JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the appellants who are a society, called the Anjuman-i-Islamia of Muttra. This society was registered under Act No. XXI of 1800, and the suit was brought in the name of the society. It appears that in the city of Muttra there is a mosque called the Juma Masjid. To this mosque appertain a number of shops, one of which is claimed in this suit. The defendants are at present in possession of that shop, and the suit is brought to eject them from it and to recover rent. It appears that the shops were assigned to a Hindu family, who enjoyed the rents and profits of the shops for their services in ringing the bell of the mosque. The last of the persons who belonged to this family was one Parsotam. After his death, his widows, Rupo and Chando, relinquished their rights to enjoy the rents and profits of the shop in favour of the plaintiff association in 1898. It is by virtue of this relinquishment that the plaintiffs bring the present suit. The defendants denied the plaintiff's title and asserted that the mosque and the shops were their private property built by their ancestors. The Court of first instance found against the defendants and decreed the plaintiff's claim. Upon the questions of fact raised in the appeal to the Court below, the learned Judge has arrived at findings adverse to the defendants, except upon two points. The first is that the plaintiff association was not legally registered under Act XXI of 1860, and was, consequently, not entitled to maintain the suit in the name of the association. The second is that the plaintiffs have not proved that they are the Mutwallis of the mosque. We will consider the second point first. In our judgment it is immaterial for the purposes of this suit to determine whether the plaintiffs are the Mutwallis of the mosque or not. The persons who enjoyed the rents and profits of the shop in question transferred their rights to the plaintiff association. It is not disputed that the transferors could have sued to eject the defendants who have been found to be trespassers. If they had the right to sue the defendants, the plaintiffs certainly have the same right. The persons who enjoyed the rents and profits of the shop in question transferred their rights to the plaintiff association. It is not disputed that the transferors could have sued to eject the defendants who have been found to be trespassers. If they had the right to sue the defendants, the plaintiffs certainly have the same right. It may be that they are not the Mutwallis of the mosque, but as the learned Judge points out, the defendants also are not the Mutwallis under the relinquishment to which we have already referred, the plaintiffs have stepped into the shoes of the two ladies, Rupo and Chando, and are entitled to maintain the suit against the defendants. 2. We have now to consider whether the registration of the plaintiffs' society under Act XXI of 1860 was legal. It was contended that the registration was not legal because the society is a society for religious purposes only and not for charitable purposes. The learned Judge is also of that opinion, but we are unable to agree with him. It is clear that a religious purpose may be a charitable purpose, and that a society for religious purposes would ordinarily be a society for charitable purposes. According to the finding of the Court below, the mosque in question is a public mosque, for public worship. As observed in Re White v. White, [1893] L.R., 2 Ch., 41. any mode of promoting the welfare of mankind would be a charitable object. It appears from the judgment of the learned Judge that he thought that the objects of the society, not being the distribution of alms or charitable reliefs, the society cannot be regarded as one for charitable purposes. We cannot accept this view. It is well-known that charitable purposes are not restricted to the giving of alms or other charitable reliefs, but the words have much wider legal meaning. We do not think that the Indian legislature makes a distinction between religious purposes and charitable purposes. The registration of the plaintiffs' society was, therefore, in our judgment, perfectly legal, its object being to obtain possession of the mosque property and other endowed property and to manage it for the benefit of a public mosque. We do not think that the Indian legislature makes a distinction between religious purposes and charitable purposes. The registration of the plaintiffs' society was, therefore, in our judgment, perfectly legal, its object being to obtain possession of the mosque property and other endowed property and to manage it for the benefit of a public mosque. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and restore that of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts including in this Court, fees on the higher scale.