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1906 DIGILAW 257 (CAL)

Hridoy Kant Bhattacharjee v. Behari Lal Mookerjee

1906-12-19

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JUDGMENT Caspersz, J. - This is an appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs rejecting an application for execution of a rent decree, preferred by the Appellant Hridoy Kant Bhattacharjee. The decree in question bears date the 21st June 1904. It was in favour of Kasi Nath Maitra, the Receiver appointed by the Court in a certain partition suit between the sons and widow, Tripura Sundari Debi of the late Babu Mohini Mohun Roy. In the place of the said Receiver, the name of Tripura Sundari Debi was brought on the record and, again, in the place of that lady, on her death, the name of the present Appellant, Hridoy Kant Bhattacharjee, was duly substituted-he being the executor under her Will whereof probate was taken in the Court of the District Judge of Alipore on the 19th of December 1905. The Appellant, as executor, therefore, represents the estate, whatever it might consist of, of Tripura Sundari Debi. It is conceded that the property in respect of which the arrears of rent were decreed by the decree sought to be executed, was assigned to Tripura Sundari as part of her one-fifth share under the final partition decree, dated the 10th November 1904, and that the said decree also was allotted to her share. The learned Subordinate Judge held that this rent decree was part of the corpus of the property allotted to Tripura Sundari and that she being merely a life-tenant, and unable to dispose of that life-interest by her Will, her executor was not entitled to execute the decree. 2. In appeal, it has been contended before us that the decree did not form part of the corpus of the estate inasmuch as Tripura Sundari became entitled to her share from before the date of institution of the partition suit (14th January 1901), or, at any rate, when the preliminary decree was made on the 19th January 1904. The principal contesting Respondent is the reversioner Khitish Chandra Acharjee Chowdhury who now represents the estate of Dakshina Mohun Roy, the eldest son of the late Mohini Mohun Roy, and the judgment-debtors likewise support that Respondent. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised that no appeal lies against the order refusing execution of the decree in question, and it has been urged that orders under sec. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised that no appeal lies against the order refusing execution of the decree in question, and it has been urged that orders under sec. 232, C.P.C., are not subject to appeal, they being not mentioned in sec. 588. But we are of opinion that it is open to the executor transferee whose name has been placed on the record to challenge the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge under sec. 244 of the Code, the question arising being a question between the legal representative of Tripura Sundari and the judgment-debtors, and we express these views irrespective of the question whether the equities arising between the parties, if any, may not be gone into in a regular suit. 4. Turning then to the contentions on the merits of the case, we observe that the rent-decree, dated the 21st June 1904, was in respect of a property called Taramaria, the nett arrears from which amounted to Rs. 9,900 as given in the statement of money compensation (pp. 60-61 of the paper-book). Tripura Sundari, to whom this property, amongst others, was allotted by the partition, had to pay to the other co-sharers by way of equalizing the allotments of the respective shares-a sum of Rs. 12,235, or, rather, a resultant sum of Rs. 15,424 as given in the final partition decree, dated the 10th November 1904. In that decree, it is provided as follows: It is further ordered that the arrears of rent, etc., of each mehal, would go along with that mehal, that is, the arrears of rent, etc., and the decrees and kistibandis and other documents, etc., relating to the mehals in question would pass to the party to whose share such mehals are allotted and each of the co-sharers would have to make up and adjust accounts for all the rents, etc., that may be collected up to the date of delivery of possession." Now, Tripura Sundari took possession of her share on the 16th January 1905, and, on the 23rd March 1905, she petitioned the Court that orders might be passed for adjustment of the amount of money compensation payable by her having regard to the realizations made by the Receiver before the said date of taking possession. The Receiver, thereupon, presented an account showing realizations up to Chaitra 1311 amounting to Rs. 42,600 odd and an expenditure of Rs. The Receiver, thereupon, presented an account showing realizations up to Chaitra 1311 amounting to Rs. 42,600 odd and an expenditure of Rs. 23,651 odd, leaving a balance of Rs. 18,948-8-6 in favour of Tripura Sundari; and the Court, by its order, dated the 17th June 1905, directed that the sum of Rs. 15,424-0-8 due from Tripura Sundari be deducted from the said amount of Rs. 18,968-8-6, and this was accordingly done. We gather that, in the sum of Rs. 42,600 odd, the Receiver included realizations of Rs. 2,000 and 1,000 in respect of Dihi Taramaria (the property to which the rent-decree sought to be executed had reference); and it is evident from the application for execution put in by Hridoy Kant Bhattacherjee that these two sums were shown in his accounts as credited to the same judgment-debtors. We have, however, been unable to discover to what exact period those realizations related, or, in other words, whether they may be properly deemed to be accumulations of rents accruing as due to the widow Tripura Sundari and to which she would have been entitled if she had been let into possession at the earliest possible date. If this be not so, it is impossible to say with any degree of confidence that Tripura Sundari paid her co-shares their respective sums of money compensation out of any amount over which she had absolute control. 5. But however that may be, it seems to be quite clear that Tripura Sundari became entitled to this decree as part of the share allotted to her under the partition; it was but a part of the corpus of the property that she received. If this be so, the question, and the only question for our consideration, is whether she could bequeath this decree by any Will, so that it might pass to her legal representative. 6. Under the Hindu Law, according to the Bengal School, when, upon partition, a share is given to the mother, she gets it simply in lieu of, or, as provision for, her maintenance, and not because she is a coparcener in the estate, and the said share reverts, upon her death, to her sons, out of whose portion it was taken [see Kedar Nath Coondoo v. Uemangini Dassi ILR 13 Cal. 336, 340 (1886), Sorolah Dossee v. Bhooban Mohun Neogi ILR 15 Cal. 336, 340 (1886), Sorolah Dossee v. Bhooban Mohun Neogi ILR 15 Cal. 292 (1888) and Hemangini Dasi v. Kedar Nath Kundu ILR 16 Cal. 758 (1889)]. If that be the correct view, it follows that, upon the death of Tripura Sundari, the right in the decree in question would not pass to her heirs and assigns, but would revert to her sons or their heirs. The executor, therefore, under the Will of Tripura, could not claim to execute the decree. In the result, we agree with the Subordinate Judge, and we, accordingly, dismiss the appeal with costs. We assess the hearing fee at Rs. 200.