JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was issued calling on the District Magistrate of Monghyr to show cause why the proceedings taken by the Deputy Magistrate, Babu Shama Churn Mitra, under Sec. 107, Cr. P. C., against the Petitioners should not be quashed or such other order made by this Court as to it might seem fit, on the ground that as both parties had applied to the Land Registration Court for registration of their names as proprietors of the estate left by the deceased, Safdar Hossein Khan, and as there appeared to be a bond fide dispute between both the parties as to their title and possession, the learned Magistrate erred in law in instituting proceedings against the Petitioners only who are one of the parties and not against both parties under that section, and a further rule was Issued on the District Magistrate to show cause why the order passed by the same Deputy Magistrate on the 23rd and 24th December last requiring bail in the sums of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 2,000 from Abdul Hamid and Mullik Damri, respectively, should not be set aside or modified on the ground that the condition contained in those orders is one which the Magistrate had no power to impose under the provisions of sec. 112, Cr. P. C. In answer to the rule, the Magistrate has submitted a long explanation and learned Counsel have appeared to show cause. From these it appears that Safdar Hossein Khan of village Horsainabad died on the 7th August 1905 leaving considerable landed property and a childless wife Mussammat. Umatul Mehdi aliat Hussein Bandi. The Petitioner, Bibee Kulsum, is the father's sister of the deceased and it appears that she claims to be entitled under the Mahomed an law as heir to all the landed property left by the deceased. On the 19th October 1905 both of these two ladles applied for registration of their names as proprietors under the Land Registration Act and on the 15th December 1905, the Petitioner Bibee kulsum appears to have registered two deeds of sale of shares in villages Chawara and Prankar forming a part of the estate left by Safdar Hussein Khan, in favour of Mullik Abdul Hamid, Mullik Damri and Mussammat Wahaban. They are three of the Petitioners before us. They are three of the Petitioners before us. Two of the other Petitioners, Yadgar Hussein khan and Amir Hussein, are the sons of Mussammat kulsum, and the other three Sheo Sahai Lal, Chattor Lal and Pariag Lal, are the servants of the same lady. 2. On the 15th December a petition was filed before the Deputy Magistrate on behalf of Bibee Umatul Mehdi representing that Bibee kulsum had transferred the shares in the property to the persons already mentioned and that as they were well-known turbulent characters in the district there was a danger of a breach of the peace as the transfer had been made with the object of securing their assistance to obtain possession of the whole property left by Safari Hussein Khan by force. She prayed in that petition that the registration of the two deeds of sale might be stopped. This of course could not be done but the petition was forwarded to the Police for report after the Magistrate passed an order against Mussammat Bibee Eulsum and her two sons under sec. 144, Cr. P. C. On the 21st December the Police reported that there was imminent danger of a breach of the peace being committed by the lady, her sons, servants and the persons to whom the shares in the property had been transferred, and accordingly on the 22nd December 1905 the proceedings which are the subject of the first rule were taken against the present Petitioners. 3. In showing cause against the rule, it is contended that the action of the Magistrate in taking proceedings against the Petitioners under sec. 107, Cr. P. C. was justified. The facts show that after the death of Safdar Hossein khan his widow Umatul Mehdi remained in possession of his property through the servants of her deceased husband. Bibee Kulsum who claims title to the property was not in possession of any portion of the property and the deeds of sale were executed in favour of the other Petitioners, who had also no possession of the property, in order to secure possession by force and to dispossess Bibee Umatul Mehdi. 4. Bibee Kulsum who claims title to the property was not in possession of any portion of the property and the deeds of sale were executed in favour of the other Petitioners, who had also no possession of the property, in order to secure possession by force and to dispossess Bibee Umatul Mehdi. 4. On behalf of the Petitioners it has been contended that Bibee Kulsum was in possession of at least some of the properties and that the Magistrate was not justified in concluding that the widow of Safdar Hossein Ehan, Blbee Umatul Mehdi, remained in possession of the whole of the property after his decease. Whether Bibee Kulsum was or is in the peaceful possession of any portion of the property is a question which will have to be decided in the proceedings under sec. 107; but in our opinion, the facts reported to the Magistrate by the Police and brought to his notice by the petition filed before him certainly were sufficient to support the view which he took that the widow of the deceased was In possession and that Bibee Kulsum, her sons and her servants and the persons to whom she had transferred shares in some of the villages were trying to assert their rights and to get possession by force. 5. It has been suggested that, if these proceedings under sec. 107 are allowed to proceed against the Petitioners, Bibee Kulsum will be prejudiced in the proceedings she has instituted for registration of her name under the Land Registration Act. We have however nothing to do with this question and we think that possibly the fact that under that section the applicant has to prove possession may be a reason for the action taken by Bibee Kulsum which the Magistrate has considered rendered it necessary for him to take proceedings under sec. 107, Cr. P. C. We think that the cause shown against the rule is sufficient and that this is not a case, as it is at present presented before us, of two persons peacefully seeking to assert their rights, but it is a case where one party is in possession and the other is seeking to obtain possession not through the Civil Courts but by means which in the opinion of the Magistrate were likely to create a breach of the peace. We are not, therefore, prepared to make the first rule absolute, and we direct that the rule be discharged. At the same time as it appears that orders have been passed by the Magistrate, which are at present in abeyance, appointing some of the Petitioners special constables and as in consequence of that order the Petitioners may have a reasonable apprehension that they will not have a fair and impartial trial before the Deputy Magistrate, we direct that the proceedings under sec. 107 be transferred from the file of the Deputy Magistrate, Babu Shama Churn Mitra, to the file of the District Magistrate of Monghyr. 6. As regards the second matter in respect of which a rule was issued the learned Counsel who appears to show cause admits that the condition which the Magistrate imposed on the two Petitioners, Abdul Hamid and Mullik Damri, when releasing them on ball, is not a condition which he had any authority to impose under sec. 114, Cr. P. C, or which could be enforced. It Is true in the explanation the Magistrate stated that the two persons through their pleaders voluntarily offered to give the undertaking which was contained in the condition; but as the condition is one which cannot be Imposed under sec. 112, Cr. P. C, and cannot be enforced we set that condition aside, and direct that that condition be struck out of the ball-bond. Another rule was issued on the District Magistrate to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate, dated the 17th January 1906, making absolute the order passed by him on the 15th December 1905, under sec. 144, Cr. P. C. should not be set aside on the ground that having regard to the terms of the order It was not such as the Deputy Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass under sec. 142 of the Code. The order was In the following terms:-" I direct that notice under sec. 144, Cr. P. C, be issued to the 2nd party directing them not to commit any act that may likely Induce a breach of the peace and not to attempt to take forcible possession of the village ( s.e Chawara) which is not actually in their possession." The order was issued on the 15th December and under the provisions of the section it will cease to have effect to-day. It is therefore unnecessary for us to set aside that order as the order will cease to have any effect before any order of this Court can be communicated to the lower Court, At the same time we desire to point out to the Magistrate that the order was bad in law as being indefinite and not in accordance with the terms of the section. As, however, the order ceases to have effect to-day, we discharge the rule.