JUDGMENT Rampini, J. - The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the Nawab of Murshldabad to enforce an agreement entered into with him by one Mohant Tulsi Das, the predecessor as shebait of an idol of the present Defendant. The Nawab had obtained decrees for rent against Mohant Tulsl Das. In execution of these decrees he attached certain properties to which Mohant Tulsi Das successfully laid claim as representative of the idol. The Nawab then apparently contemplated the Institution of a suit to establish the title of his debtor, i.e., Mohant Tulsi Das in his personal capacity, to the property; but Tulsi DABS entered into an agreement with the Nawab settling their differences. Mohant Tulsi Das admitted his liability to the extent of Rs. 27,000 paid Rs. 16,000 in cash, and assigned to the Nawab the sum of Rs. 10,000 due to him (Tulsi Das), as rent from the raiyats of the property. As shebait of the idol he guaranteed that if the raiyats did not pay, the balance would be realizable from the debutter property of the Idol. The raiyats paid only Rs. 3,564, so the Nawab sued for the balance. During the pendency of the suit, Tulsi DAS died. His successor as Mohant, Bhagwan DAS, was entered on the record as his representative. This substituted Defendant contested his liability on the ground that his predecessor was not justified in binding the debutter property. The Subordinate Judge has given effect to this plea of the substituted Defendant and has dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff appeals. On his behalf it is urged that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge on this point is wrong. 2. I think that in the circumstances the Mohant Tulsi Das acted as a prudent manager of the idol's property In entering into the agreement he did. The Plaintiff contemplated a suit to establish his debtor's title to the property. The idol had already been Involved in litigation, and though successful had incurred costs. If the Nawab were successful in the contemplated suit, the idol might lose Rs. 27.000 or property of that value. If successful, he would at least incur expenses for litigation and considerable harassment. The Mohant Tulsi Das was therefore justified in entering into an agreement on behalf of the idol under which a sum of Rs. 16,000 was paid by him in cash personally, Rs. 27.000 or property of that value. If successful, he would at least incur expenses for litigation and considerable harassment. The Mohant Tulsi Das was therefore justified in entering into an agreement on behalf of the idol under which a sum of Rs. 16,000 was paid by him in cash personally, Rs. 10,000 was to be paid by third persons and by which as the shebait of the idol he only stood security for this latter sum, a liability which might never be incurred, which at the worst would only amount to Rs. 10,000 and by which the idol at least was released from the danger of losing property to the extent of Rs. 27,000 and of incurring the expense and harassment of litigation. 3. I, therefore, consider that the appeal should be decreed and the suit remanded to the lower Court for disposal on the merits, It 1B accordingly directed that this be done, costs to abide the result. Mookerjee, J. 4. The circumstances which led to the litigation out of which the present appeal arises, are not disputed before this Court. On the 2nd October 1893, one Mohant Gopal Dap, shebait of an idol Raghu Nath Jiu Thakur, took an ijara lease of Mehal Ghoradah from the Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad. Gopal Das died on the 8th March 1895, and was succeeded as shehait by Tulsi Das who took possession of the ijara mehal. In 1897 the Nawab sued Tulsi Das for arrears of rent due under the lease and sought, to obtain a decree binding the debutter estate. Tulsi Das pleaded successfully that the leasehold property was not part of the debutter estate, but was held by the Muhant in his private capacity, and consequently the Nawab obtained only a personal decree against Tulsi Das. In 1900 and 1901, two other suits for rent wore brought by the Nawab against Tulai Das for rent of successive periods and decrees were obtained against him. In 1902, the Nawab took out execution of the decrees held by him and attached two properties named Mollarpur and Jungle Mehal. Tulsi Das preferred a claim on the ground that the properties attached were in his possession in trust for the idol Raghunath Jiu Thakur and that it was not competent to the decree holder to proceed against them in execution of the personal decrees obtained against the Mohant. Tulsi Das preferred a claim on the ground that the properties attached were in his possession in trust for the idol Raghunath Jiu Thakur and that it was not competent to the decree holder to proceed against them in execution of the personal decrees obtained against the Mohant. On the 25th February 1902, the claim was allowed. On the same date, Tulsi Das entered into a compromise with the Nawab by which the dispute between them was settled, and an agreement was drawn up and executed. Under this agreement, Tulsi Das undertook to surrender the lease and to pay Rs. 27,000 to the Nawab in settlement of all his claims. Out of this sum Rs. 16,000 was paid in cash, and for the balance, Tulsi Das executed a conveyance in favour of the Nawab in respect of all arrears of rent due from the tenants of the lease-hold property. Tulsi Das further undertook that if the back rents so transferred were found insufficient to satisfy the debt of Rs. 11,000, the Nawab would be at liberty to proceed against the debutter estate for the recovery of the deficiency. On the 24th February 1904, the Nawab commenced the present action upon the allegation that the back rents had fallen short by about Rs. 7,500. The Plaintiff, therefore, sought to recover this amount together with Interest from the Defendant personally as also from the debutter estate. Tulsi Das resisted the claim upon various grounds, amongst which. It is sufficient for our present purposes to mention only one, namely, that the debutter estate has not been in any way benefited by the compromise which could not, therefore, be enforced against the properties of the idol. Shortly after Tulsi Das died, and was succeeded as shebait by Mohant Bhagwan Das who was made a parly and filed a fresh written statement in which the objections taken by Tulsi Das were repeated, and a number of fresh objections put forward. When the case came on for trial, no oral evidence was adduced by either party, but the facts set forth above, as also the allegations contained in the agreement of the 25th February 1902 were accepted as correct. When the case came on for trial, no oral evidence was adduced by either party, but the facts set forth above, as also the allegations contained in the agreement of the 25th February 1902 were accepted as correct. Upon this footing the Court proceeded to try the preliminary issue, whether the debutter property can be made liable for the debt alleged to be due to the Plaintiff; and whether he has any cause of action against Mohant Bhagwan Das as shebait of Raghunath Jiu Thakur. This question was answered against the Plaintiff, and the suit was dismissed with costs. The Plaintiff has now appealed to this Court, and, on his behalf, the decision of the Court below has been assailed on the ground that the compromise of 1902 is operative against the debutter estate. 5. To determine the question raised before us, it Is necessary to consider the situation as It stood at the time, when the compromise was executed. There had been prolonged litigation between the Nawab on the one hand and Tulsi Das on the other in which the latter had, on three occasions, successfully resisted the attempt of the former to obtain decree for rent binding upon the debutter estate. This had been followed up by execution proceedings in which the Nawab sought to proceed against properties which, he alleged, were the personal properties of the Mohant, but which, according to the latter, formed part of the estate dedicated to the idol. This led to claim oases which terminated in favour of the shebait acting on behalf of the idol. Under these circumstances, the obvious course open to the Nawab would have been a suit for declaration that the properties attached by him were the personal properties of his judgment-debtor. A litigation for this purpose once commenced was likely to be protracted over a number of years, and might have to be fought out by the shebait, not only before the Subordinate Judge, but also before this Court, and not improbably before the Judicial Committee. If the litigation terminated against the idol, a liability for a very large sum of money would be thrown on the debutter estate, and the properties attached, one of which had been purchased in 1872, for over Rs. 70,000 might be lost. If the litigation terminated against the idol, a liability for a very large sum of money would be thrown on the debutter estate, and the properties attached, one of which had been purchased in 1872, for over Rs. 70,000 might be lost. On the other hand, even if the litigation terminated In favour of the idol, the debutter estate would be involved In considerable expense which, as is well known, is never completely recouped by the costs allowed to the successful litigant. The effect of the compromise was to avoid this uncertainty and to appreciably reduce the danger to the debutter estate to a minimum. Under the compromise, the amount due to the Nawab, and for which he bad taken out execution was reduced by Rs. 16,000. The balance was made recoverable In the first instance out of the back rents due from the tenants of the personal estate of the Mohant, if after this, a balance still remained due, the creditor would be entitled to proceed either against the Mohant personally or against the debutter property. Under these circumstances, can it be rightly contended that the liability which Imposed upon the debutter estate was one which was not for its benefit and was not binding upon it? It cannot be disputed that a shebait has no proprietary Interest in endowed property, and It cannot be sold in execution of a decree against him personally [Ram Krishna v. Padma Charan 6 C.W.N. 663 (1902)], but although It is not competent to a shebait to alienate endowed property by way of mortgage or sale for satisfaction of his debt, yet he is authorized to deal with the endowed properly for its benefit and preservation, and especially for the purpose of defending it from hostile litigious attacks. The power of the shebait in this respect has sometimes been compared to that of a Hindu widow in possession of her husband's estate [Jaggessur v. Roodro Narain 12 W.R. 299 at p. 301 (1869)] and at others, it has been regarded as analogous to that of the manager of the property of an Infant [Prosunno Kumari v. Golab Chand L.R. 2 IndAp 145 at p. 151 (1875), Doorga Nath v. Ram Chunder L.R 4 IndAp 52 at p. 63 (1876), She Shankar v. Ram Shewak ILR 24 Cal. 77 at p. 82 (1896) and Parsatam v. Dat Gir ILR 25 All. 77 at p. 82 (1896) and Parsatam v. Dat Gir ILR 25 All. 296 at pp, 304, 311 (1903)]. The test, therefore, to be applied is, was the transaction one for the benefit of the estate? Was the liability Imposed, such as a prudent owner would undertake, for the ultimate protection of the estate? [Huncoman Persaud v. Babooee Munraj 6 M.I.A. 393 at p. 423 (1856) If A. in execution of a decree against B. attaches the property of C. as the properly of his judgment-debtor, C. may not always find it profitable to take the chances of litigation, and it might be a prudent act on his part to settle the matter with A. If C. happens to be an Infant and D is his guardian, D. may, for the benefit of his ward, adopt precisely the same course, and if the transaction is a prudent and beneficial one, it would bind the estate of the minor. It is argued, however, on behalf of the Respondents-and It must be admitted that the argument has considerable force and show of reason- that other consideration? ought to prevail, when B. and D. happen to be the same person. I am unable to hold that a different principle would be applicable to such a case. The only difference will be that the Court will scrutinize the bond fides of the transaction with caution and not without suspicion, because there is a possibility of B. throwing upon the estate of C. a burden which ought to be lawfully borne by B. himself. No doubt, there is in such a case a possible conflict of interest between B. and C. but if the conduct of B. is perfectly fair, and the arrangement made by him is for the ultimate benefit of C, there is no reason why it should not be upheld. No doubt, there is in such a case a possible conflict of interest between B. and C. but if the conduct of B. is perfectly fair, and the arrangement made by him is for the ultimate benefit of C, there is no reason why it should not be upheld. It is suggested, however, that in the present case, the liability which has been Imposed upon the endowment by the late shebait, is in one sense due to the conduct of the Plaintiff himself, and he is, therefore, precluded from relying upon it in view of the principle laid down in Honooman Persaud v. Babooee Munraj 6 M.I.A. 393 (1856), namely, that If the danger to the estate arises or has arisen from any misconduct to which the creditor is or has been a party, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong to support a charge in his own favour against the estate, grounded on a necessity which his wrong has helped to cause. The answer, however, to this contention is that the creditor in this case did not act mala fide, he Bought to recover his dues by execution against property which he believed in good faith to be the property of his judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor was admittedly in possession, but he attributed that possession to his character as a trustee of an endowment. There was, therefore, a substantial question in dispute between the parties and the conduct of the shebait and the tenacity with which he resisted the claim of the Plaintiff through the various stages of the antecedent litigation, prove conclusively that he acted in good faith, and did not by the compromise dishonestly throw upon the endowment a burden which ought to have been borne by himself. 1 must hold, accordingly, that in the matter of the compromise, the shebait acted honestly and with due caution, what he did was not only not improvident management, but was distinctly beneficial to the endowment. It follows, therefore, that the terms of the agreement are binding upon the debutter estate in the hands of the successors of the original shebait. For these reasons I agree with my learned brother that this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge reversed and the case remitted to him for trial on the merits.