JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was issued calling on the District Magistrate to show cause why the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate directing the charges to be sent up under sec. 342, I. P. C, and the subsequent proceedings taken thereon should not be quashed as after the Sub-divisional Magistrate had on the 5th October last dismissed the case and directed it to be entered as a non-cognizable offence, there is nothing to show on what further materials he elected to proceed in the matter. We have received an explanation from the Sub-divisional Magistrate in this case though no one has appeared to show cause why the rule should not be made absolute. The explanation does not, in our opinion, disclose satisfactory reasons for the action taken by the Magistrate. Whatever section of the Code, if it was passed under any section, the order of the 5th October was passed under, that order was, so far as we can understand it, an order accepting the police-report that the charge as laid under sec. 342 had not been made out and that the police-report that the charge was false was correct. The Magistrate says that after the receipt of that final report in B Form from the Police, he had reason to consider what he describes as a progress report in the case which, however, bears date the 24th of September, and which was, apparently, submitted to him on the 18th of October though it bears an order of the District Superintendent, dated the 1st October. A copy of that report has been sent up with the explanation and after recording it we find that it confirms the previous report of the Police and states that the offence charged under sec. 342 was false. It adds that a case under sec. 352 for simple assault might proceed. The Magistrate without, however, giving any reasons has passed the order : " Send up charge-sheet" under sec. 342. As we can find in the report and on materials before the Magistrate nothing whatever to support a charge under that section, we think that the order of the Magistrate-is not a proper order and that the only order which he should have passed on the report, unless he had given reasons for any other, was to refuse to issue process on a charge under sec. 342, I. P. C. 2. 342, I. P. C. 2. We, therefore, make the rule absolute, set aside his order directing the charge to be sent up under sec. 342, I. P. C, and direct that the subsequent proceedings taken be quashed.