JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - I have had an opportunity of reading the judgment about to be delivered by Mr. Justice Mookerjee and I only desire to say that I entirely agree. Mookerjee, J. The facts which have given rise to the litigation out of which the present appeal arises are not disputed before us. One Chandra Kumar Bose, the brother of the Plaintiff Respondent Nanda Kumar Bose, died on the 24th August 1881, leaving a widow, Manikya Mala, the first Defendant to this suit, and an adopted son Aukhoy Kumar Bose. On the day of his death, Chandra Kumar executed a Will by which he made a disposition of his properties and also authorised his widow to take three sons successively in adoption, one after the death of another. Aukhoy Kumar attained his majority, married and died on the 25th January 1893, leaving a childless widow Bidhu Mukhi. Bidhu Mukhi died in July 1898, and shortly after, on the 29th August, Manikya Mala, the widow of Chandra Kumar, took the second Defendant Mohendra Chandra in adoption, professing to act in exercise of the power conferred upon her by the Will of her husand. The Plaintiff commenced this action on the 8th June 1904, for declaration that the adoption is invalid under the Hindu Law. The learned Subordinate Judge has made a decree in favour of the Plaintiff, declaring that the adoption of the second Defendant by the first Defendant is invalid. The Defendants, have appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the validity of the adoption has been sought to be maintained upon two grounds, namely, first, that upon a true construction of the Will of Chandra Kumar, the adopted son took a mere life interest, followed by a gift over to the widow of Chandra Kumar upon failure of the male issue of the adopted son, and consequently, the widow could divest her own estate by a second adoption; and, secondly, that as the adoption now in dispute was made after the death of the widow of the first adopted son, and at a time when the estate had reverted to the widow of Chandra Kumar, there was nothing under the Hindu Law to invalidate the second adoption. 2. The decision of the first question raised before us must depend upon the construction of the provisions of the Will of Chandra Kumar. 2. The decision of the first question raised before us must depend upon the construction of the provisions of the Will of Chandra Kumar. The first paragraph of the Will authorises the widow to take three sons successively in adoption, one after the death of another. The second paragraph provides as follows: My adopted son shall succeed to all the moveable and immoveable properties which I have. On the death of one adopted son and until the adoption of another son by my wife, all my properties shall remain in the ownership and possession of my wife as my ordinary heir and after my wife has adopted another son, the properties shall vest in him. 3. The third paragraph of the Will provides for the management of the estate during the minority of the adopted son, and lays down that the estate is to be made over to him when he attains majority. The learned vakil for the Appellants contended that the adopted son took a life interest in the estate, and that upon his death the estate did not pass to his widow, but reverted to his adoptive mother. We are unable to accept this contention as well-founded. Under sec. 82 of the Indian Succession Act, which was made applicable to Hindus by sec. 2 of the Hindu Wills Act, " where property is bequeathed to any person, he is entitled to the whole interest therein of the testator, unless it appears from the Will that only a restricted interest was intended for him." This is substantially the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in Tagore v. Tagore L. R. I. A. Sup. 47, 65 (1872) where their Lordships observed that "if an estate were given to a man simply without express words of inheritance, it would in the absence of a conflicting context carry by Hindu Law, (as under the present state of law, it does by Will in England), an estate of inheritance." We feel no doubt that under the Will of Chandra Kumar, his adopted son took an absolute interest, subject to a condition of defeasance. The question therefore arises whether the executory gift over took effect in the present case. In view of sec. The question therefore arises whether the executory gift over took effect in the present case. In view of sec. 111 of the Indian Succession Act, made applicable to Hindus by the Hindu Wills Act, 1870, and the decision of the Judicial Committee in Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamal Basini Dasi L. E. 23 I. A. 18 (1896) we must hold, that the gift over did not take effect Here a legacy is given to the widow of the testator if a specified uncertain event, namely, the death of the adopted son of the testator shall happen; no time is mentioned in the Will for the occur rence of that event; the legacy cannot therefore take effect unless the specified uncertain event, namely, the death of the adopted son, happens before the period when the fund bequeathed is pay able or distributable. There was some discussion at the Bar as to the precise period when the fund bequeathed is pay able or distributable in this case; it was suggested on the one hand that the period in question is the death of the testator as laid down by the Judicial Committee in Norendra Nath v. Kamal Basini L. R. 23 I. A. 18 27 (1896) it was argued on the other hand, that the period of distribution is the time when the adopted son attains majority. It is immaterial for our present purposes which view is accepted, because the adopted son died, not only after the death of the testator but also after he had attained majority. In either view, therefore, the gift over did not take effect. There is no foundation, therefore, for the suggestion made by the learned vakil for the Appellants, that the question raised before us is identical with the one left open by the Judicial Committee in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore 10 M. I. A. 279, 311 (1865) namely, the effect of a testamentary disposition by an adoptive father, under which he restricts the interest of his adopted son in his estate to a life-interest and limits it over to another adopted son of his own, if the first adopted sonleaves no issue male or such issue male fails. We must hold, accordingly, that upon the death of Chandra Kumar his estate vested absolutely in Aukhoy Kumar, that upon the death of the latter it vested in his widow Bidhu Mukhi and that upon her death it reverted to Manikya Mala as the heiress of her adopted son. 4. The second ground taken before us raises a question of some nicety which is not altogether free from difficulty. It is contended on behalf of the Appellants, that inasmuch as the second adoption was made after the death of the widow of the adopted son and at a time when the estate had vested in the widow of the original owner, there was no bar to the second adoption as it would divest the estate of the adoptive mother alone, it has been conceded before us, and in view of the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865) and Pudma. Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229: s. c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1881) it could not possibly be disputed, that the adoption would have been invalid. If it had been made during the life-time of the widow of the adopted son because during such period the power of adoption was incapable of execution. The question, therefore, is reduced to this: whether the power of adoption, vested in the widow of the original owner, which, during the life-time of her daughter-in-law was incapable of execution, became extinguished upon the death of her adopted son when the estate vested in his widow or whether, such power of adoption merely remained in abeyance and was revived and became capable of execution upon the death of her daughter-in-law, when the estate reverted to her. The solution of this question depends upon the principles deducible from a series of decisions of the Judicial Committee in which their Lordships had to consider the limits within which a power of adoption may be exercised by a Hindu widow. 5. The first case in which the question arose was that of Bhoobun Moyrr v. Ram Kishore Acharjee 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865) One Gour Kishore died leaving a son Bhabani and a widow Chandrabalee to whom he gave express authority to adopt in the event of his son's death. 5. The first case in which the question arose was that of Bhoobun Moyrr v. Ram Kishore Acharjee 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865) One Gour Kishore died leaving a son Bhabani and a widow Chandrabalee to whom he gave express authority to adopt in the event of his son's death. Bhabani married, attained his majority and died leaving a widow but no issue. Chandrabalee then adopted a son. Ram Kissore, who sued Bhabani's widow Bhuban Move to recover the estate. The Judicial Committee held that her estate could not be divested by the subsequent adoption. Lord Kings-down, in delivering the judgment observed, that although the deed of permission did not, in express terms, assign any limits to the period within which the adoption might be made, it was plain that some limits must be assigned. It is incontestable that the judgment is founded upon the proposition of law, that a widow's power of adoption is limited. The question is what are the limits to be assigned: they are indicated in the following passage from the judgment. 6. It might well have been, that Bhabani had left a son, natural born or adopted, and that such son had died, himself leaving a son, and that such son had attained his majority in the life-time of Chandrabalee; it could hardly have been intended that after- the lapse of several successive heirs, a son should be adopted to the great grandfather of the last taker, when all the spiritual purposes of a son, according.to the largest construction of them, would have been satisfied. But whatever may have been the intention, would the law allow it to be effected? We rather understand the Judges below to have been of opinion, that if Bhabani Kishore had left a son, or if a son had been lawfully adopted to him by his wife under a power legally conferred upon her, the power of adoption given to Chandrabalee would have been at an end. But it is difficult to see what reasons could be assigned for such a result which would not equally apply to the case before us." 7. It is manifest from this passage that according to the Judicial Committee, when the son died leaving a widow, the power of adoption vested in the mother, came to an end. But it is difficult to see what reasons could be assigned for such a result which would not equally apply to the case before us." 7. It is manifest from this passage that according to the Judicial Committee, when the son died leaving a widow, the power of adoption vested in the mother, came to an end. No doubt in subsequent passages their Lordships observed that the adopted son had lived to an age which enabled him to perform all the religious services which a son could perform for a father, and, also, that the unlimited estate which the son had taken having vested in his widow a new heir coma not be substituted by adoption, so as to defeat that estate. These are, however, additional reasons in support of their Lordships' conclusion that the adoption was invalid and do not, in any way weaken the effect of the reason first set forth. That this is the true view of the effect of the decision is proved conclusively by the case of Pudma Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229: s. c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1881), which arose out of the same adoption. Ram Kishore got into possession of the properties left by Gour Kishore after the deaths of Bhuban Moye and Chandrabalee. He was sued for its recovery by a distant relation of Gour Kishore, who would be entitled to succeed if the adoption of Ram Kisore was invalid. The High Court held [Puddo Kumuree v. Juggut Kishore I. L. R. 5 Cal. 615 at pp.642-643 (1879)], that the Judicial Committee had not decided that the adoption was invalid but merely, that by the adoption of Ram Kishore, the estate vested in Bhuban Moye was not divested, which was also the view adopted in the case of Ram Soondur v. Sar-banee Dusi 22 W. R. 121 (1874). The case then went before.the Privy Council and the Judicial Committee negatived this view of the effect of their previous decision. [Pudma Coomari. Debi v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229 at p. 245: s. C. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1891)]. Their Lordships pointed out that they considered the previous decision to be, that upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of Bhabani, the power of adoption was at an end and incapable of execution. Debi v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229 at p. 245: s. C. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1891)]. Their Lordships pointed out that they considered the previous decision to be, that upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of Bhabani, the power of adoption was at an end and incapable of execution. They further added that the vesting of the estate in the widow, if not in Bhabani himself as the son and heir of his father, was a proper limit to the exercise of the power. This language is repeated and emphasised by their Lordships in their judgment in Thaymmal v. Venkatarama L. R. 14 I. A. 67 at p. 70: s. C I. L. R. 10 Mad. 205 (1887) where it was stated that the survival of the son's widow and the vesting of the estate in her put an end to the right of his mother to adopt a son to his father. Their Lordships further expressed their entire concurrence in the view of the law laid down in Pudma Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 223: s. c. I. L. R. 8 cal. 302 (1881) and with reference to the passage from that judgment already mentioned, observed that " nothing can be clearer or more explicit than the language used by the Committee in that case.'' Substantially the same view was re-affirmed in Tara Churn Chatterji v. Suresh Chunder Mookerji L. R. 16 I. A. 166: s. c. I. L. R. 17 Cal. 122 (1889). In view of these decisions of the Judicial Committee it is impossible for us to uphold the contention of the Appellants that their Lordships intended merely to decide that the power of adoption vested in the mother did not come to an end but remained suspended during the life-time of the widow left by the son. The effect of the decisions of the Judicial Committee was considered by the Bombay High Court in Kiishnarav v. Shankarrav I. L. R. 17 Bom. 1G4 (1894) and we agree in the view taken by the learned Judges who decided that case, the facts of which were very similar to those of the case before us. The question was then considered by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bam Krishna v. Shamrao I. L. R. 26 Bom. 1G4 (1894) and we agree in the view taken by the learned Judges who decided that case, the facts of which were very similar to those of the case before us. The question was then considered by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bam Krishna v. Shamrao I. L. R. 26 Bom. 562 (1902), in which Mr. Justice Chandavarkar after an elaborate review of the authorities observed that the language of the judgment in Bhoobun Moyee's case 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865) is so explicit that it is impossible to construe it otherwise than as meaning, that there is a limit to the period within which a widow can exercise her power of adoption and that once that limit is reached the power is at an end. The learned Judge expressed his concurrence with the view of Sir Charles Sargeant in Hasabnis's case I. L. R. 17 Bom. 164 (1892). that the language of the Privy Council is altogether inconsistent with any idea of the right to adopt being merely suspended during the widow's life and concluded that where a Hindu died leaving a -widow and a son and that son died leaving a widow, the power of adoption vested in the former widow was extinguished and could never afterwards be revived. The same view is indicated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Ranade in Venkappa v. Jiraji. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 306, 310 (1900) where that learned Judge observed, that a widow, succeeding as heir to her son, is competent to adopt only when that son has left neither widow nor issue. Upon a review then, of the authorities we must overrule the contention of the Appellants that the widow's death is the limit of time within which and the failure of male issue in the male line and the vesting of the estate in the widow, are the only two conditions subject to which the power may be exercised, no matter whether the estate vests in the adopting widow just after the death of the son or after the death of the widow of the son. 8. The learned vakil for the Appellants placed considerable reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Bykant. Monee v. Kisto Soonderee Roy 7 W. R 392 (1867) nd Manik Chand v. Jagat Settani I. L. R. 17 Cal. 8. The learned vakil for the Appellants placed considerable reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Bykant. Monee v. Kisto Soonderee Roy 7 W. R 392 (1867) nd Manik Chand v. Jagat Settani I. L. R. 17 Cal. 518 (1889) nd upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Kannepalli v. Pucha 10 C. W. N. 921: s. c, 4 C. L. J. 171 (1906). In the first of these cases an adoption made under circumstances very similar to those of the present case was upheld by this Court. It does not appear to have been argued whether the fact that the adoptive mother made the adoption after the death of her daughter-in-law distinguished the case from that of Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865). But it appears to have been assumed, that all that the Judicial Committee intended to decide was that the widow was competent to adopt if she divested the estate of no one but herself. That this was the prevailing view of the effect of the decision of the Judicial Committee is made clear by the cases of Ram Soobndur v. Sarbanee 22 W, R. 121 (1874) and Puddo Kumari v. Juggut Kishore I. L, R. 5 Cal. 615 (1879). That the view is erroneous, we now know from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Pudma Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229: s. c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1881). It follows accordingly that the decision in Bykant Monee v. Kisto Soonderee 7 W. R. 392 (1867) is inconsistent with the decisions of the Judicial' Committee in "Pudma Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229: s. c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1881) and Thayammal v. Venkatarama L. R. 14 I. A. 67: s. c. 1. L. R. 10 Mad. 205 (1887) and is therefore not binding on this Court. As regards the case of Ma nil; Chand v. Jagat Settani I. L. R. 17 Cal. 302 (1881) and Thayammal v. Venkatarama L. R. 14 I. A. 67: s. c. 1. L. R. 10 Mad. 205 (1887) and is therefore not binding on this Court. As regards the case of Ma nil; Chand v. Jagat Settani I. L. R. 17 Cal. 518 (1889) no doubt there are certain observations in the judgment which may tend to lend some apparent support to the contention of the Appellants, but the learned Judges seem to have recognised that according to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Pudma Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229: s. c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1881) the power of adoption is at an end and incapable of execution when the estate vests in the widow of the son, and they held this principle to be inapplicable to the case before them (which was that of a Jain widow) on the ground that no power from the husband was necessary to the validity of the adoption. As regards the recent decision of the Judicial Committee in Kannepalli v. Pucha 10 C. W. N. 921: s. c. 4 C. L. J. 171 (1906) it does not touch the question before us. It is argued, however, that it has the effect of considerable weakening, if not actually overruling, the earlier decision of their Lordships in Bhoobun Moyee. v. Ram Kishore 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865) No doubt their Lordships quote with approval a passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Mitter in Ram Soondur v. Sarbanee Dasi 22 W. R. 121 (1874) in which that learned Judge had held that an adopted son attaining an age of sufficient maturity and by performing the religious services enjoined by the Shastras cannot exhaust the whole of the spiritual benefit which a son is capable of conferring upon the soul of his deceased lather. This, no doubt, militates against the view taken in the case of Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore. 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865) to which their Lordships attention does not appear to have been invited, namely, the view that all the spiritual purposes of a son may, under certain circumstances, be taken to have been satisfied. But their Lordships do not dissent from the view that when the adopted son dies leaving a widow, the power of adoption given to the mother pomes to an end. But their Lordships do not dissent from the view that when the adopted son dies leaving a widow, the power of adoption given to the mother pomes to an end. That their Lordships could not have intended to dissent from or throw any doubt upon this view is reasonably clear from the circumstance that they do not make any reference to the earlier, portion of the judgment of Mr. Justice Mitter in Ram Soondur v. Sarbanee Dasi 22 W.R. 121 (1874) in which that learned Judge had put a limited construction upon the decision of the Judicial Committe in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore 10 M I. A. 279 (1865) which limited construction was expressly disapproved by their Lordships in Pudma Coomari v. Court of Wards L. R. 8 I. A. 229: s. c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 302 (1881). We must further remember that the immediate question before the Judicial Committee in Kannepalli v. Pucha 10 C.W.N. 921: s.c. 4 C. L.J. 171 (1906) was whether upon the death of the first adopted son when little more than two years of age it was competent to the widow to take a second boy in adoption. It was held that the authority to adopt was not exhausted by the first adoption- which view does not in any way conflict with the rule laid down in any of the earlier cases before the Judicial Committee. On the other hand the case of Raja, Vellanki v. Venkata L. R. 4 I. A. I: s. c. I. L. R. 1 Mad. 174 (1876) shows that an adoption of a son after the death of one son is valid. 9. On these grounds, we must hold that the adoption of the second Defendant by the first Defendant after she had succeeded as heir to her first adopted son after his death and that of his widow is invalid. It has been conceded before us that there is nothing in the original texts of the Hindu Law which deals with the question raised before us or touches the matter directly. But it was much pressed upon us that the principle laid down by the Judicial Committee does not accord with the spirit of the Hindu Law, as expounded in the books or understood by the Hindus themselves. But it was much pressed upon us that the principle laid down by the Judicial Committee does not accord with the spirit of the Hindu Law, as expounded in the books or understood by the Hindus themselves. It is not open to us, however, to go into that question, as we are bound by the law as laid down in Bhoobun Moyee's case 10 M. I. A. 279 (1865), and as expounded and re-affirmed in the later decisions of the Judicial Committee. The appeal consequently fails and must be dismissed with costs. Holmwood, J. I entirely agree.