Judgement Appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court (July 5, 1906) suspending the appellant for four years from practice as an advocate. The printed case for the appellant stated that " on the 19th of April, 1906, when the appellant was arguing a criminal case before Mr. Justice Richards, his Lordship became suddenly provoked and asked the appellant to hold his tongue. The appellant thereupon, under the influence of the grave provocation received, wrote a registered letter to the learned Chief Justice, and also wrote an article which appeared in The Cochrane (of which the appellant is the editor) on the 1st of June, 1906." The article, which it is unnecessary to set out at length, is referred to in the judgment of their Lordships as constituting a libel on the judges. On June 6 notice was served on the appellant to shew cause, and on July 5 he was suspended as above stated ; the judges unanimously holding that he had been guilty of gross misconduct in publishing the article. The Appellant appeared in person, and contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction over him as a member of the English Bar, and had no jurisdiction to try the case, as all the judges present in Allahabad did not sit in accordance with r. 197 of the rules of Court. Five were present in Allahabad, but only three sat. He referred to ss. 7 and 8 of the letters patent constituting the Court. The alleged offence was committed by him in his capacity of editor and not professionally as an advocate. If aggrieved the judges could have proceeded against him under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code. He referred to In re Rajendronath Mukerji (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 242.); In re Parbati Charan Chatterji (( 1895) L.R. 22 Ind. Ap. 193.); Penal Code, ss. 228, 500; In re Wallace (( 1866) L. R. 1 P. C. 283.); In re Weare ([ 1893] 2 Q. B. 439.); Queen v. Castro (( 1873) L. R. 9 Q. B. 219.); Ex parte Turner (( 1844) 3 Mont. D. & De G. 523.); and Lechmere Charltons Case. (( 1836) 2 My. & Cr. 316.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The petitioner in this case, Mr. D. & De G. 523.); and Lechmere Charltons Case. (( 1836) 2 My. & Cr. 316.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The petitioner in this case, Mr. Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhicary, is a barrister of Grays Inn, and an advocate of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad; and he complains of an order of that Court whereby he was suspended from practice in that Court for a period of four years, from July 5, 1906, for 11 gross misconduct." The grounds of his appeal are nine in number, and, as two of them relate to the competency of the Court to make the order, it will be convenient to dispose of them in the first instance. The first objection is that the Court " had no jurisdiction to deal with the applicant for alleged misconduct, he being a member of the English Bar." In the opinion of their Lordships this objection is untenable. By s. 7 of the letters patent by which it was established the High Court is authorized and empowered " to approve, admit, and enrol such and so many advocates .... as to the said High Court shall seem meet"; and by s. 8 the High Court is empowered "to make rules for the qualification and admission of proper persons to be advocates .... and to remove or to suspend from practice on reasonable cause the said advocates." By r. 180 of the Court " any barrister of England or Ireland, and any member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland may present an application for his admission to the roll of advocates of the Court" ; and on compliance with certain conditions specified in r. 181 may, under r. 182, if " the Chief Justice and judges then present in Allahabad " think fit, be admitted as an advocate of the Court. It is clear, therefore, that any barrister so admitted becomes thereupon subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court. The second objection taken by Mr. Sarbadhicary is that the Court which dealt with the charge against him was not properly constituted under the rules of the Court. Rule 2 provides that "A charge against an advocate .... in respect of any mis conduct for which such person may be suspended or dismissed from practice .... shall be heard and decided by a bench of three judges. Rule 2 provides that "A charge against an advocate .... in respect of any mis conduct for which such person may be suspended or dismissed from practice .... shall be heard and decided by a bench of three judges. Such bench may, at the hearing, refer the matter for disposal to a bench consisting of five judges.” If this rule applies, there is no doubt that the Court which heard and disposed of Mr. Sarbadhicarys case was properly constituted, for it consisted of three judges. But Mr. Sarbadhicary contends that, under r. 197 (which provides that " the Chief Justice and judges present for the time being in Allahabad may, for good cause appearing to them, by an order in writing under the seal of the Court, suspend or remove from the rolls of the Court any advocate . . . . "), he was entitled to have his case heard by a bench of five judges, as that number then were present in Allahabad. The learned judges who heard the case, and before whom this objection was raised, say that " r. 197 provides for cases in which the Chief Justice and judges may for good cause, and without charge or trial, suspend or remove from the roll of the Court any advocate of the Court." And their Lordships see no reason why they should reject this explanation. An advocate convicted of a criminal offence might properly be suspended or removed from practice under this rule without further charge or trial. In their Lordships opinion this objection also fails. The facts of the case lie within a very short compass. On April 19, 1906, Mr. Sarbadhicary was conducting a criminal case before Richards J., when, to use the petitioners own language, " An altercation happened between the honourable gentleman and the counsel about the administration of the oath to the accused by the magistrate who tried them. The counsel was backed by two depositions of the two accused.....They were shewed to the judge (who) wanted to assail the counsel, but the latter, relying on his own innocence, stated, as had the copies(Sic.), he was not the least to blame. The judge was angry, and said, Why did the counsel assail the Court below ? The counsel stated that, before the files reached, the copies were the only source of his information; and sat. The judge was angry, and said, Why did the counsel assail the Court below ? The counsel stated that, before the files reached, the copies were the only source of his information; and sat. The judge asked the counsel to be polite, and the counsel applied (to) the judge for the same favour. The judge remarked he should not be answered back. The judge thereupon angrily said Sit down." In an affidavit filed in this matter Mr. Sarbadhicary says the words used were "Hold your tongue." But whatever the words used, Mr. Sarbadhicary says he was " greatly affected " by them, and sent the judge a notice that " he would be legally proceeded against, both civilly and criminally, on the expiration of two months." Before this period expired, on June 1, 1906, Mr. Sarbadhicary published in a periodical called The Cochrane, of which he is both the editor and publisher, an article which has given rise to the order of suspension of which he now complains. There is no doubt that the article in question was a libel reflecting not only upon Richards J., but other judges of the High Court in their judicial capacity and in reference to their conduct in the discharge of their public duties. There is also no doubt that the publication of this libel constituted a contempt of Court which might have been dealt with by the High Court in a summary manner, by fine or imprisonment, or both. The only question which their Lordships have to consider is whether the publication of such a libel constitutes "reasonable cause" for the suspension of an advocate from practice under the powers conferred by the letters patent. Their Lordships will not attempt to give a definition of " reasonable cause," or to lay down any rule for the interpretation of the letters patent in this respect. Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is obvious that the intention of the Crown was to give a wide discretion to the High Court in India in regard to the exercise of this disciplinary authority. Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is obvious that the intention of the Crown was to give a wide discretion to the High Court in India in regard to the exercise of this disciplinary authority. The rules of the Court, to which reference has been made, indicate the precautions taken by the Court itself to secure that the powers shall not be used capriciously or oppresively, and there is no reason to apprehend that the just independence of the Bar runs any risk of being impaired by its exercise. On the other hand, it is essential to the proper administration of justice that unwarrantable attacks should not be made with impunity upon judges in their public capacity; and? having regard to the fact that in this case a contempt of Court was undoubtedly committed (and, as the evidence shews, not for the first time) by an advocate in a matter concerning himself personally in his professional character, their Lordships agree with the conclusion at which the judges of the High Court arrived, and that there was "reasonable cause" for the order which they made. Among other grounds of objection to the order Mr. Sarbadhicary endeavoured to draw a distinction between " his capacity as an advocate and his capacity as an editor," and cited the case of In re Wallace (L. R. 1 P. C. 283.) as an authority in support of his argument. But that was an entirely different case from the present. In delivering judgment Lord Westbury says (L. R. 1 P. C. at p. 294.) "It was an offence .... committed by an individual in his capacity of a suitor in respect of his supposed rights as a suitor, and of an imaginary injury done to him as a suitor; and it had no connection whatever with his professional character, or any thing done by him professionally, either as an advocate or an attorney." Here the whole controversy arose from the misbehaviour of Mr. Sarbadhicary as an advocate conducting a case before the Court, and the contempt of which he was properly found guilty was committed in the attempt to vindicate his professional conduct in a publication for which he was solely responsible. Their Lordships will say nothing as to the character of the libel, or as to the extent of the punishment awarded. They will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeal.