JUDGMENT Geidt, J. - The Respondents to this appeal are the heirs of one Azmatullah who, after obtaining a decree on a mortgage against the Appellant, died before an order absolute for sale was made. They have applied to be brought on the record as decree-holders in the place of Azmatullah and to have the order absolute for sale, and their application has been granted by both the Courts below. The appeal is based on the ground that the application was made more than six months after Azmatullah's death, and is therefore barred by Art. 175A Sch. II of the Limitation Act. The lower Appellate Court before which alone this objection appears to have been taken considered that the application made by the Respondents was a step in aid of execution, and was therefore not governed by that article. In support of this appeal reliance Is placed on the decision of this Court in Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh I. L. R. 21 Cal. 818 (1894), where it was held that an application for an order absolute for sale was "not an application for execution of the decree, because, until the decree absolute is made under sec 89, there is in fact no decree capable of execution." In Tara Prosad Roy v. Bhobodeb Roy I. L. R. 22 Cal. 931 (1895), it was held that a decree nisi for sale passed in terms of sec. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be executed until an order absolute for the sale of the mortgaged property had been made, and that, until such an order was made, the judgment-debtor had a right to redeem. These rulings show that the District Judge was wrong in holding that the application for an order absolute is an application for execution. 2. The question, however, still remains whether Art. 175A of the Limitation Act bars the Respondents' application. Reading that article with sec 365 of the CPC to which it expressly refers, and with sec. 366, it seems clear that the applications governed by that article are applications for substitution made in the course of the suit. Now, when a conditional decree for sale is passed on a mortgage, the suit, as such, is at an end, all questions that arise in the suit must be determined before such a decree can be passed. 366, it seems clear that the applications governed by that article are applications for substitution made in the course of the suit. Now, when a conditional decree for sale is passed on a mortgage, the suit, as such, is at an end, all questions that arise in the suit must be determined before such a decree can be passed. Other questions may arise and may have to be determined between the parties before the order absolute for sale is made, but they are questions that arise subsequently, e.g., whether within the period fixed by the; Court payment has been made by the judgment-debtor or not. 3. The procedure laid down in Chap. IV of the Transfer of Property Act shows that the decree drawn up under sec. 86 or sec 88 is the decree in the suit. It is a conditional decree, no doubt, and it cannot be executed until a further order absolute is made. But this subsequent order is not a fresh decree, though it may operate as a decree by making the conditional decree absolute. The decree made in the first instance is not abrogated but still subsists. It directs that in the event of the sum found due not being paid within an appointed period, the Defendant shall be debarred of all right to redeem the property or that the mortgaged property shall be sold. It is in accordance with that direction that the order absolute is made on the occurrence of the contingency contemplated, namely, default in payment. The phraseology employed by the legislature bears out this view. The term ' decree ' is not applied to the order absolute. As already stated, it is by virtue of that order that the decree which was conditional in the first instance becomes absolute and capable of execution. 4. In this view of the matter I am of opinion that the application made by the Respondents was not an application made In the course of a suit, and is therefore not barred by Art. 175A of the Limitation Act. 5. I am strengthened in the conclusion at which I have arrived by a further consideration. 4. In this view of the matter I am of opinion that the application made by the Respondents was not an application made In the course of a suit, and is therefore not barred by Art. 175A of the Limitation Act. 5. I am strengthened in the conclusion at which I have arrived by a further consideration. It is conceded that if Azmatullah, the original decree-holder, had been alive at the time when the Respondents' application was made, he would have been entitled to the order absolute for sale, and it is difficult to perceive on what principles his heirs should be in worse position than himself. I am of opinion that there is nothing in the Limitation Act which bars the application made by Azmatullah's heirs, and I would therefore dismiss this appeal. No order is made as to costs as the Respondent has not appeared. Ghose, J. I agree in the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother.