JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— It is admitted that the application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council is time-barred unless either section 5 or section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act is applicable to such applications. Article 177 of the second schedule to the Act limits a period of six months from the date of the decree for the admission of such an appeal. The application for leave to appeal was not made within this period but the applicant relies upon the sections of the Act to which we have referred as justifying the admission of the appeal. Section 5 (paragraph 2) provides that any appeal or application for a review of judgment may be admitted, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal or making the application within such period. By section 12 in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, or order appealed against is to be excluded. We shall assume that the applicant had sufficient cause for not presenting his application within the period prescribed by article 177 or that the application was made within time, if section 12 of the Act be applicable. In our opinion neither of these sections applies to an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. An application for leave to appeal clearly does not come within the first portion of section 5 as that portion of the section provides only for cases where the Court is closed when the period of limitation expires. The second portion of the section deals with “any appeal or application for a review of judgment.” It is contended that the application for leave to appeal is an appeal within the meaning of this section. It is significant that the first portion of this section deals with the case of any appeal or application, while the second portion of the section only deals, with any appeal or application for a review of judgment, not with any application. If it were intended that applications generally were to come within the meaning of the latter portion of the section, we should expect to find the words “appeal or application” as used in the first portion of the section. 2. If it were intended that applications generally were to come within the meaning of the latter portion of the section, we should expect to find the words “appeal or application” as used in the first portion of the section. 2. Again the language of section 12 is similar. In the first portion of the section the words used are “in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, “appeal or application” while in the second portion there is a marked change of language, the words used being “in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal and an application for leave to appeal as a pauper and an application for a review of judgment.” This change of language in both sections seems to indicate that the latter portions of the sections were not intended to apply to all applications. It is further noticeable that appeals are dealt with in the second of the three divisions into which the second schedule to the Limitation Act is divided, whilst applications, including an application for the admission of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, are included in the third division. 3. The question is governed by authority. In the case of Jawahir Lal v. Narain Das, [1878] I.L.R., 1 All, 644, ROBERT STUART, C.J., held that in computing the period of limitation prescribed by article 177, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree was founded cannot be excluded under the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act. SPANKIE, J., dissented from this judgment, but so far as we are aware, the ruling of the Chief Justice has been followed up to the present time. In the matter of the petition of Sitaram Kesho, [1892] I.L.R., 15 All., 14., Sir JOHN EDGE, C.J., and TYRRELL, J., held that the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 did not extend to applications for leave to appeal to Her late Majesty in Council. Likewise in the case of Muroba Ramcharider v. Ghanasham Nil Kant Nad Kormi, [1895] I.L.R., 19 Bom., 301., it was held that an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was not an appeal, and that in computing the period of limitation the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree cannot be excluded. Likewise in the case of Muroba Ramcharider v. Ghanasham Nil Kant Nad Kormi, [1895] I.L.R., 19 Bom., 301., it was held that an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was not an appeal, and that in computing the period of limitation the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree cannot be excluded. The decision in the case of Anderson v. Piria Sami, [1891] I.L.R., 15 Mad., 169., is to the same effect. We see no reason for dissenting from the views expressed in the cases which we have cited and hold that the application is time-barred. It is rejected with costs.