JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Munsif, 2nd Court, Sealdah, dated the 11th of June 1906, sanctioning the prosecution of the Petitioner, Sheikh Habibur Rahman, under sees. 205, 463, 465 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, and also under any sections thereof to which his offence might relate, should not be set aside. This sanction was affirmed by the District Judge on the 20th of July 1906. Mr. Caspersz has appeared in support of the rule. But we have thought it unnecessary to allow him to go into the merits of the case, because, on the face of it, the sanction is not in accordance with sec. 195, sub-sec. (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This sub-section says:-"The sanction referred to in this section may be expressed in general terms and need not name the accused person; but it shall, so far as practicable specify the Court or other place in which, and the occasion on which, the offence was committed." 2. Now, the sanction granted by the Munsif in this case is, no doubt, couched in general terms, but It does not specify the Court or other place in which or the occasion on which the offence was committed; nor does It specify the offences which are alleged to have been committed by the Petitioner. The learned pleader for the opposite party urges that the facts are to be found in the judgment of the Munsif and so to be gathered, by implication. 3. We think, however, that when a criminal prosecution is instituted against any person, the sanction should be in express terms and should strictly comply with the provisions of the law on this point. The Munsif has in giving this sanction evidently not taken the trouble to refer to the law out the subject as embodied in sec 195, sub sec. (4), Cr. P. C. j and the same remark may with justice be made in respect of the District Judge. If the lower Courts had taken the trouble to read sub-sec. (4) to sec. 195, before granting sanction, or affirming sanction, they would have seen, in the first place, that there were no grounds whatever for supposing that the accused had been guilty of any offence under sec. If the lower Courts had taken the trouble to read sub-sec. (4) to sec. 195, before granting sanction, or affirming sanction, they would have seen, in the first place, that there were no grounds whatever for supposing that the accused had been guilty of any offence under sec. 205, I. P. C, as that Is the section which relates to the offence of false percolation for the purpose of any act or proceeding In a suit-, which lb is not alleged that the Petitioner Habibur Rahman has ever committed. 4. The other sections referred to may, no doubt, be applicable to the offence which Habibur Rahman may have committed in this case; but the sanction to prosecute granted with regard to them is couched in such general terms that it is impossible to say exactly what offences are Imputed to him and In connection with what deed he Is charged with having committed them. 5. We are therefore constrained to revoke the sanction granted in this case. 6. We may point out to the Munsif that he has neglected his duty in another respect. He says that whether the Petitioner acted bond fide or otherwise would be the subject of consideration at trial. In so doing the learned Munsif has entirely shirked his duty. It was his duty to find whether the acts of the Petitioner were done bond, fide of mala fide and not to have granted sanction to prosecute, unless convinced that, the Petitioner had acted mala fide. It is not for one Court to throw on another Court the burden of enquiring into the question as to whether the person accused is guilty or not. No sanction should have been granted in this case unless the Munsif had made up his mind that the accused had committed the offences for which be was to be prosecuted. 7. The learned pleader for the opposite party says that we have no authority to interfere in the present case. But we think we have power to interfere under sub-sec. 6 to sec. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Both the Courts which have granted sanction are subordinate to this Court; and, therefore, we have authority to set aside the sanction granted by them. We accordingly make this rule absolute as prayed.