the Chief Judge, and the amount of that decree with costs, and following this is the acknowledgment of the payment of a fee of Rs. 6, which is the fee payable upon an application for a seal warrant. This document is signed by the plaintiff's pleader and is also signed by somebody, apparently an official of the Court. We also have before us a document of the same date which purports to be an application on behalf of the plaintiffs for an order that “execution costs in the shape of a seal warrant be received in this Court to save the decree from being barred.” Then the grounds of the application are stated as follows, namely:— “a similar application having been made on Tuesday last, the Court ordered a recall of the decree from the Court of Bareilly, which has not sent back the decree. That the plaintiff cannot wait as the decree is going to be barred.” Upon that in red ink is an endorsement containing, amongst others, a notification that on the 22nd of August, it was ordered that a “C.J.” (whatever that be) be transmitted to the District Court of Bareilly, that on 29th of August, 1899, application for a “C.J.” was filed and “C J.” issued, and that on the 29th of July 1902, on the application of the plaintiffs it was ordered that the decree be recalled. The order then passed is that which we have already stated, namely, “Receive costs for execution but do not issue it.” Now it is said that this is not a bond fide application for execution, “but we have no grounds for thinking that it was not bond fide. An application for execution was made in the ordinary form’ and Us. 6 were paid as the costs for the issue of a seal warrant. An application for execution was made in the ordinary form’ and Us. 6 were paid as the costs for the issue of a seal warrant. The Court not having the record before it was, it would seem, not in a position to issue the seal warrant, and therefore, no doubt, gave the direction that the seal warrant should not be forthwith issued. The only other matter to which we need refer is that the learned Judge of this Court says that from a return made to the commission issued by the Court for the purpose of ascertaining what a seal warrant is, it appears “that before the warrant is issued the applicant is also required to deposit Re. 1 on account of the wages of the peon to be placed in charge of the property “and that it was neither shown nor alleged that the extra money was paid, and therefore there was nothing to satisfy him that there was a bond fide application made to enforce execution. “We are unable to hold that the non-payment of this fee to the peon under the circumstances in any way affected the genuineness of the application for a seal warrant. It was, no doubt, due to the fact that the Court directed that the seal warrant was not to issue that the 1 rupee was not forthwith paid; if the seal warrant was not to issue forthwith there would be no immediate attachment of property and no occasion for the payment of the fee for the peon's services. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decrees of the learned Judge of this Court and of the Courts below, and we remand this case to the Court of first instance with directions that it proceed with the execution of the plaintiff's decree. The plaintiff decree-holder will be entitled to his costs in all Courts.