JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs on foot of a mortgage, dated the 8th of October, 1901. Although the deed according to plaintiffs was a deed of usufructuary mortgage, they have not been given possession and they brought the present suit to obtain possession and also damages. The deed of mortgage has been placed before us. After reciting the consideration given for it, the mortgagors covenant they will put Tribhuwan Rai, from whom they were obtaining the land, in possession of certain land “on the 1st of Asarh of that year, in which the interest will remain unpaid on Jeth Badi 15th. The aforesaid Mahajan should from the said date remain in possession of the land, etc.” Further on the mortgage deed provides: “If perchance we, the executants or our heirs, dispossess the said Mahajan from the land mortgaged or do not deliver possession after agreeing to do so or if the mortgagee be dispossessed in any way, in that case the aforesaid Mahajan shall have power by means of a law suit to realize the amount due to him and ten maunds pucka of grain on account of damages.” There is still one more passage in the deed which is material to the matters before us and it runs thus: “The land mortgaged shall remain hypothecated and pledged in lieu of the aforesaid amount of debt so long as it is not paid off.” The land hypothecated was described in the deed as “zamiudari sir,” i.e., proprietary rights in sir and khudkasht land. Default was not made in payment until the 22nd of June, 1902, and the question which we have to consider is whether the law which governs this mortgage is Act No. XII of 1881, or Act No. II of 1901. Default was not made in payment until the 22nd of June, 1902, and the question which we have to consider is whether the law which governs this mortgage is Act No. XII of 1881, or Act No. II of 1901. It is contended that as no default was made until the 22nd of June, 1902, and that date was subsequent to the passing of Act No. II of 1901, this deed did not operate as a deed of mortgage until after Act No. II of 1901 had found its place in the Statute-book and the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the language used in the deed shows that it was only a money bond in its inception and did not operate and was not intended to operate as a deed of usufructuary mortgage until the date on which the default was made. After carefully considering the words used in the deed we agree with the interpretation which respondent's learned counsel puts upon the deed. The only real difficulty lies in the word “mortgage” used in the third extract from the deed which we have set out above. Comparing the three passages and the context we are satisfied that those words mean “the land when mortgaged.” They admit of this interpretation from a grammatical standpoint and only when so read are they in harmony with the other provisions contained in the deed. As the mortgage did not come into operation until Act No. II of 1901 was in force, the lower appellate Court was right in holding that these proprietors, whose proprietary rights had been rendered subject to a deed of usufructuary mortgage after the commencement of the Act became ipso facto tenants with rights of occupancy in the sir and kashtkary land. Section 10 of the Act is conclusive on this point and the first and fourth pleas taken in the memorandum of appeal fail. 2. Section 20 of the same Act forbids the transfer of interest held by occupancy tenants except under circumstances which do not exist in this case and render it impossible that the appellants should be put into possession. This compels us to decide the second plea in the memorandum of appeal against the appellants. 3. There remains the third plea under which appellants claim interest at the rate of 2 per cent, per mensem. This compels us to decide the second plea in the memorandum of appeal against the appellants. 3. There remains the third plea under which appellants claim interest at the rate of 2 per cent, per mensem. The interest first mentioned in the deed is 8 annas per cent, per mensem and we agree with the lower appellate Court that the subsequent stipulation for the enhanced rate of interest was penal. This plea also fails. 4. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, which will in this Court include fees on the higher scale.