JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Petitioner has been convicted under secs. 447 and 426, I. P. C., by the Deputy Magistrate of Alipore for having committed criminal trespass and mischief by going on to the land belonging to the complainant and having the paddy seedlings grown by the complainant on the land forcibly ploughed up. A rule was subsequently obtained from this Court calling on the District Magistrate of the 24-Pergunnahs to show cause why the conviction of the Petitioner under sees. 447 and 426, I. P. C., should not be set aside on the grounds that the orders of the Assistant Superintendent of Survey, Calcutta Suburbs, are not judicial orders and not evidence of possession, and that the dispute between the parties is purely of a civil nature. 2. We have gone through the record of the case in which very full notes of the evidence of each witness have been taken, though the case was tried summarily, and an exhaustive judgment has been recorded. We find that the Magistrate has held that the complainant, the opposite party, had been all along in possession of the land, that he had sowed it with paddy and that the Petitioner had failed in certain proceedings before the Assistant Superintendent of the Survey to obtain an order including the land in his holding. There is on the record ample evidence to which the Magistrate refers beside the evidence of the Assistant Superintendent of Survey to support the conclusion at which the Magistrate has arrived that the land was all along in the possession of the complainant, and that on the day in question the accused went with a body of men and in spite of remonstrances raised by the servants of the complainant, insisted on going on the land and ploughing it up. We do not think that this is a case which by reason of the fact that the accused sets up a title to the land was one which was outside the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court and, we think, therefore, the ground on which the rule was issued cannot be maintained. We do not think that this is a case which by reason of the fact that the accused sets up a title to the land was one which was outside the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court and, we think, therefore, the ground on which the rule was issued cannot be maintained. The Deputy Magistrate in submitting his explanation has stated that he relied on the other evidence in the case to support the complainant's possession, and merely referred to the proceedings before the Assistant Superintendent of Survey as showing that the Petitioner, the accused, had failed in his attempt before that officer to obtain possession. 3. In the application another point was raised which has not been included in the rule, but we are informed that the learned Judge directed a note to be made on the application that the matter would be considered when the rule would come up for hearing. We have, therefore, allowed the learned vakil to argue this point though we are not prepared to say that the way in which this point comes before us is entirely regular. 4. The point taken is, that the Magistrate after finding the Petitioner guilty of the offences already stated, had no power under the Code to pass the order which he has passed under sec. 522 of the Code, directing the restoration of the complainant to possession of the land. 5. It is argued that in this case, though the evidence may go to prove that there was a show of force yet there is no distinct finding that force was actually employed, and, therefore, on the authority of the rulings of this Court in the. cases of Ram Chandra Boral v. Jityandria alias Faring Bhuttacharjee I. L. R. 25 Cal. 434 (1897) and Ishan Chandra Kalla v. Vina Nath Badhak I. L. R. 27 Cal. 174 (1899), it must be held that the order passed under sec. 522 was ultra vires. In this case we are of opinion that an order under sec. 522 was unnecessary as the complainant had been found to be in possession of the land and the opposite party had been found to be guilty of criminal trespass by entering into the land. 522 was ultra vires. In this case we are of opinion that an order under sec. 522 was unnecessary as the complainant had been found to be in possession of the land and the opposite party had been found to be guilty of criminal trespass by entering into the land. The learned vakil, however, informs us, that in spite of the conviction, his client still remains in possession of the land and apparently intends to remain in possession of the land until evicted therefrom. As to this, we can only say that possibly the Petitioner by so doing, may, after the findings of the Court in the case in which he has been convicted, be liable to a further prosecution under sec. 447. The rulings to which the vakil has referred certainly go so far as to say that actual force is necessary, and that a show of force is not sufficient under the law to authorise an order under sec. 522. We are bound by those rulings, but at the same time we desire to observe that it is, in our opinion, an anomaly that a person who avoids a breach of the peace by yielding to threats and show of force should be in a worse position with reference to his land than another who offers forcible resistance, and, in consequence, to whom criminal force is used. As, however, we are bound by the rulings to which we have referred, and, as under the circumstances of this case we think the order under sec. 522 is unnecessary, we set it aside and make the rule absolute to that extent only. Otherwise, the rule is discharged.