JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - I think this rule must be made absolute on the short ground that the delay on the part of the applicant has been such that the application ought not to have been granted. The case in respect of which the alleged criminal charges are made was disposed of so far back as the 15th of April 1905, and the first application for sanction to prosecute was made on the 3rd July 1905. That application was not heard until the 12 the of February 1906 and was then dismissed. In the meantime, the opposite party feeling, I presume, some doubt as to the chances of his success on the first application instituted a second application on the 3rd of February 1906 for sanction to prosecute under sec. 195, the first application, I understand, having been one under sec. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The latter application was refused by the Munsif on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to make the order having regard to the decision of this Court in the case of Krishna Gobinda Dutt 9 C. W. N. 859 (1905) Against that order an appeal was preferred to the District Judge who then made the order sanctioning the prosecution. I think the Court had jurisdiction to make the order under sec. 195; and this view does not clash with that which is expressed in the case which has been cited. The languages of the sections are different. Be that as it may, it Is unnecessary to go into that question now. The delay in this case is practically from the 15th of April 1905 till the 3rd of February 1906, that is, a delay of nearly a year. I agree with the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Utned Singh ILR 18 All. 203 (1896), where the learned Judges say that applications of this nature ought to be made promptly or the delay should be satisfactorily accounted for. Here the application has not been made promptly nor has the delay been accounted for, and the reasons given by that Court for such view appear to me to be satisfactory. 203 (1896), where the learned Judges say that applications of this nature ought to be made promptly or the delay should be satisfactorily accounted for. Here the application has not been made promptly nor has the delay been accounted for, and the reasons given by that Court for such view appear to me to be satisfactory. On this ground the rule must be made absolute, I desire to add for my own part that the case to which I have referred in Krishna Gobinda Dutt 9 C.W.N. 859 (1905) may require further consideration. Caspersz, J. I agree.