JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent, for return of purchase money with interest paid by him for the purchase of some landed property in the district of Allahabad purchased by him at an auction sale in execution of a decree on the allegation that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property. The Court of ‘first instance decreed the claim, and this decree was confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court. 2. The facts are shortly as follows:— One Kalian Chand, father of the appellant Sumer Chand, held a simple money decree against one Mata Bhik, and in execution of that decree attached the property in question. One Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh claimed to be entitled to the attached property and filed an objection to the attachment but this objection was overruled on the 11th of December, 1897. The property was thereupon put up for sale and was purchased on the 20th of December, 1897, by Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh in the name of the plaintiff, Wahid Husain Khan. On the 8th of October, 1898, that is nearly a year after this purchase, Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh instituted a suit under section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have his right to the property established, and in this suit he impleaded Mata Bhik and Sumer Chand, the son of Kalian Singh, who was then dead, and obtained a decree. On appeal to this Court the suit was dismissed as against Sumer Chand on the ground that the decree obtained by his father having been satisfied, as was the fact, he had no concern with the suit. The decree was therefore limited to a decree against Mata Bhik, the suit being dismissed as against Sumer Chand. The plaintiff-respondent then, on the 22nd of August, 1902, instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal for recovery of the purchase money paid by him on the sale of the property in December, 1897, with the result which we have mentioned. 3. The appellant's main ground of appeal is that the property was purchased by Wahid Husain Khan as a benamidar for Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh with full knowledge that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest therein if such was the case and therefore was not entitled to a refund of the purchase money. 3. The appellant's main ground of appeal is that the property was purchased by Wahid Husain Khan as a benamidar for Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh with full knowledge that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest therein if such was the case and therefore was not entitled to a refund of the purchase money. We are of opinion that this ground of appeal is well founded. 4. The learned Additional District Judge in his judgment states that Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh was obliged to bid for and purchase the property, which was his ancestral property, to make sure that it did not pass away to anybody else.” We are unable to take this view of the matter. An objection to the attachment had been filed on behalf of Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh which was overruled, and in view of this fact if he did not intend to submit to the overruling of his objection, he certainly ought not, in our opinion, to have bid at the auction, for the property, paid the purchase money and allowed the sale to be confirmed. 5. In the absence of a covenant for title or a warranty or of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of a vendor according to English Law a purchaser of real property purchases subject to the rule of caveat emptor. It is not suggested that there was any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of either the judgment-debtor, Kalian Chand or Mata Bhik, and no fraud or misrepresentation has been alleged. In the sales under a decree of Court there is no warranty of title either by the decree-holder or by the Court. Mahabir Parshad Narain Singh, at the time of the purchase, was aware that his title to the property was disputed, his objection to the attachment having been overruled. With full knowledge as to the true state of facts he bid for the property and became the purchaser. Mr. Karamat Husain on behalf of the respondent relied upon the case of Fatima Khatoon Chowdrain v. Mahomed Jan Chowdry, [1868] 12 Moore's I.A., 65., as supporting his contention, but we are unable to see that that case helps him. With full knowledge as to the true state of facts he bid for the property and became the purchaser. Mr. Karamat Husain on behalf of the respondent relied upon the case of Fatima Khatoon Chowdrain v. Mahomed Jan Chowdry, [1868] 12 Moore's I.A., 65., as supporting his contention, but we are unable to see that that case helps him. In that case, in order to save a family estate about to be sold under a decree of Court made in a suit against one member of the family, the members of the family interested in the property, being entitled to dower charged on the estate, paid the amount of the decree into Court to be handed over to the decree-holder under protest and subject to a suit to be brought by them to set aside an order rejecting a claim to their charge on the estate. The money so paid into Court was taken out by the decree-holder. It was held that an action would lie against the decree-holder to recover back the amount so paid into Court and handed over to him, as it was a deposit under protest to prevent any injurious sale. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the payment of the money under the circumstances in which it was made constituted a voluntary payment with the full knowledge of the facts and therefore the money could not be recovered back. Their Lordships of the Privy Council overruled this decision, holding that the money was not voluntarily paid and in their judgment they state that “If it had been such a payment no doubt such is the law” (that is the law laid down in the judgment of the High Court). They found, however, that the payment was not voluntary unlike this case. In the case before us there was rib compulsion or necessity whatever on the plaintiff-respondent to make the purchase and, as it appears to us, he certainly ought not to have done so, ought not to have paid the purchase-money save under protest. He should not have allowed the sale to be confirmed if it was his intention afterwards to repudiate the transaction and seek to recover back the purchase money. 6. He should not have allowed the sale to be confirmed if it was his intention afterwards to repudiate the transaction and seek to recover back the purchase money. 6. In the case of Dorab Ally Khan v. Abdool Azeez, [1880] L.R., 5 I.A., 116., the question for decision was, can a purchase at a Sheriff's sale under a writ of fifa upon being evicted by the execution debtor recover the purchase money from the execution creditor, when the Sheriff was without authority to execute the writ at the place where the property was situate, but did so under the authority and by the express direction of the judgment creditor. Their Lordships of the Privy Council remanded the case for the trial of the following issue:— “Whether on the facts to be proved a cause of action having been shown by the plaint, the evicted purchaser was entitled to recover back the purchase money as money had and received to his use as upon a total failure of consideration and to any other and what relief.” In the course of the judgment, Sir JAMES W. COLVIN observed, “Their Lordships of course offer no opinion whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed in establishing his right to any relief. It may turn out that his testator, who never made any claim for a return of the purchase money in his lifetime, bought with knowledge of the defect in the Sheriff's jurisdiction, or has by acquiescence or in some other way, forfeited any right which he might otherwise have had to relief”. From these words we gather that if a party purchase at a sale in execution with full knowledge of the true state of things and knowing that the title offered is defective, a claim to be relieved from the consequences of his purchase cannot be listened to. A fortiori where a purchaser has allowed a sale by the Court to him to be confirmed and the purchase money to be paid over to a judgment creditor, he cannot, we think, be allowed to succeed in a suit for the recovery of that purchase money. But it is contended by Mr. Karamat Husain chat in view of the provisions of section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his suit. But it is contended by Mr. Karamat Husain chat in view of the provisions of section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his suit. That section provides that “when it is found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property which purported to be sold and the purchaser is for that reason deprived of it, the purchaser shall be entitled to receive back his purchase money from any person to whom the purchase money has been paid”. The contention is that it was found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest when the decree was passed in the suit instituted by the plaintiff under section 283 of the Code; and this no doubt is the case, but this is not enough. The cause of action does not accrue until the purchaser has been deprived of the property. Before he can sue, two events must occur—first, it must have been found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest, and secondly, the purchaser must be deprived of the property, see Gurshidawa v. Gangaya, [1897] I.L.R., 22 Bom., 783.. Here the purchaser has not been deprived of the property. We may further point out that the plaintiff did not avail himself of the provisions of that section. The procedure under it is by summary application within a limited time and not by suit. A suit will, no doubt, be maintainable for a return of’ purchase money when there has been a total failure of consideration, but not, we think, in a case in which the plaintiff acted as the plaintiff did here. 7. For these reasons we think that the decisions of the Courts below are erroneous. We allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of both the lower Court, and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs in all Courts including fees in this Court on the higher scale.